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F O R E WO R D
Islamic finance is a rapidly growing part of the financial sector in the
world. Indeed, it is not restricted to Islamic countries and is spreading
wherever there is a sizable Muslim community. More recently, it has
caught the attention of conventional financial markets as well. According
to some estimates, more than 250 financial institutions in over 45 countries
practice some form of Islamic finance, and the industry has been growing
at a rate of more than 15 percent annually for the past five years. The
market’s current annual turnover is estimated to be $350 billion, com-
pared with a mere $5 billion in 1985.
An institutional infrastructure to support development of the Islamic
financial sector has been evolving since 1975, with the establishment of the
Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) as a regional development institution
to promote economic development in Muslim countries and the Islamic
Financial Services Board (IFSB) in 2002, with a mandate to promote
regulatory standards, corporate governance, and capital markets. In addi-
tion, other bodies such as AAOIFI have made significant contributions to
developing accounting standards for Islamic financial institutions.
Major, globally-active financial services firms with foundations in
conventional finance now offer Shariah compatible financial services
through a dedicated subsidiary or through Islamic “windows.”
Islamic finance is not new to the World Bank Group. It has been
involved in diverse activities including financial transactions, research,
publications, and presentations regarding the regulation of risk in
Islamic financial institutions. Both IFC and IBRD have met a portion of
their financing requirements via Sukuk issues.
This publication expands on the work of previous researchers who
have already explained the fundamental principles and functions of an
Foreword
xiv
economic, banking, and financial system operating under Shariah.
With its focus on corporate governance and risk analysis, the present
volume complements earlier publications in this area by World Bank
Treasury colleagues.
We trust that the ideas proposed will contribute to the debate on the
application of risk analysis for Islamic banks themselves and for their
regulators and supervisors.
Kenneth G. Lay, CFA
Vice President and Treasurer 
The World Bank
F O R E WO R D
Globally, there has been significant interest and explosion in literature on
risk analysis and management in the past decade or so. This has emerged
largely because of a combination of developments. First, there has been
greater reflection on risk mitigation and management in the wake of fre-
quent episodes of financial crises. Second, financial diversification and
product innovation have brought new dimensions and types of risks to
the forefront. Third, the endeavours of the financial community to
develop and innovate financial architecture, which, among other things,
have resulted in agreements on Basel II that have evolved after a rich
debate and understanding of how to measure, monitor, and cushion for
different types of risks facing financial institutions and markets.
However, all these developments have thus far revolved around the
conventional finance system, benefiting incrementally from the financial
engineering and innovation of esoteric products and structures. While
Islamic finance has grown substantively in the last few years, appreciation
of its risk architecture and profile is still evolving. Risk Analysis for Islamic
Banks not only aims to fill the gap in knowledge, but it also enriches the
debate on risk management. While offering perspective on the size and
dimensions of Islamic finance, this book’s value lies in its success in bring-
ing to the forefront some new presentations and a perspective that offers
new insights into the risk structure and dimensions of Islamic finance.
The book recognizes up front that Islamic finance, governed by
Shariah principles, offers its own unique approach to risk sharing and
management. To illustrate this, it brings out effectively and simply the
dynamics of specific risks inherent in Islamic banks and products by ana-
lyzing each of the products and their risks. It also examines a typical
structure of financial statement for Islamic banks in order to get some
xv
aggregate perspective on risk at the institutional level. This helps in
understanding the underpinnings of the theoretical framework of risk on
both the asset and liability sides of the Islamic financial institution. The
risk profile of assets depends on the structure of Islamic financial instru-
ments and contracts and their functionality and maturity profile. In
addition, on the liability side, equity risks are recognized to differ for
depositors and investment account holders. It is therefore inevitable that
there will be important differences in the size and types of risks in Islamic
banks versus conventional banks, depending on the nature of transac-
tions, products, and partnership arrangements that carry profit and the
risk-sharing elements relative to credit risk that are more relevant in loan
products. Credit risk for Islamic products is specialized. Islamic banks
also face additional externalities on account of counterparty risks. Finally,
Islamic banks tend to be more concentrated in trade and commodity
financing, which tend to be less risky and of shorter maturity.
This book illustrates well through balance sheet analysis what Islamic
banks need to watch out for in the changing dynamics in business and
commodity markets, given the important differentiation in their asset
and liability book relative to conventional banks. The book makes the
important observation that—while in theory Islamic banking should be
exposed to less risk given that Islamic finance offers a “pass through” of
risk to investors and depositors—in practice this is not being pursued.
The book further makes a potent argument that while Islamic
finance offers its own ideological framework and ethical standards, as well
as some new perspectives on risk framework, Islamic banks are eventu-
ally prone to some of the same risks as conventional banks. As such, it is
critical that it be reinforced that Islamic institutions need to adapt simi-
lar frameworks and principles for analyzing their risks and exposures and
for effectively managing fiduciary responsibility interlinked with issues
of conflict of interest and asymmetric information, and so on.
In line with this, the book articulates well the internationally well-
accepted risk management and corporate governance framework in a sim-
ple and lucid manner. Consistent with the best practices of the corporate
governance framework, the book elaborates well that Islamic banks need
to conform to the well-accepted and time-tested principles of corporate
governance, while recognizing that Shariah offers a stakeholder-oriented
model of corporate governance implicit in Islamic property and contract
provisions.Also, the model of governance is affected by the role of investors
as depositors, in addition to the oversight of Islamic banks by Shariah Advi-
sory Boards considered to be critical for ensuring credibility and sanctity.
The authors argue well the fiduciary responsibility of the shareholders and
xvi
Foreword
squarely place the ultimate responsibility for oversight of the banks on
boards of directors and the responsibility for operations on management.
The significance of audit committees and the role of auditors in the assess-
ment of risk management and implementation is well placed. Other stake-
holders, such as Multilateral Development Banks and newly created
standard setters for Islamic banking industry and accounting, also share the
responsibility for encouraging proper risk management practices in this
emerging area of finance.
Drawing from the specific features of Islamic finance and its inher-
ent features of risk sharing, the book argues that materiality of financing
transactions under Islamic banking—which may alter the risk profile of
the balance sheet—would also involve changes in capital requirements.
On one hand, the materiality of investments changes risks. On the other
hand, quasi-liability products such as investment account holders and
other forms of risk sharing deposits, may reduce the need for a safety
cushion. Islamic banks, while maintaining capital, have booked the share-
holders’ portion of the profit equalization reserve, while it excludes
hybrid or subordinated interest-based debt products. It is these matters
that have driven Islamic Financial Services Board to set some standards
and norms for how to assess the risk associated and assign proper risk
weights for the specific transaction and features of Islamic banking.
With its particular focus on Islamic banks, representing an impor-
tant mode of Islamic financial intermediation, this book makes a timely
and valuable contribution to the above objective. The value of this book
lies in its comprehensiveness. It balances well Islamic financing strengths
with the need to recognize the value of conventional approaches and
systems that have a proven track record of corporate governance, which
is central to risk management. The authors have aptly emphasized the
macro and micro aspects of risk management and moved beyond the dis-
cussion on the overall risk management framework to deal with the insti-
tutional challenges of asset-liability management and the measurement
of different risk types. The importance of a high level of transparency and
improvement in governance has also been accentuated.
Finally, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks is an important contribution
to the existing literature on risk management of Islamic banks and will
be useful for all stakeholders, including practitioners and academics.
Dr. Shamshad Akhtar
Governor, The State Bank of Pakistan
Former Director-General, Asian Development Bank
Foreword
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Principles and Key 
Stakeholders
P A R T
Islamic finance is a rapidly growing part of the financial sector in theworld. Indeed, it is not restricted to Islamic countries and is spreading
wherever there is a sizable Muslim community. More recently, it has caught
the attention of conventional financial markets as well. According to
some estimates, more than 250 financial institutions in over 45 countries
practice some form of Islamic finance, and the industry has been growing
at a rate of more than 15 percent annually for the past five years. The mar-
ket’s current annual turnover is estimated to be $350 billion, compared
with a mere $5 billion in 1985.1 Since the emergence of Islamic banks in
the early 1970s, considerable research has been conducted, focusing mainly
on the viability, design, and operation of “deposit-accepting” financial
institutions, which function primarily on the basis of profit- and loss-
sharing partnerships rather than the payment or receipt of interest, a
prohibited element in Islam.
Whereas the emergence of Islamic banks in global markets is a signifi-
cant development, it is dwarfed by the enormous changes taking place in
the conventional banking industry. Rapid innovations in financial markets
and the internationalization of financial flows have changed the face of
conventional banking almost beyond recognition. Technological progress
and deregulation have provided new opportunities, increasing competitive
pressures among banks and non-banks alike. The growth in international
financial markets and the proliferation of diverse financial instruments have
provided large banks with wider access to funds. In the late 1980s, margins
attained from the traditional business of banking diminished. Banks have
Principles and Development
of Islamic Finance
2
1
Principles and Development of Islamic Finance
3
Key Messages
• Institutions offering financial instruments and services compatible with the principles of Islam are
emerging rapidly in domestic and international financial markets.
• The basic framework for an Islamic financial system is a set of rules and laws, collectively referred
to as Shariah, governing economic, social, political, and cultural aspects of Islamic societies. 
• Prohibition of riba —a term literally meaning “an excess” and interpreted as “any unjustifiable
increase of capital whether in loans or sales”—is the central tenet of the system. Such prohibi-
tion is applicable to all forms of “interest” and therefore eliminates “debt” from the economy.
• Efforts to develop financial intermediation without interest started in the 1960s. Several Islamic
banks were established in the 1970s, and their number has been growing since then.
• The last decade has witnessed rapid developments in the areas of financial innovation, risk man-
agement, regulation, and supervision.
responded to these new challenges with vigor and imagination by forging
ahead into new arenas. At the same time, markets have expanded, and
opportunities to design new products and provide more services have
arisen. While these changes have occurred more quickly in some coun-
tries than in others, banks everywhere are developing new instruments,
products, services, and techniques. Traditional banking practice—based
on the receipt of deposits and the granting of loans—is only one part of
a typical bank’s business today and often the least profitable.
New information-based activities, such as trading in financial markets
and generating income through fees, are now a major source of a bank’s
profitability. Financial innovation has also led to the increased market
orientation and marketability of bank assets, which entail the use of assets
such as mortgages, automobile loans, and export credits as backing for
marketable securities, a process known as securitization. A prime moti-
vation for innovation has been the introduction of prudential capital
requirements, which has led to a variety of new financial instruments.
Some instruments are technically very complicated and poorly understood
except by market experts, while many others pose complex problems for
the measurement, management, and control of risk. Moreover, profits
associated with some of these instruments are high and, like the financial
markets from which they are derived, are highly volatile and expose banks
to new or higher degrees of risk.
These developments have increased the need for and complicated
the function of risk measurement, management, and mitigation (control
assessment). The quality of corporate governance of banks has become a
hot topic, and the approach to regulation and supervision has changed
dramatically. Within an individual bank, the new banking environment
and increased market volatility have necessitated an integrated approach
to asset-liability and risk management.
Rapid developments in conventional banking have also influenced
the reshaping of Islamic banks and financial institutions. There is a grow-
ing realization among Islamic financial institutions that sustainable
growth requires the development of a comprehensive risk management
framework geared to their particular situation and requirements. At the
same time, policy makers and regulators are taking serious steps to design
an efficient corporate governance structure as well as a sound regulatory
and supervisory framework to support development of a financial system
conducive to Islamic principles.
This publication provides a comprehensive overview of topics related
to the assessment, analysis, and management of various types of risks in the
field of Islamic banking. It is an attempt to provide a high-level framework
(aimed at non-specialist executives) attuned to the current realities of
changing economies and Islamic financial markets. This approach empha-
sizes the accountability of key players in the corporate governance process
in relation to the management of Islamic financial risk.
PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
The Islamic financial system is not limited to banking; it also covers
capital formation, capital markets, and all types of financial intermedi-
ation and risk transfer. The term “Islamic financial system” is relatively
new, appearing only in the mid-1980s. In fact, earlier references to com-
mercial or mercantile activities conforming to Islamic principles were
made under the umbrella of either “interest-free” or “Islamic” banking.
However, interpreting the Islamic financial system simply as free of interest
does not capture a true picture of the system as a whole. Undoubtedly,
prohibiting the receipt and payment of interest is the nucleus of the
system, but it is supported by other principles of Islamic doctrine advo-
cating social justice, risk sharing, the rights and duties of individuals and
society, property rights, and the sanctity of contracts.
An Islamic economic system is a rule-based system formulated by
Islamic law, known as Shariah. The Shariah consists of constitutive and
regulative rules according to which individual Muslims, and their collec-
tivity, must conduct their affairs. The basic source of the law, in Islam, is
the Qur’an, whose centrality in Islam and influence on the life of Muslims
Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks
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cannot be overemphasized. Its chapters constitute the tissues out of which
the life of a Muslim is tailored, and its verses are the threads from which
the essence of his or her soul is woven. It includes all the necessary con-
stitutive rules of the law as “guidance for mankind.” However, it contains
many universal statements that need further explanation before they can
become specific guides for human action. Hence, after the Qur’an, the
Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and actions are the most important sources
of the law and a fountainhead of Islamic life and thought.
The philosophical foundation of an Islamic financial system goes
beyond the interaction of factors of production and economic behavior.
Whereas the conventional financial system focuses primarily on the eco-
nomic and financial aspects of transactions, the Islamic system places
equal emphasis on the ethical, moral, social, and religious dimensions,
which seek to enhance equality and fairness for the good of society as a
whole. The system can be fully appreciated only in the context of Islam’s
teachings on the work ethic, distribution of wealth, social and economic
justice, and role of the state. The Islamic financial system is founded on
the absolute prohibition of the payment or receipt of any predetermined,
guaranteed rate of return. This closes the door to the concept of interest
and precludes the use of debt-based instruments.
Given an understanding of the role of institutions, rules, the law, and
ideology of Islam, one can make the following propositions regarding the
economic system:2
 The foremost priority of Islam and its teaching on economics is justice
and equity. The notion of justice and equity, from production to distri-
bution, is deeply embedded in the system. As an aspect of justice, social
justice in Islam consists of the creation and provision of equal opportu-
nities and the removal of obstacles equally for every member of society.
Legal justice, too, can be interpreted as meaning that all members of
society have equal status before the law, equal protection of the law, and
equal opportunity under the law. The notion of economic justice, and
its attendant concept of distributive justice, is characteristic of the
Islamic economic system: rules governing permissible and forbidden
economic behavior on the part of consumers, producers, and govern-
ment, as well as questions of property rights and the production and
distribution of wealth, are all based on the Islamic concept of justice.
 The Islamic paradigm incorporates a spiritual and moral framework
that values human relations above material possessions. In this way, it
not only is concerned about material needs but also establishes a balance
between the material and spiritual fulfillment of human beings.
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 Whereas conventional thinking focuses on the individual, society, or
community and appears as a mere aggregate having no independent sig-
nificance, the Islamic system creates a balanced relationship between the
individual and society. Self-interest and private gains of the individual
are not denied, but they are regulated for betterment of the collectivity.
Maximizing an individual’s pursuit of profit in enterprise or satisfaction
in consumption is not the sole objective of society, and any wasteful con-
sumption is discouraged.
 The recognition and protection of the property rights of all members of
society are the foundation of a stakeholder-oriented society, preserving
the rights of all and reminding them of their responsibilities.
To assure justice, the Shariah provides a network of ethical and moral
rules of behavior for all participates in the market and requires that these
norms and rules be internalized and adhered to by all (see box 1.1). This
concept of market is based on the basic principle forbidding any form
of behavior leading to the creation of instantaneous property rights
without commensurate equity created by work. In this context, market
imperfection refers to the existence of any factor considered not to be
permissible by the Shariah, such as fraud, cheating, monopoly practices,
coalitions and all types of combinations among buyers and sellers,
underselling, speculative hoarding, and bidding up of prices without the
intention to purchase. The freedom of contract and obligation to fulfill
it, consent of the parties to a transaction, full access to the market for
all buyers and sellers, honesty in transactions, and provision of full
information regarding the quantity, quality, and prices of factors and
products to buyers and sellers before the start of negotiation and bar-
gaining are prescribed.
Beginning with the notion of property as a sacred trust, as well as
prohibitions also present in other monotheistic religions, Shariah pro-
tects property from any exploitation through unjust and unfair dealings.
Prohibition of riba (interest), elimination of gharar (contractual ambi-
guity), and restrictions on other forms of exploitation are some of the
implications of this core principle. (See appendix A for a glossary of Islamic
terms.) The significance of contracts and the related obligations cannot
be overstated. In this context, financial transactions are no different from
any other set of contracts subject to compliance with Shariah principles.
Primarily, a financial transaction is considered valid if it meets the basic
requirements of a valid legal contract and does not contain certain
elements, such as riba, gharar, qimar (gambling), and maysur (games of
chance involving deception). While the prohibition of riba is the most
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BOX 1.1 Principles of an Islamic Financial System 
The basic framework for an Islamic financial system is a set of rules and laws, collec-
tively referred to as Shariah, governing economic, social, political, and cultural aspects of
Islamic societies. Shariah originates from the rules dictated by the Qur’an and its practices and
explanations rendered (more commonly known as Sunnah) by the Prophet Muhammad. Further
elaboration of the rules is provided by scholars in Islamic jurisprudence within the framework
of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The basic principles of an Islamic financial system can be summa-
rized as follows.
Prohibition of interest. Prohibition of riba—a term literally meaning “an excess” and
interpreted as “any unjustifiable increase of capital whether in loans or sales”—is the
central tenet of the system. More precisely, any positive, fixed, predetermined rate tied to
the maturity and the amount of principal (that is, guaranteed regardless of the performance
of the investment) is considered riba and is prohibited. The general consensus among Islamic
scholars is that riba covers not only usury but also the charging of “interest” as widely prac-
ticed. This prohibition is based on arguments of social justice, equality, and property rights.
Islamic law encourages the earning of profits but forbids the charging of interest because
profits, determined ex post, symbolize successful entrepreneurship and creation of addi-
tional wealth, whereas interest, determined ex ante, is a cost that is accrued irrespective of
the outcome of business operations and may not create wealth. Social justice demands that
borrowers and lenders share rewards as well as losses in an equitable fashion and that the
process of accumulating and distributing wealth in the economy be fair and representative
of true productivity.
Money as “potential” capital. Money is treated as “potential” capital—that is, it
becomes actual capital only when it joins hands with other resources to undertake a produc-
tive activity. Islam recognizes the time value of money, but only when it acts as capital, not
when it is “potential” capital.
Risk sharing. Because interest is prohibited, suppliers of funds become investors instead
of creditors. The provider of financial capital and the entrepreneur share business risks in
return for a share of the profits. The terms of financial transactions need to reflect a symmet-
rical risk-return distribution that each party to the transaction may face. The relationship
between the investors and the financial intermediary is based on profit- and loss-sharing prin-
ciples, and the financial intermediary shares the risks with the investors. 
Prohibition of speculative behavior. An Islamic financial system discourages hoarding
and prohibits transactions featuring extreme uncertainties, gambling, and risks.
Sanctity of contracts. Islam upholds contractual obligations and the disclosure of infor-
mation as a sacred duty. This feature is intended to reduce the risk of asymmetric information
and moral hazard.
Shariah-approved activities. Only those business activities that do not violate the rules
of Shariah qualify for investment. For example, any investment in business dealing with alco-
hol, gambling, or casinos is prohibited.
Social justice. In principle, any transaction leading to injustice and exploitation is
prohibited. A financial transaction should not lead to the exploitation of any party to the 
transaction. Exploitation entails the absence of information symmetry between parties to 
a contract.
critical and gets the most attention, one cannot dispute the criticality of
gharar and other elements. Historically, jurists or Shariah scholars did not
interfere unnecessarily in economic activities and gave economic agents
full freedom to contract as long as certain basic requirements—that is,
the prohibition of riba—were met.
Prohibition of interest is not due to any formal economic theory as
such but is directly prohibited by the divine order in the Qur’an. Verses of
the Qur’an clearly prohibit dealing with riba but do not define it precisely.
Such omission is often attributed to the fact that the concept was not vague
at the time of prohibition, so there was no need to provide a formal defini-
tion. Defining the term in any language other than Arabic adds further
complexity. For example, no single English word captures the essence of
riba. This has caused much of the confusion in explaining the concept both
to the lay person and to scholars.
Literally, the Arabic term riba refers to excess, addition, and surplus,
while the associated verb implies “to increase, to multiply, to exceed, to
exact more than was due, or to practice usury.” E. W. Lane’s Arabic-English
Lexicon presents a comprehensive meaning that covers most of the earlier
definitions of riba:3
To increase, to augment, swellings, forbidden “addition,” to make more
than what is given, the practicing or taking of usury or the like, an excess
or an addition, or an addition over and above the principal sum that is lent
or expended.
While the original basis for the prohibition of interest was divine
authority, Muslim scholars recently have emphasized the lack of a theory
to justify the use of interest. Muslim scholars have rebutted the arguments
that interest is a reward for savings—a productivity of capital—and
constitutes the difference between the value of capital goods today and
their value tomorrow. Regarding interest being a reward for savings, they
argue that interest could be justified only if it resulted in reinvestment
and subsequent growth in capital and was not a reward solely for for-
going consumption. Regarding interest as productive capital, modern
Muslim scholars argue that the interest is paid on the money and is
required regardless of whether or not capital is used productively and
thus is not justified. Finally, regarding interest as an adjustment between
the value of capital goods today and their value tomorrow, they argue
that this only explains its inevitability and not its rightness: if that is the
sole justification for interest, it seems more reasonable to allow next year’s
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economic conditions to determine the extent of the reward, as opposed
to predetermining it in the form of interest (Mirakhor 1989).
After riba, contractual ambiguity is the most important element in
financial contracts. In simple terms, gharar refers to any uncertainty cre-
ated by the lack of information or control in a contract. It can be thought
of as ignorance in regard to an essential element in a transaction, such as
the exact sale price or the ability of the seller to deliver what is sold. The
presence of ambiguity makes a contract null and void.
Gharar can be defined as a situation in which either party to a contract
has information regarding some element of the subject of the contract that
is withheld from the other party or in which neither party has control over
the subject of the contract. Classic examples include transactions involving
birds in flight, fish not yet caught, an unborn calf in its mother’s womb, or
a runaway animal.All such cases involve the sale of an item that may or may
not exist. More modern examples include transactions whose subject is not
in the possession of one of the parties and over which there is uncertainty
even about its future possession.
Keeping in mind the notion of fairness in all Islamic commercial
transactions, Shariah considers any uncertainty as to the quantity, quality,
recoverability, or existence of the subject matter of a contract as evi-
dence of gharar. However, Shariah allows jurists to determine the extent
of gharar in a transaction and, depending on the circumstances, whether
it invalidates the contract. By prohibiting gharar, Shariah prohibits many
pre-Islamic contracts of exchange, considering them subject to either
excessive uncertainty or opaqueness to one or both parties to the con-
tract. In many cases, gharar can be eliminated simply by stating the object
of sale and the price. A well-documented contract eliminates ambiguity
as well.
Considering gharar as excessive uncertainty, one can associate it
with the element of “risk.” Some argue that prohibiting gharar is one
way of managing risks in Islam, because a business transaction based on
the sharing of profit and loss encourages parties to conduct due dili-
gence before committing to a contract. Prohibition of gharar forces par-
ties to avoid contracts with a high degree of informational asymmetry
and with extreme payoffs; it also makes parties more responsible and
accountable. Treating gharar as risk may preclude the trading of deriv-
ative instruments, which is designed to transfer risks from one party to
another.
Another area where prohibition of gharar has raised concerns in con-
temporary financial transactions is the area of insurance. Some argue that
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writing an insurance (takaful) contract on the life of a person falls within
the domain of gharar and thus invalidates the contract. The issue is still
under review and not fully resolved.
DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Islamic finance was practiced predominantly in the Muslim world through-
out the Middle Ages, fostering trade and business activities with the devel-
opment of credit. Islamic merchants in Spain, the Mediterranean, and the
Baltic states became indispensable middlemen for trading activities. In fact,
many concepts, techniques, and instruments of Islamic finance were later
adopted by European financiers and businessmen.
An interest in the Islamic mode of banking emerged in several Mus-
lim countries during the postcolonial era as part of an effort to revive and
strengthen an Islamic identity. Independent but parallel attempts in Egypt
and Malaysia led to the establishment of financial institutions in the early
1960s that were designed to operate on a non-interest basis so as to com-
ply with Islamic economic principles.4 The first wave of oil revenues in the
1970s and the accumulation of petrodollars gave momentum to this idea,
and the growth of Islamic finance coincided with the current account
surpluses of oil-exporting Islamic countries. The Middle East saw a mush-
rooming of small commercial banks competing for surplus funds. At the
same time, interest grew in undertaking theoretical work and research to
understand the functioning of an economic and banking system without
the institution of “interest.” The first commercial bank was established in
1974 in the United Arab Emirates, followed by establishment of the
Islamic Development Bank in 1975.
Western analysts quickly challenged the feasibility of a financial sys-
tem operating without interest and debt. Here, we summarize their argu-
ments in six propositions:5
 Zero interest would mean infinite demand for loanable funds and zero
supply.
 Such a system would be incapable of equilibrating demand for and
supply of loanable funds.
 Zero interest would mean no savings.
 Zero savings would mean no investment and no growth.
 There could be no monetary policy since instruments for managing
liquidity could not exist without a predetermined, fixed rate of interest.
 In countries adopting such a system, there would be one-way capital
flight.
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By 1988 these arguments were countered when research, based on
modern financial and economic theory, showed the following:
 A modern financial system can be designed without the need for an
ex ante positive nominal fixed interest rate. In fact, as Western researchers
showed, no satisfactory theory could explain the need for an ex ante
positive nominal interest rate.
 The failure to assume an ex ante positive nominal fixed interest rate—
that is, no debt contract—does not necessarily mean that there has to
be zero return on capital.
 The return on capital is determined ex post, and the magnitude of the
return on capital is determined on the basis of the return to the economic
activity in which the funds are employed.
 The expected return is what determines investment.
 The expected rate of return—and income—is what determines savings.
Therefore, there is no justification for assuming that there will be no
savings or investment.
 Positive growth is possible in such a system.
 Monetary policy would function as in the conventional system, its effi-
cacy depending on the availability of instruments designed to manage
liquidity.
 Finally, in an open-economy macroeconomic model without an ex ante
fixed interest rate, but with returns to investment determined ex post,
the assumption of a one-way capital flight is not justified.
Therefore, a system that prohibits an ex ante fixed interest rate and
allows the rate of return on capital to be determined ex post, based on
returns to the economic activity in which the funds are employed, is
theoretically viable.
In the process of demonstrating the analytical viability of such a sys-
tem, research also clearly differentiated it from the conventional system.
In the conventional system, which is based on debt contracts, risks and
rewards are shared asymmetrically, with the debtor carrying the greatest
part of the risk and with governments enforcing the contract. Such a sys-
tem has a built-in incentive structure that promotes moral hazard and
asymmetric information. It also requires close monitoring, which can be
delegated to an institution acting on behalf of the collectivity of deposi-
tors and investors; hence the need for banking institutions.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was shown, mostly by Minsky
(1982), that such a system is inherently prone to instability because there
will always be maturity mismatch between liabilities (short-term deposits)
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and assets (long-term investments). Because the nominal value of liabilities
is guaranteed, while the nominal value of assets is not, when the maturity
mismatch becomes a problem, banks will attempt to manage liabilities by
offering higher interest rates to attract more deposits. There is always the
possibility that this process will not be sustainable but instead will erode
confidence and lead to a run on banks. Such a system, therefore, needs a
lender of last resort and bankruptcy procedures, restructuring processes,
and debt workout procedures to mitigate the contagion.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Lloyd Metzler of the University of
Chicago proposed an alternative system in which contracts are based on
equity rather than debt and in which the nominal value of liabilities is
not guaranteed, since this is tied to the nominal value of assets.6 Met-
zler showed that such a system does not have the instability character-
istic of the conventional banking system. In his now classic article,
Mohsin Khan showed the affinity of Metzler’s model with Islamic
finance (Khan 1987). Using Metzler’s basic model, Khan demonstrated
that this system produces a saddle point and is, therefore, more stable
than the conventional system.
By the early 1990s, it was clear that an Islamic financial system not
only is theoretically viable, but also has many desirable characteristics. The
phenomenal growth of Islamic finance during the 1990s demonstrated the
empirical and practical viability of the system (see table 1.1).
The 1980s proved to be the beginning of a period of rapid growth and
expansion of the Islamic financial services industry. This growth became
steady through the 1990s. The major developments of the 1980s include
continuation of serious research at the conceptual and theoretical level,
constitutional protection in three Muslim countries, and the involvement
of conventional bankers in offering Shariah-compliant services. The
Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan announced their intention
to make their financial systems compliant with Shariah. Other countries
such as Bahrain and Malaysia introduced Islamic banking within the
framework of the existing system. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
initiated research in understanding the macroeconomic implications of an
economic system operating without the concept of interest.Similar research
was conducted to understand the issues of profit- and loss-sharing partner-
ship contracts and the financial stability of such a system.
During the early growth of Islamic financial markets in the 1980s,
Islamic banks faced a dearth of quality investment opportunities, which
created business opportunities for the conventional Western banks to act
as intermediaries, deploying Islamic banks’ funds according to guidelines
provided by the Islamic banks.Western banks helped Islamic banks to place
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funds in commerce and trade-related activities by arranging a trader to
buy goods on behalf of the Islamic bank and resell them at a markup. Grad-
ually, Western banks recognized the importance of the emerging Islamic
financial markets and started to offer Islamic products through “Islamic
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TABLE 1.1 Development of Islamic Economics and Finance in Modern History
Time period Development
Pre-1950s • Barclays Bank opens its Cairo branch to process financial transactions
related to construction of the Suez Canal in the 1890s. Islamic scholars
challenge the operations of the bank, criticizing it for charging interest. This
criticism spreads to other Arab regions and to the Indian subcontinent,
where there is a sizable Muslim community.
• The majority of Shariah scholars declare that interest in all its forms
amounts to the prohibited element of riba. 
1950s–60s • Initial theoretical work in Islamic economics begins. By 1953, Islamic
economists offer the first description of an interest-free bank based on
either two-tier mudarabah (profit- and loss-sharing contract) or wakalah
(unrestricted investment account in which the Islamic bank earns a flat fee).
• Mitghamr Bank in Egypt and Pilgrimage Fund in Malaysia start operations.
1970s • The first Islamic commercial bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, opens in 1974.
• The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) is established in 1975.
• The accumulation of oil revenues and petrodollars increases the demand for
Shariah-compliant products.
1980s • The Islamic Research and Training Institute is established by the IDB in 1981.
• Banking systems are converted to an interest-free banking system in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan.
• Increased demand attracts Western intermediation and institutions.
• Countries like Bahrain and Malaysia promote Islamic banking parallel to the
conventional banking system.
1990s • Attention is paid to the need for accounting standards and a regulatory
framework. A self-regulating agency, the Accounting and Auditing Organiza-
tion of Islamic Financial Institutions, is established in Bahrain.
• Islamic insurance (takaful) is introduced.
• Islamic equity funds are established.
• The Dow Jones Islamic Index and the FTSE Index of Shariah-compatible
stocks are developed.
2000–the present • The Islamic Financial Services Board is established to deal with regulatory,
supervisory, and corporate governance issues of the Islamic financial industry.
• Sukuks (Islamic bonds) are launched.
• Islamic mortgages are offered in the United States and United Kingdom.
Source: Khan (1996); IDB (2005).
windows” in an attempt to attract clients directly. Islamic windows are not
independent financial institutions; rather, they are specialized setups within
conventional financial institutions that offer Shariah-compliant products.
Meanwhile, due to the growing demand for Shariah-compliant products
and fear of losing depositors, non-Western conventional banks also started
to offer Islamic windows. In general, Islamic windows are targeted at high-
net-worth individuals who want to practice Islamic banking: approxi-
mately 1–2 percent of the world’s Muslim population.
The number of conventional banks offering Islamic windows is
growing, as several leading conventional banks, such as the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), are pursuing this market
very aggressively. HSBC has a well-established network of banks in the
Muslim world and, in 1998, launched HSBC Global Islamic Finance with
the objective of promoting Islamic asset securitization, private equity, and
banking in the industrial countries. The list of Western banks keeping
Islamic windows includes, among others, ABN Amro, American Express
Bank, ANZ Grindlays, BNP-Paribas, Citicorp Group, and Union Bank of
Switzerland (UBS). The leading non-Western banks with a significant
presence of Islamic windows are National Commercial Bank of Saudi
Arabia, United Bank of Kuwait, and Riyadh Bank. Citibank is the only
Western bank to have established a separate Islamic bank: Citi Islamic
Investment Bank (Bahrain) in 1996.
By the early 1990s, the market had gained enough momentum to
attract the attention of public policy makers and institutions interested
in introducing innovative products. The following are some of the note-
worthy developments.
Recognizing the need for standards, a self-regulatory agency—the
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
(AAOIFI)—was established. AAOIFI was instrumental in highlighting
the special regulatory needs of Islamic financial institutions. AAOIFI
defined accounting and Shariah standards, which were adopted or rec-
ognized by several countries. However, as the market grew, the regulatory
and supervisory authorities, with the help of the IMF, established a dedi-
cated regulatory agency, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), in
the early 2000s to address systemic stability and various governance and
regulatory issues relating to the Islamic financial services industry. IFSB
took on the challenge and started working in the area of regulation, risk
management, and corporate governance.
Further progress was made in developing capital markets. Islamic
asset-backed certificates, sukuks, were introduced in the market. Different
structures of sukuks were launched successfully in Bahrain, Malaysia, and
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other financial centers.Among the issuers were corporations, multilaterals,
and sovereign entities such as the Islamic Development Bank, the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and
the governments of Bahrain, Pakistan, and Qatar. During the equities mar-
ket boom of the 1990s, several equity funds based on Shariah-compatible
stocks emerged. Dow Jones and Financial Times launched Islamic indexes
to track the performance of Islamic equity funds.
Several institutions were established to create and support a robust
financial system, including the International Islamic Financial Market, the
International Islamic Rating Agency, the General Council of Islamic Banks
and Financial Institutions, and the Arbitration and Reconciliation Centre
for Islamic Financial Institutions. Today, Islamic finance is no stranger to
leading financial centers of the world. With the recent wave of high oil rev-
enues in the Middle East, demand for Shariah-compliant products on both
the buy and sell sides has increased sharply. It is expected that as leading
market makers embrace and begin to practice Islamic finance, the market
will grow further, and new products and services will be introduced in the
near future.
NOTES
1. A billion is 1,000 million.
2. For further details see Mirakhor (1989); Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007).
3. www.study.quran.co.uk/LLhome.htm.
4. In Malaysia, a pilgrimage fund was established in the late 1950s to facilitate
savings to pay for the pilgrimage trip to Makkah. The Pilgrimage Fund
became a full-fledged interest-free investment bank in 1962. Around the
same time, a cluster of small interest-free savings banks emerged in northern
rural Egypt, starting in Mitghamr in 1963.
5. For further details, see Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007).
6. See http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/metzler.htm.
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Financial systems are crucial for the efficient allocation of resources ina modern economy. Their landscape is determined by the nature of
financial intermediation—that is, how the function of intermediation is
performed and who intermediates between suppliers and users of the
funds. The acquiring and processing of information about economic
entities, the packaging and repackaging of financial claims, and financial
contracting are common elements that differentiate financial intermedi-
ation from other economic activities.
The main functions of a financial intermediary are asset transfor-
mation, conduct of orderly payments, brokerage, and risk transformation.
Asset transformation takes place in the form of matching the demand for
and supply of financial assets and liabilities (for example, deposits, equity,
credit, loans, and insurance) and entails transformation of the maturity,
scale, and location of the financial assets and liabilities of the ultimate
borrowers and lenders. The administration of an accounting and payment
system (for example, check transfer, electronic funds transfer, settlement,
clearing) is another important function of intermediation. Typically,
financial intermediaries also offer pure brokerage or matchmaking
between borrowers and lenders and facilitate the demand for and supply
of intangible and contingent assets and liabilities, such as collateral, guar-
antees, financial advice, and custodial services.
Financial intermediaries not only channel resources from capital-
surplus agents (generally households) to capital-deficit ones (businesses)
but also allow intertemporal smoothing of households’ consumption and
businesses’ expenditures, enabling both firms and households to share
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Key Messages
• The Islamic financial system is based on a set of contracts. These contracts include contracts for
real economic activities, financing, intermediation, and social welfare.
• The mudarabah (trust financing) contract is the cornerstone of financial intermediation by Islamic
banks. The owner of capital (depositors) forms a partnership with a manager (financial interme-
diary) on a profit- and loss-sharing basis.
• Both the assets and liabilities side of an Islamic bank balance sheet are based on Shariah-
compatible financial instruments. Depositors are considered investors and are known as 
investment account holders.
• The assets of Islamic banks consist of trade financing, commodity trading, leasing, partnerships,
and equity-based partnerships.
• Islamic products are offered by dedicated Islamic banks and several non-Islamic banks through
special “Islamic windows.”
• The number of Islamic investment banks, mortgage companies, Islamic insurance (takaful), and
Islamic funds is growing. 
risks. Increased financial market complexity and volatility have led financial
intermediaries to offer products that mitigate, transfer, and share financial
risks. Other factors stimulating financial innovations are the liberation of
capital accounts, deregulation, and breakthroughs in technology.
Financial intermediation in Islamic history has an established histori-
cal record and has made significant contributions to economic development
over time. Financiers in the early days of Islam—known as sarrafs—under-
took many of the traditional, basic functions of a conventional financial
institution, such as intermediation between borrowers and lenders, oper-
ation of a secure and reliable domestic as well as cross-border payment
system, and provision of services such as the issuance of promissory notes
and letters of credit. Commercial historians have equated the function of
sarrafs with that of banks. Historians like Udovitch consider them to have
been “bankers without banks”(Udovitch 1981). Sarrafs operated through
an organized network and well-functioning markets, which established
them as sophisticated intermediaries, given the tools and technology of
their time. It is claimed that financial intermediaries in the early Islamic
period also helped one another to overcome liquidity shortages on the basis
of mutual help arrangements. There is evidence that some of the legal
concepts, contracts, practices, and institutions developed in the late
eighth century provided the foundations for similar instruments in
Europe several centuries later (Chapra and Khan 2001).
The Shariah provides a set of intermediation contracts that facilitate an
efficient and transparent execution and financing of economic activities.
This set of contracts is comprehensive enough to provide a wide range of
typical intermediation services such as asset transformation, a payment
system, custodial services, and risk management. Intermediation contracts
can be classified into three groups. The first is the most significant: it deals
with intermediation through the formation of a partnership of capital and
entrepreneurial skills. The second group, which is based on the concept of
trust, deals with the placement of assets in the hand of intermediaries for
the sake of protection or security. The third group facilitates explicit and
implicit guarantees of financial performance between economic agents.
These contracts play a critical role by providing stability and mitigating
risk in the financial system.
STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
For Islamic financial institutions, the nature of financial intermediation,
including the function of banking, is different from that of conventional
financial institutions. This difference is the key to understanding the 
difference in the nature of risks in conventional and Islamic banking. For
Islamic banks, the mudarabah contract is the cornerstone of financial
intermediation and thus of banking. In a mudarabah contract, the owner
of capital forms a partnership with an entrepreneur or manager who has
certain business skills, and both agree to share the profits and losses of
the venture undertaken. Such a contract can be applied by an Islamic
bank to raise funds in the form of deposits as well as to deploy funds on
the assets side.
The basic concept is that both the mobilization and (in theory) the
use of funds are based on some form of profit sharing among the depos-
itors, the bank, and the entrepreneurs (users of funds). A typical Islamic
bank performs the functions of financial intermediation by screening
profitable projects and monitoring the performance of projects on behalf
of the investors who deposit their funds with the bank.
Table 2.1 presents a stylized balance sheet of an Islamic bank, display-
ing different activities and financial instruments. It serves as a good start-
ing point for understanding the dynamics of the risks inherent in Islamic
banks. Panel A classifies both assets and liabilities based on the maturity
profile of different instruments. Although some instruments, such as
ijarah and istisnah, can be used across different maturity groups, this
demarcation is based on the most common use of the instruments. Panel
B provides an alternative view based on the functionality and purpose of
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different instruments. Although several Islamic banks organize their
financial statements on the basis of functionality, a maturity-based view
of the balance sheet is important to keep in mind as it helps to understand
exposure at the institutional level.
Liabilities
The liabilities side of the balance sheet is based on the “two-window”
theoretical model of an Islamic bank. In addition to equity capital, this
model divides the “liability”or funding side of the bank balance sheet into
two deposit windows, one for demand deposits and the other for invest-
ment or special investment accounts. The choice of window is left to the
depositors. Unlike conventional commercial banking, the investment
accounts of an Islamic bank are not liabilities in a strict sense because
depositors in a conventional bank create immediate claims on the bank,
whereas investors-depositors in Islamic banks are like partners.
In addition, special or restricted investment accounts are often
shown as off-balance-sheet funds under management. A 100 percent
reserve is required for demand deposits (but no reserve requirement is
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TABLE 2.1 A Theoretical Balance Sheet of an Islamic Bank Based on Maturity Profile 
Assets Liabilities
Based on maturity profile
Short-term trade finance (cash, murabahah, salaam) Demand deposits (amanah)
Medium-term investments (ijarah, istisnah) Investment accounts (mudarabah)
Long-term partnerships (musharakah) Special investment accounts 
(mudarabah, musharakah)
Fee-based services (joalah, kifalah, and so forth) Reserves
Non-banking assets (property) Equity capital
TABLE 2.1 B Theoretical Balance Sheet of an Islamic Bank Based on Functionality
Assets Liabilities
Based on functionality
Cash balances Demand deposits (amanah)
Financing assets (murabahah, salaam, ijarah, istisnah) Investment accounts (mudarabah)
Investment assets (mudarabah, musharakah) Special investment accounts 
(mudarabah, musharakah)
Fee-based services (joalah, kifalah, and so forth) Reserves
Non-banking assets (property) Equity capital
stipulated for the second window). This 100 percent requirement is based
on the presumption that the money deposited as demand deposits is
placed as amanah (demand deposits): they yield no returns and are
repayable on demand and at par value; therefore, money creation through
the multiplier effect is limited.
Money deposited in investment accounts, in contrast, is placed with
the depositors’ full knowledge that their deposits will be invested in
risk-bearing projects; no guarantee is needed or justified. Investment
account holders are investors or depositors who enter into a mudarabah
contract with the bank, where investors act as the supplier of funds (rab
al-mal) to be invested by the bank on their behalf, as the agent
(mudarib). The investors share in the profits accruing to the bank’s
investments on the assets side. Therefore, such profit-sharing invest-
ment deposits are not liabilities. Investors’ capital is not guaranteed, and
they incur losses if the bank does; the form is closer to that of a limited-
term, non-voting equity or a trust arrangement. Some Islamic banks
also offer special investment accounts developed on the basis of a spe-
cial-purpose or restricted mudarabah or on profit and loss sharing
(musharakah). These special investment accounts, which are similar to
close-end mutual funds, are highly customized and targeted toward
high-net-worth individuals.
Assets
On the assets side, Islamic banks have more choice of instruments with
different maturities and risk-return profiles. For short-term maturities,
trade financing or financial claims resulting from a sales contract—that
is, murabahah, salaam, and so forth—are available. For medium-term
investments, leasing (ijarah), manufacturing contracts (istisnah), and
various partnerships are possible; for long-term investments, partner-
ships in the form of musharakah can be undertaken. An Islamic financial
intermediary may also engage an external entrepreneur on a mudarabah
basis in which the bank acts as principal and the entrepreneur (user of the
funds) acts as agent. In this capacity, an Islamic bank can form a syndicate
with other financial or nonfinancial institutions to provide entrepreneurs
with medium- to long-term capital. Finally, like any conventional bank,
Islamic banks also provide customized services, guarantees, and under-
writing services for a fee.
The risks of a financial intermediary can be better understood
when the sources and applications of funds under management by the
financial intermediary are viewed as subportfolios of distinct risk-return
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and maturity profiles. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the sources and
application of funds for a typical Islamic bank. The composition and
mix of different maturity buckets on the assets side depend on each
financial institution, which may select a mix to match its needs to those
of its depositors.
BASIC CONTRACTS AND INSTRUMENTS 
Contracts play a vital role in the Islamic financial system, and all finan-
cial transactions are based on contractual agreements. Figure 2.1 provides
an overview of different contracts and their intended role in Islamic
financial systems. Following is a brief explanation of select basic contracts
serving as financial instruments classified by their functionality.
Financing Instruments
Financing instruments are used primarily to finance obligations arising
from the trade and sale of commodities or property. Financing instruments
also include instruments generating rental cash flows against exchange of
rights to use the assets such as ijarah and istisnah. Financing instruments
are closely linked to a sale contract and therefore are collateralized by the
product being financed. These instruments are the basis of short-term
assets for the Islamic banks. Murabahah, a cost-plus sales contract, is one
of the most popular contracts for purchasing commodities and other
products on credit. The concept is that a financier purchases a product—
that is, a commodity, raw materials, and so forth—for an entrepreneur
who does not have his or her own capital to do so. The financier and the
entrepreneur agree on a profit margin, often referred to as markup, which
is added to the cost of the product. The payment is delayed for a specified
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TABLE 2.2 Sources and Application of Funds
Sources of funding (liabilities and equity) Application of funding (assets)
Equity capital and shareholders’ reserves Short-term trade finance 
(murabahah, salaam)
Demand and safekeeping deposits (amanah) Regulatory cash reserve requirement
Medium-term investment (ijarah, istisnah)
Investment accounts (mudarabah) Long-term partnerships (musharakat)
Special investment accounts Fee-based services 
(mudarabah, musharakah) (joalah, kifalah, and so forth)
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FIGURE 2.1 Contracts and Instruments
Source: Authors.
Contracts
and Instruments
Financing
Trade Financing
Murabahah (Cost-plus-Sale),
Bay’ Salaam (Forward Sale)
Bay’ Muajil (Deferred
Payment Sale) 
Ijarah (Leasing)
Istisnah (Manufacturing)
Fee-Based Services
Kifalah (Guarantee)
Joalah (Fee-for-Service)
Amanah (Custody)
Wikalah (Representation)
Social Welfare
Qard Hassan
Waqf
Tikaful (Insurance)
Investing Other
Mudarabah
(Principal/Agent Partnership)
Musharakah
(Equity Partnership)
period of time during which the entrepreneur produces the final product
and sells it in the market. To be a valid contract, Shariah requires that a
murabahah contract be the result of an original sale and not a means of
financing existing inventory. In addition, the financier must take ownership
of the item on sale.
Murabahah was originally a sales transaction in which a trader would
purchase a product and then sell it to the end user at a price calculated
using an agreed profit margin over the costs incurred by the trader. Today,
banks have taken over the trader’s role of financier.
Bay al-muajjil, or sale with deferred payment, allows the sale of a prod-
uct on the basis of a deferred payment in installments or a lump sum. The
price of the product is agreed upon by the buyer and the seller at the time
of the sale and cannot include any charges for deferring payments. Bay’
al-salaam, or purchase with deferred delivery, is similar to conventional
forward contracts in terms of function but is different in terms of the pay-
ment arrangements. In the case of bay’ al-salaam, the buyer pays the seller
the full negotiated price of a specific product that the seller promises
to deliver at a specified future date. The main difference between bay’ al-
salaam and a conventional forward contract is that the full negotiated price
is payable at the time of the contract, as opposed to the latter, where the full
payment is not due in advance. This forward sale benefits both the seller
and the buyer. The seller gets cash to invest in the production process, and
the buyer eliminates uncertainty in the future price.
Several medium-term financing instruments are available: ijarah
(a leasing contract) and istisnah (a manufacturing contract).
An ijarah contract gives something in return for rent. Technically, it
is a contract of sale, but it is not the sale of a tangible asset; rather, it is a
sale of the usufruct (right to use the object) for a specified period of time.
The word ijarah conveys the sense of both hire and lease. In general, it
refers to the lease of tangible assets such as property and merchandise, but
it also denotes the hiring of personal services for a fee. Compared with
the conventional form of financing, which is generally in the form of a
debt, leasing provides financing in relation to a particular asset. In a sense,
it combines financing and collateral, because the ownership of the asset
serves as collateral and security against any future loss.
One of the major advantages of ijarah is that it resembles the con-
ventional lease agreement. There are some differences between the two,
but they function in largely the same way. One difference is that in ijarah
the leasing agency must own the leased object for the duration of the
lease. Another difference is the absence of compound interest that may
be charged under conventional leases in the event of default or delay in
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the installment payments. Similarities with conventional leasing make
this contract attractive to conventional investors and borrowers as well.
An istisnah contract facilitates the manufacture or construction of an
asset at the request of the buyer. Once the manufacturer undertakes to man-
ufacture the asset or property for the buyer, the transaction of istisnah comes
into existence. Both parties—namely, the buyer and the manufacturer—
agree on a price and on the specification of the asset to be manufactured.
At the time of delivery, if the asset does not conform to the specifications,
the party placing the order has the right to retract the contract.
An important feature of istisnah relates to the mode and timing of pay-
ment. There is flexibility in regard to the payment, and it is not necessary
for the price to be paid in advance. It is also not necessary for it to be paid
at the time of delivery. Both parties can agree on a schedule of payment
convenient to both, and the payment can be made in installments.
Like ijarah, istisnah has great potential for application in the area of
project finance in different sectors and industries. Successful applications
include the manufacture of aircraft, locomotives, ships, and heavy-duty
machinery. The istisnah contract also is suitable for building infrastructure
such as roads, dams, housing, hospitals, and schools.
Investing Instruments 
Investing instruments are vehicles for capital investment in the form of a
partnership. There are two types of investing instruments: fund manage-
ment (mudarabah) and equity partnerships (musharakah).
Mudarabah, which can be short, medium, or long term, is a trust-based
financing agreement whereby an investor entrusts capital to an agent to
undertake a project. Profits are based on a prearranged, agreed ratio. A
mudarabah agreement is akin to a Western-style limited partnership in
which one party contributes capital, while the other runs the business;
profit is distributed based on a negotiated percentage of ownership. The
investor bears the loss, but the agent does not share in any financial loss
unless there is evidence of misconduct or negligence. Mudarabah is used
on both the liabilities and the assets side.
Musharakah, which can be either medium or long term, is a hybrid
of shiraka (partnership) and mudarabah, combining the act of invest-
ment and management. In the absence of debt security, the Shariah
encourages this form of financing. The Shariah is fairly comprehensive
in defining different types of partnerships, in identifying the rights and
obligations of the partners, and in stipulating the rules governing the
sharing of profits and losses. Musharakah is a form of partnership in which
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two or more persons combine either their capital or their labor, share the
profits and losses, and have similar rights and liabilities.Within musharakah
there are further subclassifications of partnerships with respect to the
level of the partners’ authority and obligations and the type of his or her
contribution, such as management skills or goodwill.
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN PRACTICE1
While early forms of Islamic financial institutions were highly concen-
trated in commercial banking activities, more diverse forms have emerged
in the last two decades to cater to the demands of different segments of
the market. Although the Islamic mode of banking has been mandated
and adopted by the governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan,
and Sudan, the supply of Shariah-compliant products has been led pri-
marily by the private sector. In fact, private Islamic banks as a group are
becoming some of the largest private sector financial institutions in the
Islamic world, with growing networks through branches or subsidiaries.
There is no standard way of grouping Islamic financial institutions, but
based on the services rendered, today’s Islamic financial institutions can
be divided into the following broad categories: Islamic banks, Islamic
windows, Islamic investment banks and funds, Islamic mortgage com-
panies, Islamic insurance companies, and mudarabah companies.
Islamic Banks 
Islamic banks represent the majority of Islamic financial institutions; they
are spread around the globe in both the public and private sectors. Islamic
banks typically are a hybrid of a conventional commercial bank and an
investment bank and resemble a universal bank. After the state sponsor-
ship of Islamic banking in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, and
Sudan, all commercial banks were transformed to comply with Shariah
rules and principles. Islamic banks in other countries, especially in the
Middle East, are in the private sector, where ownership is by sharehold-
ers in public companies, by holding companies, or by wealthy families or
individuals. There are two major holding companies: Dar-al-Mal Islami
Group and Al Barakah Group, which have an extended network of
Islamic financial institutions.
Islamic banks have grown in numbers, but the average size of assets is
still small compared with that of a conventional bank. No Islamic bank is
on the list of the top 100 banks in the world. According to some estimates,
more than 60 percent of Islamic banks have assets that are below the level
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($500 million) that theoretical studies suggest as being the minimum to
be viable. Aggregate assets of all Islamic banks are still less than those of
any of the top 60 banks in the world. Finally, the size of assets of the largest
Islamic bank amounts to a meager 1 percent of the assets of the largest
bank in the world (see table 2.3).
Islamic Windows
As discussed in chapter 1, Islamic windows are specialized setups that offer
Shariah-compliant products. During the 1980s, conventional Western
banks acted as intermediaries, deploying funds according to guidelines
defined by the Islamic banks. Western banks helped Islamic banks to place
funds in commerce and trade-related activities by arranging for a trader
to buy goods on behalf of the Islamic bank and to resell them at a markup.
Gradually, Western banks began to offer Islamic products and to attract
clients directly without having to use an Islamic bank as intermediary.
The number of conventional banks offering Islamic windows is
growing. Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation launched HSBC
Global Finance in 1998, and numerous Western banks offer Islamic win-
dows, including ABN Amro, American Express Bank, ANZ Grindlays,
BNP Pariba, Citicorp Group, Morgan Stanley, and Union Bank of
Switzerland (UBS).
Islamic Investment Banks and Funds
Islamic investment banks and investment funds emerged during the
1990s, when the market reached a threshold where large transactions and
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TABLE 2.3 Size of Islamic Financial Institutions in 1999
Number 
of Islamic financial Average capital Average assets
Region institutions (US$ million) (US$ million)
South Asia 51 17 770
Africa 35 6 45
South East Asia 31 5 75
Middle East 47 116 2,204
Europe and the Americas 9 70 101
Asia and Australia 3 3 6
Total 176 42 839
Source: Kahf (1999).
investment banking became attractive. Whereas a typical Islamic bank’s
services are retail and consumer centered, Islamic investment banks are
aiming to capitalize on large investment syndication, market-making, and
underwriting opportunities. Islamic investment banks have been success-
ful in developing innovative large-scale transactions for infrastructure
financing in conjunction with conventional project finance for projects
such as the Hub Power project in Pakistan.
Islamic investment funds are not new but are making a comeback after
initial experimentation during which many of them did not survive. The
1990s witnessed real growth in Islamic funds,and by the start of the new mil-
lennium, there were more than 150 Islamic funds with a wide range of offer-
ings, including equity (more than 85),commodity, leasing,and trade-related
funds. Funds other than equity are considered to be low risk because of the
nature of the underlying instrument. Both leasing and commodity funds
provide investors a low return with minimum risk of loss. In the case of
leasing, the fund is a securitized pool of lease contracts dealing with
collateralized assets generating a steady stream of cash flow.Since a lease con-
tract is more familiar to conventional bankers, lease funds have wider accept-
ability with conventional investors. Similarly, commodity funds have a
short-term exposure in markets that are efficient and have developed forward
markets, thus reducing the level of risk. In contrast, equity funds are similar
to conventional mutual funds and are exposed to a higher degree of risk.
Islamic equity funds gained popularity during the 1990s when global
equity markets experienced historical growth. Such funds are designed to
ensure that equity stocks included in the fund are not only well diversified
but also fully compliant with the Shariah’s guidelines. The selection of a
stock goes through a strict screening or filtering process, which ensures
that (a) the company’s capital structure is predominantly equity based
(only a limited proportion of debt is accepted in certain circumstances);
(b) the nature of the business does not involve any prohibited activity such
as gambling, interest-based transactions, and the production or con-
sumption of alcohol, and (c) only a negligible portion of income is derived
from interest on securities. Since the majority of Muslim countries do not
have well-developed capital and stock markets, fund managers focus
mostly on equity markets in the developed countries, where the domain
of qualified stocks is limited, which constrains the opportunities to hold a
well-diversified portfolio.
Dow Jones has recognized the significance and potential of Islamic
equity funds by setting up an equity benchmark index—the Dow Jones
Islamic Market Index (DJIM). DJIM tracks Shariah-compliant stocks from
the 2,700 stocks in the Dow Jones Global Index. FTSE followed, announcing
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its own version of an index to track the performance of stocks qualified for
Islamic investment. During the boom in equity markets, several institutions
arranged investment in Shariah-compliant stocks through the Internet, but
the timing of launch was not ideal, as equity markets started to decline by
the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, there is still a great potential for Islamic
funds to expand across the globe through new technology.
Islamic Mortgage Companies
Islamic mortgage companies are another recent development. Targeted at
the housing market for Muslim communities in Western countries (Canada,
United Kingdom,and United States) with developed conventional mortgage
markets, four models of Islamic mortgage are currently in practice. The first
model is based on the ijarah (lease) contract and is the closest to the
structure of a conventional mortgage. The second model is based on equity
partnership (diminishing musharakah), where the mortgagee (lender) and
mortgagor (borrower) jointly share ownership, which over a period of time
is transferred to the mortgagor, who buys shares of ownership by con-
tributing each month toward buying out the mortgagee’s share in the prop-
erty. Return to the lender is generated out of the fair rental value of the
property. The third model is based on murabahah (sales transaction) and is
practiced in the United Kingdom, where the property transfer tax (stamp
duty) discriminates against the ijarah- or musharakah-based mortgage.The
fourth model is designed along the lines of cooperative societies, where
members buy equity (musharakah) membership and help each other to
purchase property from the pool of the society’s funds. Recently, the U.S.
agency Freddie Mac recognized the importance of Islamic mortgages and
began to underwrite and securitize them. The chances of success for Islamic
mortgages are bright in Western markets, where capital markets are liquid,
transparent, and well regulated. In particular, there is great potential for
Islamic mortgages in the North American markets, where there is a sizable
Muslim community in the middle- and upper-income brackets.
Islamic Insurance Companies
The closest Islamic instrument to the contemporary system of insurance is
takaful, which literally means mutual or joint guarantee. Typically, takaful
is carried out in the form of solidarity mudarabah, where the participants
agree to share their losses by contributing periodic premiums in the form
of investments. They are then entitled to redeem the residual value of prof-
its after fulfilling the claims and premiums. A critical difference between
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contemporary insurance models and takaful is the participant’s right to
receive surplus profits. The participants in a given solidarity (that is, takaful)
mudarabah have the right to share the surplus profits generated, but at the
same time they are liable, in addition to the premiums, for amounts they
have already distributed, if the initial premiums paid during a period are
not sufficient to meet all the losses and risks incurred during that period.
Another distinct feature of takaful is that the premiums and reserves can be
invested only in Shariah-compliant instruments. Takaful companies can
constitute reserves (like conventional mutual insurance companies), which
means that the insured may have to make supplemental contributions if
claims exceed premiums. At present, there is very limited application of
takaful in Islamic financial markets, as very few institutions offer insurance
services on a large scale.
Mudarabah Companies 
The concept of a mudarabah company is very similar to that of a close-end
fund managed by a specialized professional investment management com-
pany. Like a mutual fund, a mudarabah company is incorporated as a sepa-
rate legal entity with a fund management company responsible for its
operations. Unlike an Islamic bank, a mudarabah company is not permitted
to accept deposits; it is funded by equity capital, provided by the sponsor’s
own subscribed capital and by mudarabah investment certificates,which are
open to general investors through a public offering. Profits on investments
are distributed among subscribers on the basis of their contribution, with
the manager of the funds earning a proportion of the profits.
There can be two types of mudarabah: multipurpose—that is, a
mudarabah having more than one investment purpose or objective—and
specific purpose.All mudarabahs, however, are independent of each other,
and none is liable for the liabilities of, or is entitled to benefit from the
assets of, any other mudarabah contract or mudarabah company.
Considering that the mudarabah contract is the cornerstone of Islamic
finance, mudarabah companies can play a critical role in the financial land-
scape of a developing economy,especially for small- and medium-size enter-
prises. For them to do so requires a financial sector that inspires investor
confidence and facilitates the transparency and operational efficiency of
mudarabah companies.
NOTES
1. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007).
Theory and Practice of Islamic Financial Intermediation
29
The issue of corporate governance has recently received considerableattention in conventional economic literature and public policy debates.
This attention can be attributed to several factors: (a) the growth of
institutional investors—that is, pension funds, insurance companies,
mutual funds, and highly leveraged institutions—and their role in the
financial sector, especially in major industrial economies; (b) widely
articulated concerns and criticism to the effect that the contemporary
monitoring and control of publicly held corporations in English-speaking
countries, notably the United Kingdom and United States, are seriously
defective, leading to suboptimal economic and social development;
(c) the shift away from a traditional view of corporate governance as
centered on “shareholder value” in favor of a corporate governance
structure extended to a wide circle of stakeholders; and (d) the impact
of increased globalization of financial markets, a global trend toward
deregulation of financial sectors, and liberalization of institutional
investors’ activities.
The activities of Islamic banks and banking may affect the welfare
of more than 20 percent of the world’s population, mostly concentrated
in developing countries, and their corporate governance arrangements
matter for economic development. Sound corporate governance can cre-
ate an enabling environment, which rewards banking efficiency, miti-
gates financial risks, and increases systemic stability. Lenders and other
providers of funds are more likely to extend financing when they feel
comfortable with the corporate governance arrangements of the funds’
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Key Messages
• Corporate governance provides a disciplined structure through which a bank sets its objectives,
determines the means of attaining them, and monitors the performance of those objectives. 
• Effective corporate governance encourages a bank to use its resources more efficiently. 
• Financial risk management is the responsibility of several key players in the corporate governance
structure. Each key player is accountable for a dimension of risk management. 
• The key players are regulators or lawmakers, supervisors, shareholders, directors, executive man-
agers, internal auditors, external auditors, and the general public. 
• To the extent that any key player does not, or is not expected to, fulfill its function in the risk man-
agement chain, other key players have to compensate for the gap created by enhancing their own
role. More often than not, it is the bank supervisor who has to step into the vacuum created by
the failure of certain players. 
recipient and with the clarity and enforceability of creditor rights. Good
corporate governance tends to lower the cost of capital, as it conveys a
sense of lower risk that translates into shareholders’ readiness to accept
lower returns. Corporate governance is proven to improve operational
performance. Finally, it reduces the risks of contagion from financial
distress. Besides mitigating the internal risk of distress by positively
affecting investors’ perception of risk and their readiness to extend fund-
ing, it increases firms’ robustness and resilience to external shocks.
While Islamic scholars argue that Islamic corporate governance induces
ethical behavior and is immune to the flaws of conventional banking,
Islamic banks and banking are no less prone than conventional banks
to suffer breaches of fiduciary responsibility or the consequences of
asymmetric information. Research in corporate governance issues can
benefit from understanding the relevance of corporate governance to
the Islamic financial services industry and the governance issues that
are unique to it.
Corporate governance relates to the manner in which the business of
the bank is governed, including setting corporate objectives and the
bank’s risk profile, aligning corporate activities and behaviors with the
expectation that the management will operate in a safe and sound manner,
running day-to-day operations within an established risk profile, while
protecting the interests of depositors and other stakeholders. It is defined
by a set of relationships between the bank’s management, its board, its
shareholders, and other stakeholders.
The following are the key elements of sound corporate governance
in a bank:
 A well-articulated corporate strategy against which the overall success
and the contribution of individuals can be measured;
 The assignment and enforcement of clear responsibilities, decision-
making authority, and accountabilities that are appropriate for the
bank’s risk profile;
 A strong financial risk management function (independent of business
lines), adequate internal control systems (including internal and external
audit functions), and a functional process with the necessary checks
and balances;
 Adequate corporate values, codes of conduct, and other standards of
appropriate behavior and effective systems for ensuring compliance,
including special monitoring of a bank’s risk exposures where con-
flicts of interest are expected to appear (for example, relationships with
affiliated parties);
 Financial and managerial incentives for the board, management, and
employees to act in an appropriate manner, including compensation,
promotion, and penalties (that is, compensation consistent with the
bank’s objectives, performance, and ethical values).
Figure 3.1 portrays a risk management partnership in which each key
player has clearly defined accountability for a specific dimension of every
area of risk.
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES: MONITORING 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
The primary role of bank regulators and supervisors is to facilitate the process
of risk management and to enhance and monitor the statutory framework
in which it is undertaken. Bank regulators and supervisors cannot prevent
bank failures.However,by creating a sound enabling environment, they have
a crucial role to play in influencing the other key players.
Bank supervision is sometimes applied incorrectly as a legal or admini-
strative function focused largely on regulations related to the business of
banking. Such regulations are often prescriptive in nature and impose
onerous requirements on banks, which seek to circumvent them by devel-
oping innovative products.
Once regulators and supervisors understand that they cannot bear sole
responsibility for preventing bank failures, they need to identify clearly
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Key Players
Systemic
Legal and regulatory
authorities
Supervisory authorities
Shariah board
Shareholders
Board of directors
Executive management
Audit committee
and internal auditors
External auditors
Investors or depositors
Rating agencies and media
Analysts
Insist on transparency and full disclosure; inform the public and emphasize ability to service debt
Analyze quantitative and qualitative risk-based information and advise clients
Test compliance with board policies and provide assurance regarding regarding corporate governance,
control systems, and risk management processes
Express opinion and evaluate risk management policies
Public or consumer (require transparency and full disclosure)
Understand responsibility and insist on full disclosure; take responsibility for own decisions
Institutional
Appoint “fit and proper” boards, management, and auditors
Set risk management and other bank policies; have ultimate responsibility for the entity
Create systems to implement board policies, including risk management, in day-to-day operations
Ensure that financial institutions comply with the rules of Shariah in financial intermediation activities
and managerial behavior and protect the rights of depositors and other stakeholders
Accountability (dimension of risk for which key player is responsible)
Set regulatory framework, including risk exposure limits and other risk management parameters, which
will optimize risk management in the banking sector
Monitor financial viability and effectiveness of risk management; check compliance with regulations
Key Players
and
Responsibilities
Financial and
other risk
management
areas
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FIGURE 3.1 Partnership in Corporate Governance of Banks
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what they are capable of achieving and then focus on that specific mission.
This process is currently taking place in most industrial countries. The role
of a bank’s supervisory authority is moving away from monitoring com-
pliance with banking laws and old-style prudential regulations. A more
appropriate mission statement today would be “to create a regulatory and
legal environment in which the quality and effectiveness of bank risk man-
agement can be optimized in order to contribute to a sound and reliable
banking system.”
The task of bank supervision becomes monitoring, evaluating, and,
when necessary, strengthening the risk management process that is
undertaken by banks. However, the supervisory authority is only one of
the many contributors to a stable banking system. Other players also are
responsible for managing risk, and prudential regulations increasingly
stress the accountability of top-level management. Recognizing the high
cost of voluminous reporting requirements without corresponding ben-
efits, many countries are moving toward a system of reporting that
encourages and enables supervisors to rely more extensively on external
auditors in the ordinary course of business, subject to having a clear
understanding of their role in the risk management chain.
THE SHAREHOLDERS: APPOINTING 
RISK POLICY MAKERS 
Shareholders are in a position to appoint the people in charge of the cor-
porate governance process and should screen their conduct carefully to
ensure that they do not intend to use the bank solely to finance their own
or their associates’ enterprises. By electing the supervisory board and
approving the board of directors, the audit committee, and external
auditors, shareholders are in a position to determine the direction of a
bank. Banks are different from other companies in that management and
the board are responsible not only to shareholders but also to depositors,
who provide leverage to the owners’ capital. Depositors are different
from normal trade creditors because the entire intermediation function
in the economy, including payments and clearance (and therefore the
stability of the financial system), is at stake.
The modern market-oriented approach to bank regulation is placing
increasing emphasis on the fiduciary responsibility of shareholders. This is
reflected in several ways, including more stringent bank licensing require-
ments and standards that a bank’s founder and larger shareholders must
meet in order to be considered fit and proper. Actions that may be taken
against shareholders who fail to ensure the appointment of fit and proper
persons have also become broader. Bank licensing procedures normally
include the mandatory identification of major shareholders and require a
minimum number of shareholders (which varies among jurisdictions).
Shareholders should play a key role in overseeing a bank’s affairs. They
are expected to select a competent board of directors whose members are
experienced and qualified to set sound policies and objectives. The board
of directors must be able to adopt a suitable business strategy for the bank,
supervise the bank’s affairs and its financial position, maintain reasonable
capitalization, and prevent self-serving practices among themselves and
throughout the bank as a whole.
In reality, shareholders may not be able to exercise the oversight
function in a large bank with a dispersed ownership structure. While the
founders of a bank must meet certain standards, as a bank becomes
larger and shares are held more widely, the shareholding may become so
diffused that individual shareholders have no voice in the bank’s man-
agement and have little recourse but to sell their shares if they do not like
the way the bank is being managed. In such cases, effective supervisory
oversight becomes critical.
Another issue is whether shareholders are carrying out their fiduciary
responsibilities effectively and whether they have taken advantage of their
ownership position in the bank. In practical terms, this can be ascertained
by reviewing select aspects, including the frequency of shareholder meet-
ings, the number of shareholders who are normally present, and the per-
centage of total shares they represent. The level of direct involvement, if
any, that the shareholders have with the bank, the supervisory board
(directors), and the management board (executive management) should
also be taken into account. Such an assessment should include a review
of the current composition of the management and supervisory board,
their remaining terms of office, and connections among board members,
shareholders, and bank customers. A review should be conducted of the
bank’s level of exposure to shareholders who have more than 1 percent of
holdings and are bank customers, including an examination of instruments
such as loans and deposits that specifies the amounts, terms, conditions,
and funding extended to shareholders.
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR A BANK’S AFFAIRS 
Ultimate responsibility for the way in which a bank’s business is con-
ducted lies with the board of directors. The board sets the strategic direc-
tion, appoints management, establishes operational policies, and, most
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important, takes responsibility for ensuring the soundness of a bank. The
board is answerable to depositors and shareholders for the lawful, informed,
efficient, and able administration of the institution. The members of the
board usually delegate the day-to-day management of banking to officers
and employees, but board members are responsible for the consequences
of unsound or imprudent policies and practices concerning lending,
investing, protecting against internal fraud, or any other banking activity.
The composition of a board of directors is crucial. Studies have found
that nearly 60 percent of failed banks had board members who either
lacked banking knowledge or were uninformed and passive regarding
supervision of the bank’s affairs. A board with a strong chairman who is
not the chief executive is more likely to provide objective inputs than a
board whose chairman is also the chief executive. Banks need a board that
is both strong and knowledgeable. It is essential for the board to encourage
open discussion and, even more important, to tolerate conflict well, since
conflict indicates that both sides of the coin are being considered.
Failed banks almost invariably suffer from deficiencies in their board
and senior management. The leadership provided by the board of directors
of many troubled institutions is often found to be ineffective. One of the
chief functions of independent (nonexecutive) directors should therefore
be to avoid economic and legal mistakes that could threaten the life of the
bank. When problems are discovered by internal controls or external
auditors, they should be brought to the immediate attention of the board
of directors.
The most important duty of the board is to ensure that the manage-
ment team has the necessary skills, knowledge, experience, and sense of
judgment to manage the bank’s affairs in a sound and responsible manner.
The management team should be directly accountable to the board, and
this relationship should be supported by robust structures. During good
times, a board sets the tone and direction. It oversees and supports man-
agement efforts, testing and probing recommendations before approving
them, and makes sure that adequate controls and systems are in place to
identify and address concerns before they become major problems. During
bad times, an active, involved board can help a bank to survive if it is able
to evaluate problems, take corrective actions, and, when necessary, keep
the institution on track until effective management can be reestablished
and the bank’s problems resolved.
An effective board should have a sound understanding of the nature
of the bank’s business activities and associated risks. It should take rea-
sonable steps to ensure that management has established strong systems
to monitor and control those risks. Even if members of the board are not
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experts in banking risks and risk management systems, they should ensure
that such expertise is available and that the risk management system
undergoes appropriate reviews by suitably qualified professionals. The
board should take timely actions to ensure a level of capitalization that rea-
sonably matches the economic and business environment of the bank as
well as its business and risk profile.
The board should ensure that the bank has adequate internal audit
arrangements in place and that risk management systems are applied prop-
erly at all times. Directors need not be experts in these control and audit
mechanisms, but they should consult experts inside and, if necessary, out-
side the bank to ascertain that such arrangements are robust and being
implemented properly. The board should also ensure that the banking laws
and regulations applicable to a bank’s business are followed. It should take
all reasonable steps to ensure that the information in the bank’s disclosure
statements is transparent and accurate and that adequate procedures are in
place, including external audits or other reviews, where appropriate, to
ensure that the information disclosed is not false or misleading.
MANAGEMENT: RESPONSIBILITY FOR BANK OPERATIONS AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT POLICIES
Executive management of a bank has to be fit and proper, meaning not
only that managers subscribe to standards of ethical behavior, but also
that they have the competence and experience to run the bank. Because
the management is responsible for implementing the board’s policies in
the bank’s day-to-day operations, intimate knowledge of the financial
risks being managed is vital.
As summarized in box 3.1, the financial soundness and performance
of a banking system ultimately depend on the board of directors and on
the senior management of member banks. The strategic positioning of
a bank, the nature of a bank’s risk profile, and the adequacy of the sys-
tems for identifying, monitoring, and managing the profile reflect the
quality of both the management team’s and the directors’ oversight. For
these reasons, the most effective strategy to promote a sound financial
system is to strengthen the accountability of directors and management
and to enhance the incentives for them to operate banks prudently. The
role of senior management is therefore a fundamental component of a
risk-based approach to regulation and supervision. Regulators increas-
ingly aim to strengthen the participation and accountability of senior
management, which are key responsibilities for maintaining a bank’s
safety and soundness.
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Quality and Experience 
The quality and experience of the individuals on a senior management
team are of great importance. In a financial institution, the process of risk
management does not start at the strategy meeting, in the planning
process, or in any other committee; it starts when a prospective employee
is screened for appointment to the organization or for promotion to a
senior position.
Regulators take several approaches to ensuring that management is
fit and proper. Most regulators have established standards for managers,
as illustrated in box 3.2. Jurisdictions with such standards often require
that the central bank confirm the experience, technical capacity, and pro-
fessional integrity of senior management before its members assume
their duties. However, some jurisdictions do not, as a matter of policy, get
involved in the appointment of senior management unless a bank is
deemed unsafe due to incompetent management.
Management Responsibilities 
While the board and management need to support one another, each has
its own distinct role and responsibilities to fulfill. The chief executive
officer and the management team should run the bank’s day-to-day
activities in compliance with board policies, laws, and regulations and
should be supported by a sound system of internal controls. Although
the board should leave day-to-day operations to management, it should
retain overall control. The dictation of a board’s actions by management
indicates that the board is not fulfilling its responsibilities, ultimately to
the detriment of the institution.
Management should provide directors with the information they
need to meet their responsibilities and should respond quickly and fully
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BOX 3.1 Accountability of Bank Management
The U.S. Comptroller of the Currency has studied bank failures between 1979 and 1988
in an effort to determine the root causes of those failures. The ultimate message of this study
is that not all banks in a depressed environment fail; rather, the banks with weak management
were the ones that succumbed when times became difficult. The final word on this trend has
been spoken by a governor of the U.S. Federal Reserve System: “It is important to recognize
that bank stockholders suffer losses on their investments, and senior bank management is
almost always replaced, regardless of the resolution technique used.”
to board requests. In addition, management should use its expertise to
generate new and innovative ideas and recommendations for considera-
tion by the board. A bank should have adequate policies in place to
increase the accountability of its managers. As the persons responsible
for bank stewardship, managers should be given incentives to maintain
a well-informed overview of business activities and corresponding risks.
The duties and responsibilities of a bank’s senior management include
appointment to middle-level management positions of persons with
adequate professional skills, experience, and integrity; the establishment
of adequate performance incentives and personnel management systems;
and staff training.Management should ensure that the bank has an adequate
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BOX 3.2 Fit and Proper Standards for Bank Management 
Regulators in certain jurisdictions require banks’ majority shareholders, directors, and
managers to furnish information or adhere to standards regarding the following: 
• Previous convictions for any crime involving fraud, dishonesty, or violence; 
• The contravention of any law that, in the opinion of the regulator, is designed to protect
the public against financial loss due to the dishonesty or incompetence of or malpractice
by the person concerned. This standard applies when the person is involved in the provision
of banking, insurance, investment, and financial services or in the management of juristic
persons; 
• Indication that a director has caused a particular company’s inability to pay its debts;
• Whether or not, in the opinion of the regulator, the person concerned has ever been
involved in any business practice that was deceitful or prejudicial or cast doubt on his com-
petence and soundness of judgment; 
• Whether or not any previous application to conduct business has been refused, or whether
or not any license to conduct business has been withdrawn or revoked; 
• Whether or not, while the person was a director or an executive officer of an institution,
the institution was censured, warned, disciplined, or made the subject of a court order by
any regulatory authority locally or overseas; 
• Whether or not the person concerned has been associated with an institution that has been
refused a license or has had its license to conduct business revoked; 
• Any dismissal or barring of or disciplinary proceedings toward any professional or
occupation, as initiated by an employer or professional body; 
• The nonpayment of any debt judged due and payable locally or elsewhere; 
• Whether or not the person concerned has ever been declared insolvent; 
• Convictions for any offense, excluding traffic violations, political offenses, or offenses com-
mitted when the person in question was under the age of 18 years; 
• Any litigation that the person in question has been involved with or related to the forma-
tion or management of any corporate body; 
• Any related-party transactions with the institution concerned.
management information system and that the information is transparent,
timely, accurate, and complete.
The key managerial responsibility is to ensure that all major bank
functions are carried out in accordance with clearly formulated policies
and procedures and that the bank has adequate systems in place with
which to monitor and manage risks effectively. Managerial responsibilities
for financial risk management are summarized in box 3.3.
Management’s role in identifying, appraising, pricing, and managing
financial risk is described well by the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision. The Basel Committee has stated that any corporation that uses new
financial instruments has a critical need for all levels of management to
acquire knowledge and understanding of their inherent risks and to adapt
internal accounting systems to ensure adequate control. Risk management
should be an integral part of the day-to-day activities of each and every line
manager, in order to ascertain that risk management systems are applied
properly and that procedures are followed. Management should also ensure
that the bank has adequate internal controls, including appropriate audit
arrangements, because risk management often fails as a result of an inef-
fective decision-making process and weak controls, not of unanticipated or
extraordinary risks.
Recent changes in international banking have made the management
process considerably more demanding.Financial innovation transfers price
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BOX 3.3 The Responsibilities of Management
Management has the following responsibilities with regard to financial risk: 
• Develop and recommend strategic plans and risk management policies for board approval; 
• Implement strategic plans and policies after approval by the board; 
• Establish an institutional culture promoting high ethical and integrity standards; 
• Ensure development of manuals containing policies, procedures, and standards for the
bank’s key functions and risks; 
• Implement an effective internal control system, including continuous assessment of all
material risks that could adversely affect the achievement of the bank’s objectives; 
• Ensure the implementation of controls that enforce adherence to established risk limits;
• Ensure immediate reporting of noncompliance to management; 
• Ensure that the internal auditors review and assess the adequacy of controls and
compliance with limits and procedures; 
• Develop and implement management reporting systems that adequately reflect business
risks.
or market risk from one agent to another; it does not eliminate the risk
itself. The pace of innovation, the growth of off-balance-sheet transac-
tions, and the unbundling of different types of risk have rendered the
analysis of financial statements and the management of a bank’s financial
position more complex. Management increasingly faces important ques-
tions about how best to account for, monitor, and manage risk exposure
and how to integrate off-balance-sheet activities into other exposures.
Assessment Process
It is important to appraise the quality of management. The main objective
of such an appraisal is to evaluate whether a bank’s senior management
personnel have the following:
 Adequate technical capacity, experience, and integrity to manage a
bank, aspects that can be evaluated based on the bank’s personnel prac-
tices in the area of management continuity;
 Systems in place to monitor and control the bank’s material risks,
including credit, exposure concentration, interest rate, currency, sol-
vency, liquidity, and other risks and systems for evaluating whether or
not these systems are applied properly and whether or not manage-
ment takes appropriate actions, if and when necessary;
 Proper managerial guidance and systems for determining whether
they have made adequate decisions in all key aspects of the bank’s busi-
ness, complied with all conditions of registration applicable to the
bank, and maintained contact with those persons who are capable of
controlling or significantly influencing the bank in a manner that is
contrary to the bank’s interests.
 Policies that call for the disclosure of directors’ conflicts of interest.
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE AND INTERNAL AUDITORS: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE BOARD’S RISK MANAGEMENT
IMPLEMENTATION
The audit committee and the internal auditors should be regarded as an
extension of the board’s risk management policy function. Internal
auditors traditionally have performed an independent appraisal of a
bank’s compliance with its internal control systems, accounting prac-
tices, and information systems. Most modern internal auditors would,
however, describe their task as providing assurance regarding the bank’s
corporate governance, control systems, and risk management processes.
Although audit committees play a valuable role in identifying and
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addressing areas of risk, the prime responsibility for risk management
cannot be abdicated to them; rather it should be integrated into all levels
of management.
The mission statement of an audit committee that is organized accord-
ing to modern principles should be “to enhance the management of opera-
tional risks on a groupwide basis.” Following from this, the goals of an
internal audit function are to accomplish the following:
 Enable management to identify and manage business risks;
 Provide an independent appraisal;
 Evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operations;
 Evaluate compliance with laws, policies, and operating instructions;
 Evaluate the reliability of information produced by accounting and
computer systems;
 Provide investigative services to line management.
Contrary views exist regarding the value of audit committees. Such
committees have been likened to a straw of hope that boards cling to
in an attempt to show that they are managing risk. It is logical that a
board facing risk management problems will rush to the historical
source of information about problems in the company, namely the
auditors. The proponents of this view often point out that the auditors
are simply checklist experts, while risk management has never been
such a simple pursuit and should not be delegated to a committee,
department, or team.
They also have been the object of unflattering comment, such as the
following:
 Audit committees are as ineffective in handling risk management as
external auditors. They have no hope of ensuring timely and well-
informed risk management decisions in a company. Their value lies in
retrospective risk control.
 Audit committees create the impression that risk management is some-
thing that can be audited until it becomes right. By and large, auditors
focus on numbers and figures, while risk management failures are often
due to internal and individual shortcomings or bad decisions.
 Audit committees are ineffective because risk management is a dynamic
process. The complex nature of present-day financial risks makes it
impossible for audit committees to do anything more than look after
auditable risks, and these are only one part of total risk.
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 The problems of internal auditors are exacerbated when they follow
an inspection approach—they never become a partner in the risk
management process, but remain an outsider not to be trusted to assist
management in their operational risk management task—through
sound advice coming from the macro view that internal auditors
should have of an organization.
The monitoring and directing of the internal audit function are an
integral part of the audit committee’s overall responsibilities. Both the
board and management must have a tool to ensure that policies are being
followed and risks are being managed. Under a market-oriented
approach, an audit extends beyond matters related directly to adminis-
trative controls and accounting. It comprises all methods and measures
adopted by the business to safeguard its assets and manage its risks, check
the accuracy and reliability of accounting and management information,
promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to manage-
ment policies. In short, the internal audit is an independent appraisal
function and, since it is established within an organization to examine and
evaluate its activities, performs a valuable service for the organization.
The most important duties of internal auditors are to “provide assur-
ance regarding corporate governance, control systems, and risk manage-
ment processes.” Internal auditors should also review annual financial
statements prior to their submission to the board of directors and ensure
that appropriate accounting policies and practices are used in the devel-
opment of financial statements. The review of financial statements must
be detailed enough to allow internal auditors to be able to report on a
range of aspects, including the accuracy of the balance sheet and income
statement. The internal auditors also consider compliance with regula-
tory and legislative requirements, identify all significant discrepancies
and disclosure problems, highlight differences between the annual report
and management accounts, point to major fluctuations, and check man-
agement’s compliance with statutory and other requirements.
Internal auditors and audit committees therefore make a vital contri-
bution to the risk management process. They monitor the institution’s
financial risk profile and review management’s procedures. Further details
regarding the internal auditing function and audit are summarized in box
3.4. Internal auditors also evaluate the external audit function and ensure
follow-up by management of problems identified in auditors’ reports.
However, in reality internal auditors and audit committees have limited
ability to satisfy all of these requirements.
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EXTERNAL AUDITORS: A REASSESSMENT OF THE 
TRADITIONAL APPROACH OF AUDITING BANKS 
The primary objectives of an audit are to express an opinion on whether or
not the bank’s financial statements fairly reflect its financial condition and
the results of its operations for a given period. The external audit report is
normally addressed to shareholders, but it is used by many other parties,
such as supervisors, financial professionals, depositors, and creditors. The
traditional approach to an external audit according to the requirements of
generally accepted auditing standards (International Standards of Audit-
ing, or ISA) typically includes a review of internal control systems. This
assessment is undertaken to determine the nature and extent of substan-
tive testing, provide an analytic review or trend analysis, and undertake a
certain amount of detailed testing. Apart from the audit of the income
statement, certain line items on the balance sheet are audited through the
use of separate programs, for example, fixed assets, cash, investments, or
debts. External auditors traditionally look for fraud and mismanagement
in the lending function. Audits rarely include a detailed credit analysis of
borrowers, as this has traditionally been performed by bank supervisors.
External auditors, as an integral part of the risk management part-
nership, have a specific role to fulfill. If market discipline is to promote
stability of the banking system, markets must first have information and
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BOX 3.4 The Responsibilities of Audit Committees and Internal Auditors 
Regarding the management of financial risk, the audit committees and internal auditors
are responsible for the following: 
• Review management’s adherence to board policies and procedures; 
• Provide assurance regarding corporate governance, control systems, and risk management
processes;
• Perform a financial analysis of key risk indicators in order to assess operational risk 
managenment effectiveness;
• Verify the adequacy and accuracy of the information reported to the board by management; 
• Report periodically to the board regarding adherence to policies and procedures; 
• Improve communication between the board and management; 
• Evaluate risk management measures for their appropriateness in relation to exposures; 
• Test all aspects of risk activities and positions; 
• Ensure effective management controls over positions, limits, and actions taken when lim-
its are exceeded; 
• Assess operations and suggest improvements.
the capacity to hold directors and management accountable for the sound
operation of a bank. External auditors play a key role in improving the
market’s ability to determine which banks to do business with.
The philosophy of and approach to external auditing clearly are
crucial to the success or failure of a coordinated strategy of risk manage-
ment. The work of the external auditor offers added protection for the
consumer. It is therefore important for the profession to shift from a mere
balance sheet audit to an evaluation of the risks inherent in the financial
services industry. When such an approach has been adopted by all auditors
of financial institutions, the risk management process will be significantly
enhanced, which will benefit all users of financial services. Box 3.5 sum-
marizes the risk management responsibilities of external auditors.
The role of the accounting and auditing profession has gained impor-
tance as part of the bank supervision process. Management letters and
long-form reports submitted by auditors can provide supervisors with
valuable insights into various aspects of a bank’s operations. This is espe-
cially important when auditors become aware of facts that may endanger
the stability of a particular bank or of the banking system. In many coun-
tries, especially those where supervisory resources are scarce, supervisors
should avoid repeating the work of external auditors. In such situations,
auditors have a broader mandate prescribed by law, but at a minimum it
is important to establish adequate liaison mechanisms.
THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC
The investors-depositors as market participants have to accept responsi-
bility for their own investment decisions. Perhaps the greatest disservice
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BOX 3.5 The Responsibilities of External Auditors
External auditors have the responsibility to undertake the following:
• Evaluate risks inherent in the banks they are auditing; 
• Analyze and evaluate information presented to them to ensure that it makes sense; 
• Understand the essence of transactions and financial engineering (structures) used by the
client bank; 
• Review management’s adherence to board policies and procedures; 
• Review the information supplied to the board, shareholders, and regulators; 
• Review adherence to statutory requirements; 
• Report to the board, shareholders, and regulators on the fair presentation of information
submitted to them.
that the authorities have done to investors—particularly in jurisdictions
where explicit deposit insurance does not exist—is to create the illusion
that regulators can guarantee the safety of the public’s deposits. When all
is said and done, investors must understand that no amount of manage-
ment or regulatory protection can take away their own responsibility for
decisions regarding their investments. Investors and depositors retain
responsibility for applying sound principles in the diversification of risk
and in the assessment of a financial institution. In situations where con-
sumers cannot protect themselves, a limited deposit insurance scheme for
banks and simplified contractual disclosure for insurance companies and
other portfolio managers may be considered.
The only way for the public to protect itself is to understand who is
taking the risk: individuals as investors acting through agents (investment
managers and brokers) or financial intermediaries pooling their funds
and acting as principals (banks). When this distinction is clear and the
public understands the risks that investment entails, the principal role of
financial intermediaries will be to ensure that consumers are protected.
This will be particularly true if the fit and proper requirement is applied
to all providers of financial services.
The concept of “public” should be expanded to include the financial
media and analysts, such as stockbrokers, other advisers, and rating agen-
cies. In addition, the market’s ability to provide a basis for informed deci-
sions must be improved through full disclosure of the financial statements
of banks as well as by informed and competent analysis in the media.
Investors’ interests can be safeguarded in more than one way, but disclosure
of what is actually happening is essential.
As a general principle, much of the justification for banking regula-
tion rests on imperfections in information disclosure.A policy of adequate
information provision would help to mitigate this underlying problem
and possibly allow for the removal of many of the quantitative constraints
that are prevalent in banking today.Emphasis on transparency and account-
ability of management would also reduce the compliance costs and regu-
latory distortions that are often associated with conventional approaches
to banking regulation.
Probably the most promising solution to these problems is legally
mandated public disclosure. Louis Brandeis, a U.S. Supreme Court jus-
tice, observed in 1913 that sunlight is the best of disinfectants and elec-
tric light the most efficient policeman. This quaint-sounding aphorism
still holds true. Brandeis made another crucial point: to be effective, dis-
closure must be made public. One of the most important benefits of
mandating public disclosure is that the knowledge that information has
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to be disclosed publicly affects the conduct of financial institutions.
Boards of directors and management know that, after being assimilated
by the financial press and competitors, even the most highly technical
information will filter through to the public. In the United States and
other countries with strict information disclosure requirements, the
threat of private litigation increases the incentive for management and
boards to avoid problems.
Another form of public disclosure occurs when entities such as Stan-
dard and Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, and AM Best publish their
ratings of companies. Ideally, these private rating agencies balance the
need for public disclosure and for confidentiality, since they receive a
great deal of information that is made public only in the form of ratings.
Through published ratings, they have the ability to act quickly and have
a more subtle effect than regulators commonly do. If rating agencies can
build a reputation for reliability among financial analysts, senior man-
agement in banking institutions, and the broader public, they can provide
an additional form of risk management for banks.
Market discipline could, therefore, be encouraged as an effective means
to reduce the burden on regulators with regard to large, sophisticated
investors. The role of financial analysts in assisting the public with risk
management should not be underestimated. Financial analysts provide
investment advice to clients and are therefore accustomed to presenting
financial data from the perspective of investment risk. Investors who buy
bank-negotiable certificates of deposit and other wholesale money market
instruments should bear risk along with the creditors of bank holding com-
panies. Faced with the possibility of losing their investments, such investors
will police banks in order to protect their interests. Although all regulation
can be left to the market, a policy of sharing resources between authorities
and the private sector is bound to be more effective than a policy of having
the parties act alone.
Nonetheless, institutions are sometimes downgraded only when
extensive problems have already developed and when substantial, some-
times fatal, damage has been done. The question remains whether the
market at large could have recognized deterioration or excessive risk tak-
ing at a sufficiently early stage if more information had been available. It
will likely take a long time to develop techniques for the evaluation of risk
and to standardize them in such a way as to capture them in published
data. Market players are therefore limited in their ability to see credit
problems as they develop. The experience of the 1980s, when each major
credit problem surprised the market, is likely to remain the general pat-
tern for the foreseeable future.
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If market analysts cannot identify and properly evaluate credit and
other problems until substantial harm has been done, market discipline
will be insufficient to protect the overall safety of the banking system or
of deposit insurance funds. In fact, the belated imposition of market
pressure may complicate the task that supervisors have in dealing with
problems. Consequently, the need for mechanisms to protect small and
less-sophisticated investors will continue to exist.
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As emphasized in the previous chapter, corporate governance is acollective effort and the process itself functions optimally only when
different stakeholders work collectively. As the Islamic banking industry
has developed, several institutions have played important roles. New
institutions to support further growth are emerging and becoming stake-
holders in the fast-growing industry. This chapter focuses on the role of
relevant stakeholders in the public and private sectors and discusses the
significance of each. The players in the Islamic finance industry include
the internal stakeholders, the different interest groups, and the institutions
created to regulate, promote, and monitor their activity (see table 4.1).
INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 
This section presents the key players within Islamic financial institutions
and their general roles in the industry.
Bank regulators and supervisors act as facilitators in the process of risk
management. As such, they enhance and monitor the statutory frame-
work in which risk management is undertaken. By creating a sound
enabling environment, they have a crucial role in influencing the other
key players.
Ultimate responsibility for the way in which a bank’s business is con-
ducted lies with the board of directors. The board sets the strategic direction,
appoints management, establishes operational policies, and, which is most
important, is responsible for ensuring that the bank is sound.
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Key Messages
• Effective stakeholder participation is integral to good corporate governance. The stakeholders in
the Islamic finance industry include the internal stakeholders, the different interest groups, and
the institutions created to regulate, promote, and monitor their activities.
• Shariah boards are a distinct feature of Islamic banks. Operating at the institutional and systemic
level, Shariah boards have a great responsibility to protect the rights of all stakeholders according
to the principles of Shariah.
• Shariah boards play a critical role in the introduction of new products and the provision of an over-
sight function.
• Multilateral institutions have played an important role in the development and growth of Islamic
markets and banks. The Islamic Development Bank is dedicated to that purpose. The International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank have contributed through research.
• Several key institutions such as Islamic Financial Services Board and the Accounting and Audit-
ing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions were established to strengthen regulatory
framework.
• New stakeholders are emerging to develop financial infrastructure, including institutions dedicated
to developing capital markets, rating agencies, and institutions that help to manage liquidity. 
Executive management of a bank has to be “fit and proper,” meaning
not only that managers subscribe to standards of ethical behavior, but
also that they have the competence and experience to run the bank.
Because the management is responsible for implementing the board’s
policies on a day-to-day basis, it is vital that managers have intimate
knowledge of the financial risks being managed.
The audit committee and the internal auditors should be regarded as an
extension of the board’s risk management policy function. Internal auditors
traditionally perform an independent appraisal of a bank’s compliance with
its internal control systems, accounting practices, and information systems.
Most internal auditors provide assurance regarding the bank’s corporate
governance, control systems, and risk management processes. Although
audit committees play a valuable role in identifying and addressing areas of
risk, the prime responsibility for risk management cannot be abdicated to
them; rather, it should be integrated into all levels of management.
External auditors have come to play an important role in evaluating
the quality of risk-based financial information. Since bank supervisors
neither can nor should repeat the work done by external auditors, proper
mechanisms are necessary to facilitate communication between bank super-
visors and external auditors and between them and bank management. The
audit should be risk oriented rather than based on the traditional balance
sheet and income statement. Relying too heavily on external auditors
weakens the partnership, especially if doing so weakens the management
and supervisory roles.
Shariah boards at the institutional and systemic level have a great
responsibility to protect the rights of all stakeholders according to the prin-
ciples of Shariah. Investors, depositors, and users of the funds trust the
Shariah board to ensure that the institution is fully compliant with the
Shariah in all of its activities.
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TABLE 4.1 Importance of Key Stakeholders in the Islamic Finance Industry
Responsibility for
Key players risk management Policy level Operational level
Systemic
Legal and regulatory Optimize Critical n.a.
authorities
Bank supervisors Monitor Indirect (monitoring) Indirect
Institutional
Shareholders Appoint key players Indirect Indirect
Board of directors Set policy Critical Indirect
Executive management Implement policy Critical Critical
(implementation)
Audit committee, Test compliance with Indirect (compliance) Critical
internal audit board policies and 
provide assurance 
regarding corporate
governance, control
systems, and risk 
management processes
External auditors Evaluate and express Indirect (evaluation) n.a
opinion
Shariah boards Protect rights and Critical Critical
interests of stakeholders
in light of Shariah
principles
Consumer Be accountable for n.a. Indirect
own actions
Outside stakeholders, Act responsibly n.a. Indirect
public
Note: n.a.  Not applicable.
Importance
The Shariah board is composed of religious scholars. Islamic banks
cannot introduce a new product without prior permission and approval of
their Shariah board, and, depending on the affiliation of the religious
scholars on the board with any particular school of jurisprudential thought,
this can determine the success or failure of a product with its target clients.
Due to a shortage of Shariah scholars well versed in both Shariah and
modern banking, many Shariah scholars sit on multiple boards and exert
a great deal of influence.
The public and depositors are responsible for their own investment
decisions, and this requires transparent disclosure of financial infor-
mation and informed financial analyses. Widening the definition of
public to include the financial media, financial analysts such as stock-
brokers, and rating agencies would improve the ability of the public to
judge the appropriateness of different instruments. However, small or
unsophisticated depositors normally need more protection than simply
transparent disclosure.
Shareholders are in a position to appoint the people in charge of the
corporate governance process, and their conduct should be screened care-
fully to ensure that they do not intend to use the bank solely to finance their
own or their associates’ enterprises.
MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS1
Multilateral institutions have played an important role in the development
and growth of Islamic markets and banks. Multilateral institutions interact
with the Islamic banking industry in various capacities, and it is important
to understand and evaluate the relationship—past, present, and potential.
Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
Established by the Articles of Agreement in October 1975, the Islamic
Development Bank is a multilateral financial institution designed to foster
economic development and social progress in the 53 member countries of
the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and in Muslim communities
in nonmember countries. IDB provides financial assistance by way of
equity and lease financing (ijarah), installment sale financing (murabahah),
and grant (interest-free) loans for projects and assistance in promoting
foreign trade among member countries. Projects are financed from ordi-
nary capital resources through interest-free loans, leasing, installment sale,
and equity participation. More recently, the IDB has introduced the use of
istisnah (construction and manufacturing) contracts. In addition, technical
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assistance is available for facilitating the preparation and implementation
of projects, particularly in the least developed member countries by way of
grants (from a special assistance account) or through a combination of
(interest-free) loans and grants.
IDB has concentrated on the public sector, but the trends of global-
ization, the integration of international trading and financial systems, and
the dwindling of foreign funding for government-sponsored projects have
prompted the need for the private sector to play an active role in economic
development. Recognizing this need, in 1999 IDB established an inde-
pendent entity, Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private
Sector (ICD), to deal with the private sector in its member countries.
The new institution is expected to complement the role being played by
IDB in supporting economic development by helping to strengthen the
private sector in its member countries.
IDB has also established the Islamic Research and Training Institute
(IRTI) with the objectives of providing training facilities for professionals
engaged in development activities in member countries and undertaking
research in the areas of Islamic economics, finance, and banking. IRTI
serves as an information center, collecting and disseminating information
in related fields. In addition to publication of an academic journal on
Islamic economics, IRTI arranges both professional and academic seminars
and conferences to promote research on Islamic economics and banking.
In 2005 the IDB Board of Governors approved the establishment of
the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) to finance
trade activities of its member countries. Its main functions are as follows:
 To promote and facilitate among OIC member countries the use of
Shariah-compliant instruments;
 To become a leader in the development and diversification of financial
instruments and Shariah-compliant products for trade financing;
 To facilitate access of member countries and enterprises to interna-
tional capital markets;
 To stimulate development of investment opportunities and enhance
export capabilities of member countries;
 To provide technical assistance and training to local banks in member
countries in trade finance-related areas;
 To offer advisory services to member countries and institutions on
matters relevant to its core objectives.
The practices and performance of IDB have been rather different
from what was originally envisaged, as its critics argue that the benefits to
poorer Muslim countries have been limited. Although trade credit has
grown, equity financing has languished despite all the efforts made to
promote it. For IDB, exiting from its equity investments and recovering
its capital have been virtually impossible in the absence of developed
stock markets in most Muslim countries. Consequently, a considerable
portion of its equity assets are tied up and illiquid.
It has been argued that IDB’s performance, with respect to coordi-
nating the activities of the banking sector and taking on certain central
bank functions, has been below expectations. Member countries with
balance-of-payments difficulties have not been able to convince IDB to
act as a lender of last resort. Further, IDB has been slow to recognize the
need for investment in development and infrastructure projects, even
though most of its member countries are in desperate need of them. The
initial expectations were that ICD would perform at a high level, but its
setup and operations have been slow, which has dampened hopes that it
may play the role originally envisioned. Due to limited market-based
resource mobilization, the institution is unable to lend at competitive
terms. IDB has issued two sukuks (Islamic bonds) to tap into capital mar-
kets, and it is hoped that, with more frequent access to capital markets,
the institution will be able to expand its operations.
There is validity in some of these criticisms, which raises serious con-
cerns about the effectiveness of the institution in light of its objectives.From
the IDB’s point of view, its constituent countries represent a wide spectrum
of economies, from the richest to the poorest and from the least to the most
indebted, making it difficult to achieve its original objectives. Nevertheless,
to be effective, the IDB needs to take a leadership role in the wake of grow-
ing globalization and integration of financial markets and to develop strate-
gies for promoting the development of institutions, markets, and financial
infrastructure conducive to Islamic financial institutions. The IDB also has
a role to play in serving as a forum for the formulation of common posi-
tions for OIC countries and advancing them in major international
forums. It needs to make its voice heard on major issues concerning the
new international financial architecture, ranging from international trade
to globalization. IDB also needs to coordinate with other development insti-
tutions and to participate in sustainable development in member countries.
Bretton Woods Institutions 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has demonstrated a degree of
interest in creating an Islamic financial system since the early 1980s, when
two of its member countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan,
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decided to change their banking systems to comply with the tenets of
Islam. The IMF’s involvement and contributions have evolved through
three distinct phases since 1984. In the first phase (1984–88), the IMF
initiated a modest program of research, which helped to establish the theo-
retical foundations of an Islamic financial system, the operations of
Islamic banking, and the conduct of monetary policy within an Islamic
system. In the second phase, which began in the 1990s, the IMF began
working with the central banks of Islamic countries where Islamic banking
was being practiced, providing technical assistance and sharing knowledge
with respect to monetary policy, central bank financial operations, regu-
lations, and supervision. The IMF’s work in Sudan is noteworthy, as IMF
worked closely with the Central Bank of Sudan to transform the central
banking operations to conform with the Shariah. During the third phase
(beginning in the late 1990s), the IMF began to assist Muslim countries
in establishing multilateral institutions and to facilitate cooperation
among them, notably on issues such as establishing an Islamic money
market, an Islamic capital market, and an international Islamic banking
and financial supervisory and standard-setting institution.
The World Bank’s direct involvement with Islamic financial institu-
tions has been minimal, as the institution deals primarily with the public
sector. The World Bank has been involved in the development of financial
systems, which has led to greater emphasis on financial sector and private
sector development in developing countries. With this perspective, the
Bank is working closely with its member countries where Islamic banking
institutions are operating, sharing knowledge and experience in the devel-
opment of legal, regulatory, accounting, and supervisory infrastructure.
The World Bank’s political risk guarantee, extended to participating
commercial banks in the form of an extended co-financing operation
(ECO) guarantee facility, was instrumental to the success of the private
financing of the Hub River project in Pakistan. The project was the first
to feature an Islamic markup-based, limited-recourse facility and the first
to receive mobilization finance in the form of an istisnah facility, which
was provided by the Al Rajhi Banking Corporation to finance the purchase
and installation of power turbines. The ECO guarantee specifically pro-
tected foreign commercial lenders in the event that their claims were prej-
udiced by any change made in the Islamic Shariah. This so-called
“Shariah event” protection was deemed to be critical in the project and
was instrumental in achieving a mix of conventional and Islamic financing
in a single project structure. More recently, the World Bank has made a
valuable contribution by conducting research in Islamic finance in the
area of regulation, governance, risk management, and standards.
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The International Finance Corporation (IFC), a private sector arm of
the World Bank Group, has transaction-oriented experience with Islamic
financial institutions. IFC not only promotes capital market development
but also supports project-oriented infrastructure investment, which con-
stitutes one-third of its total worldwide financial portfolio in sectors like
power, telecommunications, transportation, utilities, roads, ports, and
water. IFC has been involved in the financing of more than $7 billion for
conventional infrastructure projects costing more than $30 billion in
developing countries. There are some commonalities between IFC’s busi-
ness model and Islamic finance, such as a preference for equity modes of
financing,higher risk tolerance when entering new and innovative products,
and familiarity with the emerging markets,which Western and conventional
investors often consider to be higher risk.
The roles of the World Bank and IFC in Islamic finance need revisiting,
as there is significant potential for cooperation and collaboration between
the parties. The IFC, which would like to play a catalytic role in attracting
international institutions and thus boost confidence and growth in the
local market, needs to be involved more actively with developing Muslim
countries, some of which are perceived to be high risk. IFC’s capital market
operations and advisory services could share their extensive experience
with conventional finance, emerging markets, credit assessment setups,
transparency, and liquidity enhancement techniques with Islamic countries
interested in fostering Islamic financial institutions. Similarly, Islamic
financial institutions could benefit from the IFC’s cooperation in the area
of project and infrastructure finance, where IFC has considerable experi-
ence. However, this cooperation cannot take place unless the necessary
financial infrastructure and framework are developed in Muslim countries,
a task where the involvement of IMF, IDB, and the World Bank is badly
needed. Collectively, multilateral institutions could contribute to the devel-
opment of Islamic financial systems by providing advisory services and
technical assistance, by becoming market makers, and by working with the
central banks to develop the needed infrastructure.
Countries that are determined to establish Islamic financial institu-
tions need to exercise their rights as members of multilateral institutions to
tap into the experience and expertise of such institutions. This would give
multilateral institutions the incentive to invest time and resources in under-
standing Islamic financial markets and helping these countries to devise
solutions to the challenges they face.2 Another area of cooperation between
the World Bank and Islamic financial institutions is the transfer of knowl-
edge in treasury operations, asset management, and risk controls, areas
where Islamic financial institutions have a shortage of technical expertise.
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REGULATORY BODIES
Market participants’ anticipation of the growth of the Islamic finance
industry as well as its potential impact has raised public policy issues in
the jurisdictions in which it operates. Accordingly, Islamic financial inter-
mediation has attracted increasing attention from international organiza-
tions, international standard setters, national regulatory authorities,
policy makers, and academia. Attention has been directed most notably
on the Islamic financial institution’s risk management practices, the broad
institutional environment in which they operate, and the regulatory
framework that governs them. Several institutions have been established
as focal points on major issues, in particular the Accounting and Auditing
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, the Islamic Financial
Services Board, the International Islamic Financial Markets, the Inter-
national Islamic Rating Agency, and the Liquidity Management Center.
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
The objective of the Bahrain-based AAOIFI is to develop a core set of
accounting, auditing, governance, and (recently) Shariah standards for
Islamic financial institutions. There are clear differences between the
balance sheet structure of an Islamic financial institution and that of a
typical conventional bank. The latter deals mainly with spread-based
fixed-income instruments, whereas the major component of an Islamic
bank’s liabilities and assets consists of investment accounts on a profit-
sharing basis. Such differences have important implications for accounting
and financial reporting. AAOIFI is attempting to resolve these differences
and considers its accounting standards as being complementary to, rather
than in conflict with, International Accounting Standards (IAS), aiming
to fill the gaps in IAS, which do not have specific standards dealing with
Islamic banking transactions.
Similar to accounting standards, Islamic financial institutions are
exposed to differing prudential and supervisory standards depending on
the country in which they operate. This is mainly due to the lack of proper
understanding of the work of Islamic financial institutions and also to the
implementation of different accounting standards. This was evident in
the results of a study carried out by a committee comprising, among others,
a number of central banks and AAOIFI that was formed to develop
appropriate capital adequacy guidelines for Islamic financial institutions.
This committee promulgated the Statement on the Purpose and Calculation
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of the Capital Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks, which takes into account
the differences between deposit accounts in conventional banking and
investment accounts in Islamic banking. This statement has built on
the capital adequacy principles laid down by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision.
Notable are AAOIFI’s efforts to inform and encourage banking
supervisors around the world to adopt the AAOIFI standards as the
benchmark for Islamic financial institutions in their jurisdiction. These
efforts to improve the transparency and comparability of the financial
reporting of Islamic financial institutions are bearing fruit. The banking
supervisors in a number of countries such as Bahrain and Sudan either
require Islamic banks to comply with AAOIFI’s standards or, as in the case
of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are specifying AAOIFI’s standards as guide-
lines. In the Middle East, this leaves out Egypt, Kuwait, Tunisia, and the
United Arab Emirates, where there are substantial Islamic banks. How-
ever, in European and Western markets, supervisors have not yet given
these standards serious consideration. Countries such as Bahrain, Malaysia,
and Sudan have led the drive toward developing specific regulatory guide-
lines for the Islamic banking industry. Recently, the central bank governors
of those states where Islamic banks operate—mainly in Southeast Asia,
the Middle East, and North Africa—met to approve the establishment of
a new international body, the Islamic Financial Services Board, which will
have a role similar to that of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)
The IFSB was established in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 2002 as a result of
the efforts of AAOIFI, Islamic Development Bank, International Monetary
Fund, and the central banks of several Islamic countries. The IFSB has 110
members, including 27 regulatory and supervisory authorities as well as 78
financial institutions from 21 countries. The government of Malaysia has
enacted the Islamic Financial Services Board Act 2002, which gives the IFSB
the immunities and privileges usually granted to international organiza-
tions and diplomatic missions.
The primary objective of IFSB is to develop uniform regulatory and
transparency standards to address characteristics specific to Islamic
financial institutions, keeping in mind the national financial environ-
ment, international standards, core principles, and good practices. The
IFSB also is promoting awareness of issues that are relevant to or have
an impact on the regulation and supervision of the Islamic financial
services industry. These efforts mainly take the form of international
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conferences, seminars, workshops, trainings, meetings, and dialogues
staged in many countries. In December 2005, the Council of the IFSB
adopted two standards—the Guiding Principles of Risk Management
and the Capital Adequacy Standard—for institutions offering only
Islamic financial services. This was followed by Corporate Governance
in December 2006 and guidelines on the supervisory review process,
transparency, market discipline, capital adequacy, and governance are
at various stages of development.
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM)
The major objectives of the IIFM are (a) to enhance cooperation among
regulatory authorities of Islamic banks, (b) to address the liquidity problem
by expanding the maturity structure of instruments, and (c) to explore the
possibility of sovereign asset-backed securities. As part of this initiative,
Malaysia has been working to establish a center to provide liquidity-
enhancing products with the long-term objective of developing an Islamic
interbank money market. More recently, IIFM has signed a memorandum
of understanding with the International Capital Markets Association
(ICMA) to collaborate on the development of primary and secondary
markets for Islamic bonds (sukuks). Both associations have established
working groups to coordinate efforts to facilitate standardized documen-
tation and industry practices for floating and trading Islamic bonds.
International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA)
The IIRA aims to assist in the development of regional financial markets by
providing an assessment of the risk profile of entities and instruments that
can be used for investment decisions. IIRA is sponsored by multilateral
finance institutions, several leading banks and other financial institutions,
and rating agencies from different countries. The organization has a board
of directors and an independent rating committee as well as a Shariah
board. The IIRA’s mission is to support development of the regional capital
market and to improve its functioning.
The Shariah quality rating provided does not aim to give a Shariah
opinion on Islamic financial products, to comment on the decisions of the
Shariah committees of banks and financial institutions, or to correct their
fatwas (proclamations). IIRA’s role is to assess the level of compliance by
the institutions with the stipulations adopted by their Shariah committee
in good faith, both in letter and in spirit. They also examine whether there
is a mechanism within the institution to evaluate its compliance with
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the Shariah and whether the Shariah committee has enough authority,
information, and resources to perform the examination and evaluation.
Liquidity Management Center 
The Liquidity Management Center was established to facilitate investment
of the surplus funds of Islamic banks and financial institutions into quality
short- and medium-term financial instruments structured in accordance
with the Shariah principles. It assists Islamic financial institutions in man-
aging their short-term liquidity and supports the interbank market. In
addition, the center attracts assets from governments, financial institutions,
and corporates in both the private and public sectors in many countries.
The assets are securitized into readily transferable securities or structured
into other innovative investment instruments. The center also offers
Islamic advisory services dealing with structured, project, and corporate
finance as well as equity raising. The equal shareholders include Bahrain
Islamic Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, Islamic Development Bank, and Kuwait
Finance House.
The key objectives are as follows:
 Facilitate the creation of an interbank money market that will allow
Islamic financial institutions to manage their asset-liability mismatch;
 Enable Islamic financial institutions to participate as both investors
(providers of funds) and borrowers (providers of assets);
 Provide short-term liquid, tradable, asset-backed treasury instruments
(sukuks) in which Islamic financial institutions can invest their surplus
liquidity;
 Provide short-term investment opportunities that have greater Shariah
credibility and are priced more competitively than commodity muraba-
hah transactions;
 Enable Islamic financial institutions to assume term-risk securities
and liquidate such assets to improve the quality of their portfolios;
 Endeavor to create secondary market activity with designated market
makers where such instruments can be traded actively.
NOTE
1. Iqbal and Tsubota (2005).
2. The World Bank has been providing advisory services in the areas of regula-
tion, governance, and financial disclosure to select Gulf Cooperation Council
countries with reference to the prevailing conventional financial system.
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Two
Risk Management
P A R T
The goal of financial management is to maximize the value of a bank, asdefined by its profitability and risk level. Financial management com-
prises risk management, a treasury function, financial planning and budg-
eting, accounting and information systems, and internal controls. In
practical terms, the key aspect of financial management is risk management,
which covers strategic and capital planning,asset-liability management,and
the management of a bank’s business and financial risks. The central com-
ponents of risk management are the identification, quantification, and
monitoring of the risk profile, including both banking and financial risks.
RISK EXPOSURE AND MANAGEMENT
Many types of risks may be present in an individual bank (see table 5.1).
Financial risks are subject to complex interdependencies that may signifi-
cantly increase a bank’s overall risk profile. For example, a bank engaged in
foreign currency business is normally exposed to currency risk, but it is also
exposed to liquidity, credit, and repricing risks if it carries open positions or
mismatches in its forward book. Operational risks are related to a bank’s
organization and functioning, including computer-related and other tech-
nologies, compliance with bank policies and procedures, and measures
against mismanagement and fraud.Business risks are associated with a bank’s
business environment, including macroeconomic and policy concerns, legal
and regulatory factors, and the financial sector’s infrastructure, such as
payment systems and auditing professions. Event risks include all types of
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Key Messages
• Analytical techniques facilitate an understanding of interrelationships between risk areas internally
and among different banks. 
• Trend analysis provides information regarding the volatility and movement of an individual bank’s
financial indicators over different time periods.
• The percentage composition of the balance sheet, income statement, and various account group-
ings enables comparison between time periods but also between different banking 
institutions at a given point in time.
• Ratios are often interrelated and, when analyzed in combination, provide useful information
regarding risk.
• Computation of ratios and trends provides an answer only as to what happened.
• Analysis of the results should be performed by asking why events occurred, the impact of those
events, and what action management should take to rectify a situation or continue a desired trend.
exogenous risks that, if they were to materialize, could jeopardize a bank’s
operations or undermine its financial condition and capital adequacy.
Risk management normally involves several steps for each type of
financial risk and for the risk profile overall. These steps include identifying
the risk management objective, risk management targets, and measures
TABLE 5.1 Banking Risk Exposures
Financial risks Operational risks Business risks Event risks
Balance sheet structure Internal fraud Macro policy Political 
Income statement External fraud Financial Contagion
structure and profitability infrastructure
Capital adequacy Employment practices Legal Banking crisis
and workplace safety infrastructure
Credit Clients, products, Legal liability Other
and business services exogeneous risks
Liquidity Damage to Regulatory
physical assets compliance
Market Business disruption Reputational 
and system failures and fiduciary 
(technology risk)
Interest rate Execution, delivery, Country risk
and process management
Currency
of performance. Also important are the identification and measurement of
specific risk exposures, including an assessment of the sensitivity of
performance to expected and unexpected changes in underlying factors.
Decisions must also be made regarding the acceptable degree of risk
exposure, the methods and instruments available to hedge excessive expo-
sure, and the choice and execution of hedging transactions. In addition, the
responsibility for various aspects of risk management must be assigned, the
effectiveness of the risk management process must be assessed, and the
competent and diligent execution of responsibilities must be ensured.
Effective risk management, especially for larger banks and for banks
operating in deregulated and competitive markets, requires a formal
process. In developing economies, especially those in transition, unsta-
ble, economically volatile, and shallow market environments significantly
expand the range and magnitude of exposure to financial risk. Such
conditions render risk management even more complex and make the
need for an effective risk management process even more acute. The key
components of effective risk management that should be present in a
bank and be assessed by the analyst normally include the following:
 An established line function at the highest level of the bank’s manage-
ment hierarchy that is specifically responsible for managing risk and
possibly also for coordinating the operational implementation of the
policies and decisions of the asset-liability committee. The risk manage-
ment function should be on par with other major functions and be
accorded the necessary visibility and leverage within the bank.
 An established,explicit, and clear risk management strategy and a related
set of policies with corresponding operational targets.Various risk man-
agement strategies exist, having originated from different approaches to
interpreting interdependencies between risk factors and differences of
opinion concerning the treatment of volatility in risk management.
 Introduction of an appropriate degree of formalization and coordina-
tion of strategic decision making in relation to the risk management
process. Relevant risk management concerns and parameters for deci-
sion making on the operational level should be incorporated for all
relevant business and functional processes. Parameters for the main
financial risk factors (normally established according to the risk man-
agement policies of a bank and expressed as ratios or limits) can serve
as indicators to business units of what constitutes acceptable risk. For
example, a debt-to-equity ratio for a bank’s borrowers expresses a level
of credit risk. Maximum exposure to a single client is a risk parameter
that indicates credit risk in a limited form.
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 Implementation of a process that bases business and portfolio
decisions on rigorous quantitative and qualitative analyses within
applicable risk parameters. This process, including analysis of a
consolidated risk profile, is necessary due to the complex interdepen-
dencies of and the need to balance various financial risk factors.
Because the risk implications of a bank’s financial position and
changes to that position are not always obvious, details may be of
critical importance.
 Systematic gathering of complete, timely,and consistent data relevant for
risk management and provision of adequate data storage and manipula-
tion capacity. Data should cover all functional and business processes, as
well as other areas such as macroeconomic and market trends that may
be relevant to risk management.
 Development of quantitative modeling tools to enable the simulation
and analysis of the effects of changes in economic, business, and mar-
ket environments on a bank’s risk profile and their impact on the
bank’s liquidity, profitability, and net worth. Computer models used
by banks range from simple personal computer–based tools to elab-
orate mainframe modeling systems. Such models can be built in-
house or be acquired from other financial institutions with a similar
profile, specialized consulting firms, or software vendors. The degree
of sophistication and analytical capacity of such models may indicate
early on the seriousness of the bank’s efforts to manage risk.
The new Basel Capital Accord will heighten the importance of quan-
titative modeling tools and the bank’s capacity to use them, as they will
provide a basis for implementing the internal ratings-based (IRB)
approach to measuring a bank’s capital adequacy. It is hoped that the
IRB approach will bring additional sensitivity to risk, in that it will be
more sensitive to the drivers of credit risk and economic loss in a bank’s
portfolio and create incentives for the bank to continuously improve its
internal risk management practices.
It has been said that risk rises exponentially with the pace of change,
but that bankers are slow to adjust their perception of risk. In practical
terms, this implies that the market’s ability to innovate is often greater
than its ability to understand and properly accommodate the accompa-
nying risk. Traditionally, banks have seen the management of credit risk
as their most important task, but as banking has changed and the market
environment has become more complex and volatile, awareness has
developed of the critical need to manage exposure to other operational
and financial risks as well.
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UNDERSTANDING THE RISK ENVIRONMENT
The changing banking environment presents major opportunities for banks
but also entails complex,variable risks that challenge traditional approaches
to bank management. In order to survive in a market-oriented envi-
ronment, withstand competition by foreign banks, and support private
sector–led economic growth, banks must be able to manage financial risk.
An external evaluation of the capacity of a bank to operate safely and
productively in its business environment is normally performed once
each year. All annual assessments are similar in nature, but they have
slightly different focuses, depending on the purpose of the assessment.
Assessments are performed by supervisory authorities, external auditors,
and others.
Supervisory authorities assess whether the bank is viable, meets its
regulatory requirements, and is capable of fulfilling its financial commit-
ments to depositors and other creditors. They also verify whether or not
the bank’s operations are likely to jeopardize the safety of the banking
system as a whole.
External auditors assess whether financial statements provide a true
and fair view of the bank’s actual condition. Normally retained by the
bank’s board of directors, they also assess whether or not management
meets the objectives established by the board and evaluate whether or not
it exposes the bank’s capital to undue risks. Banks are normally required
to undergo an external audit that involves at least year-end financial state-
ments and that is considered satisfactory to supervisory authorities.
The financial viability and institutional weaknesses of a bank are also
evaluated through financial assessments, extended portfolio reviews, or
limited assurance reviews. Such evaluations often occur when a third
party evaluates credit risk that the bank poses, for example, in the context
of the following:
 Participation in a credit-line operation of an international lending
agency or receipt of a credit line or loan from a foreign bank;
 Establishment of correspondent banking relationships or access to
international markets;
 Equity investment by an international lending agency, private investors,
or foreign banks;
 Inclusion in a bank rehabilitation program.
The bank appraisal process normally includes an assessment of the
institution’s overall risk profile, financial condition, viability, and future
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prospects. The appraisal comprises off- and on-site examinations to the
extent considered necessary. If serious institutional weaknesses are found
to exist, appropriate corrective actions are recommended. If the institution
is not considered viable in its current condition, actions are presented
that may lead to its viability being reasonably assured or to its liquidation
and closure. The bank review also assesses whether the condition of the
institution can be remedied with reasonable assistance or presents a hazard
to the banking sector as a whole.
In the case of Islamic banks, added attention must be paid to the con-
tractual role (see table 5.2) of the bank concerned, when analyzing the
risks inherent in the bank’s assets and liabilities.
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TABLE 5.2 Contractual Role and Risk in Islamic Banking
Risk: Contractual role of the Islamic bank
Principal/Agent:
Trustee: Partnership: Conventional 
Contractual Agency, Investment commercial 
Balance sheet Basis brokerage banking banking
Liabilities: Funding sources
Demand deposits Amanah (trust) 
Investment accounts Mudarabah 
Special investment accounts Mudarabah 
Musharakah 
(partnership)
Reserves Amanah (trust)
Equity: shareholders’ funds Musharakah 
(partnership)
Assets: Application of funds
Cash balances Cash balances
Financing assets Murabahah 
Bay’ al-salaam 
Bay’ al muajjil 
Ijarah, istisnah  
Investment assets Mudarabah
musharakah  
Investment in real estate Mudarabah
musharakah
Property ownership Ownership
Fee-based services Joalah, kifalah   
The conclusions and recommendations of a bank appraisal are typi-
cally expressed in a letter to shareholders, in a memorandum of under-
standing, or as an institutional development program. The most common
objective of the latter is to describe priorities for improvement, as identi-
fied in the analyst’s review, that would yield the greatest benefit to the
institution’s financial performance. To the extent considered necessary,
such recommendations are accompanied by supporting documentation,
flow charts, and other relevant information about current practices. The
institutional development program often serves as the basis for discussions
among the institution’s management, government officials, and interna-
tional lending agencies, which in turn implement the recommended
improvements and decide what technical assistance is needed.
The process of bank analysis also occurs within the context of mone-
tary policy making. Central banks have a mission to maintain a stable cur-
rency and economy. Three interrelated functions are critical to monetary
stability: the implementation of monetary policy, the supervision of banks,
and the monitoring of the payments system. All three functions must take
place to ensure stability. For this reason, banking supervision cannot be
divorced from the wider mission of monetary authorities. Although the
attention of central banking policy focuses on the macroeconomic aspect
of general equilibrium and price stability, micro considerations regarding
the liquidity and solvency of individual banks are key to attaining stability.
Analysis of the Overall Banking Sector
The banking sector as a whole provides important information regarding
the provision of finance to the real sector. Sectoral analysis is important
because it allows norms to be established for either the sector as a whole or
for a peer group within the sector. The performance of individual banking
institutions can then be evaluated on the basis of these norms. Deviations
from expected trends and relationships may be analyzed further, as they
may disclose not only the risk faced by individual banks but also changes
in the financial environment of the banking sector as a whole. By examin-
ing sector statistics, analysts can gain an understanding of changes that are
occurring in the industry and of the impact of such changes on economic
agents and sectors.
Banking statistics also provide insight into conditions in both the
domestic and international economies. Financial innovation normally
results in changes to measured economic variables, and as a result of this
dynamism the monetary models of macroeconomists may not reflect
reality.
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The impact of banking activities on monetary statistics, such as figures
for the money supply and credit extended to the domestic private sector,
is also of concern to policymakers. Reviews of banks can serve as a
structured mechanism to ensure that monetary authorities recognize and
quantify nonintermediated funding and lending as well as other processes
that are important to policy makers in the central bank. Taking a struc-
tured approach to evaluating banks makes sector statistics readily avail-
able for macroeconomic monetary analysis, which helps bank supervisors
to assist monetary authorities in a meaningful way.
Understanding banking risk in a competitive and volatile market
environment is therefore a complex process. In addition to effective
management and supervision, sound and sustainable macroeconomic
policies are needed, as are well-developed and consistent legal frameworks.
Adequate financial sector infrastructure, effective market discipline, and
sufficient banking sector safety nets are crucial. To attain a meaningful
assessment and interpretation of particular findings, estimates of future
potential, diagnosis of key issues, and formulation of effective and
practical courses of action, bank analysts must have extensive knowledge
of the particular regulatory, market, and economic environment in
which a bank operates. In short, to do the job well, analysts must have a
holistic perspective of the financial system even when considering a
specific bank.
Financial Analysis 
Financial analysis assesses a company’s performance and trends in that
performance. In essence, analysts convert data into financial metrics that
assist in decision making, seeking to answer various questions: How suc-
cessfully has the company performed, relative to its own past perform-
ance and relative to its competitors? How is the company likely to
perform in the future? Based on expectations about future performance,
what is the value of this company or the securities it issues?
A primary source of data is a company’s financial reports, including
the financial statements, footnotes, and management’s discussion and
analysis. Whether financial reports are prepared under the Accounting
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)
or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), they do not nec-
essarily contain all the information needed to perform effective financial
analysis. While financial statements do contain data about the past
performance of a company (its income and cash flows) as well as its
financial condition (assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity) on the date of
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the financial statement (which might be a couple of months ago in 
some jurisdictions), such statements may not provide some important
nonfinancial information and do not forecast future results. The financial
analyst must be capable of using the financial statements in conjunction
with other information. Accordingly, analysts will most likely need to
supplement the information found in a company’s financial reports with
industry and economic data.
Projections of future financial performance are used in determining
the value of a company or its equity component. Projections of future
financial performance are also used in credit analysis, particularly in
project finance or acquisition finance, to determine whether a company’s
cash flow will be adequate to pay the interest and principal on its debt
and to determine whether a company will likely be in compliance with
its financial covenants.
Sources of data for analysts’ projections include some or all of the
following: the company’s projections, the company’s previous financial
statements, industry structure and outlook, and macroeconomic forecasts.
Adjustments of a company’s financial statements are sometimes neces-
sary, for example when comparing companies that use different accounting
methods or assessing the impact of differences in key estimates. In practice,
required adjustments vary widely.
A number of business activities give rise to obligations that, although
they are economic liabilities of a company, are not required to be reported
on a company’s balance sheet. Including such off-balance-sheet obliga-
tions in a company’s liabilities can affect ratios and conclusions based on
such ratios. For example, in the case of an operating license, the rights of
the lessee (the party leasing the asset) may be very similar to the rights of
the owner, but for accounting purposes, an operating lease is treated like
a rental contract. The lessee simply records the periodic lease payment as
a period expense in its income statement. In contrast, if a company actu-
ally owns an asset, the asset is shown on the balance sheet along with any
corresponding liability, such as financing for the asset. For this reason,
international accounting standards state that the entities should record
operating leases on the balance sheet and avoid structures that obscure
the substance of the transaction.
RISK-BASED ANALYSIS OF BANKS
Whereas Islamic banks are different from conventional banks in their
form of financial intermediation, financial instruments, and structure
of financial statements, these institutions are nevertheless subject to a
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similar framework for analyzing their risk and exposures. The principles
and procedures for measuring and controlling risk are similar, so the
analytical framework for assessing risk should be similar as well.
The practices of bank supervisors and the appraisal methods of
financial analysts continue to evolve. This evolution is necessary in part
to meet the challenges of innovation and new developments and in part
to accommodate the broader convergence of international supervisory
standards and practices, which are themselves continually discussed by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Traditional banking analysis
is based on a range of quantitative supervisory tools for assessing a
bank’s condition, including ratios. Ratios normally relate to liquidity, the
adequacy of capital, quality of the investment portfolio, extent of insider
and connected lending, size of exposures, and open foreign exchange
positions. While these measurements are extremely useful, they are not
in themselves an adequate indication of the risk profile of a bank, the
stability of its financial condition, or its prospects.
The central technique for analyzing financial risk is the detailed
review of a bank’s balance sheet. Risk-based bank analysis includes
important qualitative factors and places financial ratios within a broad
framework of risk assessment and management and the changes or
trends in risks. It also underscores the relevant institutional aspects, such
as the quality and style of corporate governance and management;
the adequacy, completeness, and consistency of a bank’s policies and
procedures; the effectiveness and completeness of internal controls;
and the timeliness and accuracy of management information systems
and information support.
Where appropriate, a bank should be analyzed as both a single entity
and on a consolidated basis, taking into account exposures of subsidiaries
and other related enterprises at home and abroad. A holistic perspective
is necessary when assessing a bank on a consolidated basis, especially if
the institution is spread over a number of jurisdictions or foreign markets.
A broad view accommodates variations in the features of specific financial
risks that are present in different environments.
A risk-based analysis should also indicate whether an individual
institution’s behavior is in line with peer group trends and industry
norms, particularly when it comes to significant issues such as profitabil-
ity, structure of the balance sheet, and capital adequacy. A thorough
analysis can indicate the nature of and reasons for such deviations. A
material change in risk profile experienced by an individual institution
could be the result of unique circumstances that have no impact on the
banking sector as a whole or could be an early indicator of trends.
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The picture reflected by financial ratios also depends largely on the
timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of data used to compute them. For
this reason, the issue of usefulness and transparency is critical, as is account-
ability, which has become an important topic due to both the growing
importance of risk management for modern financial institutions and
the emerging philosophy of supervision.
ANALYSIS VERSUS COMPUTATION
Financial analysis is the discipline whereby analytical tools are applied to
financial statements and other financial data, in order to interpret trends
and relationships in a consistent and disciplined manner. In essence, the
analyst is in the business of converting data into information and thereby
enabling the screening and forecasting of information. A primary source
of information is the entity’s financial statements.
The objective of financial statements prepared according to IFRS
and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is to provide
information that is useful in making economic decisions. However,
even financial statements prepared to exacting international norms do
not contain all the information that an individual may need to perform
all of the necessary tasks, since they largely portray the effects of past
events and do not necessarily provide nonfinancial information.
Nonetheless, IFRS statements do contain data about the past perform-
ance of an entity (income and cash flows) as well as its current financial
condition (assets and liabilities) that are useful in assessing future
prospects and risks. The financial analyst must be capable of using the
financial statements in conjunction with other information in order to
reach valid investment conclusions.
Financial statement analysis (analytic review) normally comprises
a review of financial conditions and specific issues related to risk expo-
sure and risk management. Such reviews can be done off-site, whereas
an on-site review would cover a much larger number of topics and be
more concerned with qualitative aspects, including quality of corporate
governance, physical infrastructure, and management’s use of sound
management information. 
Integrating the various analytical components and techniques dis-
cussed in this chapter will distinguish a well-reasoned analysis from a
mere compilation of various pieces of information, computations, tables,
and graphs. The challenge is for the analyst to develop a storyline, pro-
viding context (country, macroeconomy, sector, accounting, auditing,
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and industry regulation, as well as any material limitations on the entity
being analyzed), a description of corporate governance, and financial and
operational risk and then relating the different areas of analysis by iden-
tifying how issues affect one another.
Before starting, the analyst should attempt to answer at least the
following questions:
 What is the purpose of the analysis?
 What level of detail will be needed?
 What factors or relationships (context) will influence the analysis?
 What are the analytical limitations, and will these limitations have the
potential to impair the analysis?
 What data are available? 
 How will data be processed?
 What methodologies will be used to interpret the data?
 How will conclusions and recommendations be communicated?
Too much of what passes for analysis is simply the calculation of a
series of ratios and verification of compliance with preset covenants or
regulations, without analysis and interpretation of the implications of the
calculations, establishing “what happened” without asking the more
important questions regarding why and its impact. Once the analyst is
sure that the overall approach and reasoning are sound, the analytic
review should focus on the following issues:
 What happened, established through computation or questionnaires;
 Why it happened, established through analysis;
 The impact of the event or trend, established through interpretation
of analysis;
 The response and strategy of management, established through eval-
uation of the quality of corporate governance;
 The recommendations of the analyst, established through interpreta-
tion and forecasting of results of the analysis;
 The vulnerabilities that should be highlighted, included in the recom-
mendations of the analyst.
An effective storyline—supporting final conclusions and recommen-
dations—is normally enhanced through the use of data spanning between
five and 10 years, as well as graphs, common-size financial statements,
and company and cross-sectional industry trends.
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The experienced analyst will distinguish between a computation-
based approach and an analytic approach. With certain modifications,
this process is similar to the approach used by risk-orientated financial
supervisors and regulators.
Table 5.3 illustrates the more general use of the tools discussed here.
In principle, the tools can be used during the entire bank analysis cycle.
They can help an analyst to diagnose thoroughly a bank’s financial con-
dition, risk exposures, and risk management, as well as to evaluate trends
and project future developments.
ANALYTICAL TOOLS 
There are many tools to assist with bank analysis, including questionnaires
and Excel models that could easily be adapted to an Islamic banking envi-
ronment. These often consist of a series of spreadsheet-based data-input
tables that enable an analyst to collect and manipulate data in a systematic
manner. This chapter does not discuss detailed steps regarding the use of
such tools; rather it provides a conceptual framework to explain their
background. The intention is to facilitate the development of similar tools
for Islamic financial institutions.
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TABLE 5.3 Stages of the Analytical Review Process
Analytical phase Sources of information Output
Structuring and collection Questionnaires, Completed input data,
of input data financial statements, questionnaires, and
and other financial data financial data tables
Processing of data Completed input data 
(questionnaires and 
financial data tables) Processed output data
Analysis of processed Input data and processed Analytical results
and structured output data output data
Development of Analytical results Report of off-site analysis
an off-site analysis report and previous reports and identification of
items to follow up
with management and
an on-site visit
Follow-up through on-site Off-site analytical report and Recommendation as to
review, audit, or other nonfinancial data obtained whether investment or 
physical verification during physical visit and granting of credit 
discussions with management should proceed
Questionnaires
Questionnaires and data tables should be completed by the bank being
evaluated. Questions should be designed to capture management’s per-
spective on and understanding of the bank’s risk management process.
The background and financial information requested in the questionnaire
will provide an overview of the bank as well as allow for assessment of the
quality and comprehensiveness of bank policies, management and control
processes, and financial and management information. Questions fall into
several categories, as follows:
 Institutional development needs;
 Overview of the financial sector and regulation;
 Overview of the bank (history and group and organizational structure);
 Accounting systems, management information, and internal controls;
 Information technology;
 Corporate governance, covering key players and accountabilities;
 Financial risk management, including asset-liability management,
profitability, credit risk, and the other major types of financial risk.
Data-Input Tables
To facilitate the gathering and provisioning of data, an analytical model
should contain a series of input tables for collecting financial data. The
data can then be used to create either ratios or graphs. Data tables are nor-
mally related to the major areas of financial risk management. The
balance sheet and income statements serve as anchor schedules, with
detail provided by all the other schedules. The output of an analytical
model (tables and graphs) can assist executives in the high-level inter-
pretation and analysis of a bank’s financial risk management process and
its financial condition.
Output Summary Reports
The framework described above envisages the production of tables,
ratios, and graphs based on manipulated input data. The report allows an
analyst to measure a bank’s performance and to judge the effectiveness of
its risk management process. Combined with the qualitative information
obtained from the questionnaire, these statistical tables and graphs make
up the raw material needed to carry out an informed analysis, as required
in off-site (or macro level) reports. The ratios cover the areas of risk
management in varying degrees of detail, starting with balance sheet and
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income statement schedules. The graphs provide a visual representation
of some of the analytical results and a quick snapshot of both the current
situation in banks (such as financial structure and the composition of
investment portfolios) and comparisons over time.
Ratios
A ratio is a mathematical expression of one quantity relative to another.
There are many relationships between financial accounts and between
expected relationships from one point in time to another. Ratios are a
useful way of expressing relationships in the following areas of risk:
 Activity (operational efficiency). The extent to which an entity uses its
assets efficiently, as measured by turnover of current assets and liabili-
ties and long-term assets;
 Liquidity. The entity’s ability to repay its short-term liabilities, measured
by evaluating components of current assets and current liabilities;
 Profitability. Relation between a company’s profit margins and sales,
average capital, and average common equity;
 Debt and leverage. The risk and return characteristics of the company,
as measured by the volatility of sales and the extent of the use of bor-
rowed money;
 Solvency. Financial risk resulting from the impact of the use of ratios
of debt to equity and cash flow to expense coverage;
 Earnings, share price, and growth. The rate at which an entity can grow
as determined by its earnings, share price, and retention of profits;
 Other ratios. Groupings representing the preferences of individual ana-
lysts in addition to ratios required by prudential regulators such as bank-
ing supervisors, insurance regulators, and securities market bodies.
Financial analysis provides insights that can assist the analyst in
making forward-looking projections. Financial ratios serve the follow-
ing purposes:
 Provide insights into the microeconomic relationships within a firm
that help analysts to project earnings and free cash flow (necessary to
determine entity value and creditworthiness);
 Provide insights into a firm’s financial flexibility, which is its ability to
obtain the cash required to meet financial obligations or to acquire
assets, even if unexpected circumstances should develop;
 Provide a means of evaluating management’s ability.
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Although they are extremely useful tools, ratios must be used with
caution. They do not provide complete answers about the bottom-line
performance of a business. In the short run, many tricks can be used to
make ratios look good in relation to industry standards. An assessment
of the operations and management of an entity should therefore be
performed to provide a check on ratios.
Graphs and Charts
Graphs are powerful tools for analyzing trends and structures. They facili-
tate comparison of performance and structures over time and show trend
lines and changes in significant aspects of bank operations and performance.
In addition, they provide senior management with a high-level overview of
trends in a bank’s risk. Graphs can illustrate asset and liability structures,
sources of income,profitability,and capital adequacy,composition of invest-
ment portfolios, major types of credit risk exposures, and exposure to inter-
est rate, liquidity, market, and currency risk. Graphs may be useful during
off-site surveillance. In this context, they can serve as a starting point to help
with on-site examinations and to present the bank’s financial condition and
risk management aspects succinctly to senior management. They also help
external auditors to illustrate points in their presentation to management
and other industry professionals to judge a bank’s condition and prospects.
Figure 5.1 shows a bank experiencing significant growth in short-
term trade finance (murabahat) and dramatic declines in cash. When the
current period is compared to the prior period, the growth in short-term
international murabahat appears to be quite dramatic, but when the cur-
rent period is compared to the period two years ago, it becomes clear that
the growth has not been unusual in percentage terms.
In the same manner, a simple line graph can illustrate the growth
trends in key financial variables (see figure 5.2). The rapid rise and then
flattening of growth in Islamic finance and investing assets are clearly
illustrated alongside the reduction in cash, creating more concern regard-
ing the entity’s liquidity: the increase in mediusm-term trade finance and
short-term trade finance could have caused the reduction in liquidity
(depending on how these increases in working capital were financed).
ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
Data can be interpreted in many ways. Common analytical techniques
include ratio analysis, common-size analysis, cross-sectional analysis, trend
analysis, and regression analysis.
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Ratio Analysis 
Financial ratios mean little when seen in isolation. Their meaning can only
be interpreted in the context of other information. It is good practice to
compare the financial ratios of a company with those of its major competi-
tors. Typically, the analyst should be wary of companies whose financial
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FIGURE 5.1 Composition of an Islamic Bank’s Assets, by Periods
ratios are far above or below industry norms. In some cases, evaluating a
company’s past performance provides a basis for forward-looking analyses.
Such an evaluation may suggest that its performance is likely to continue at
similar levels or that an upward or downward trend is likely to continue.
Alternatively, for a company making a major acquisition or divestiture, for
a new financial institution, or for a bank operating in a volatile environ-
ment, past performance may be less relevant to future performance.
An analyst should evaluate financial information based on the
following:
 Financial institution’s goals. Actual ratios can be compared with com-
pany objectives to determine if the objectives are being attained.
 Banking industry norms (cross-sectional analysis). A company can be
compared with others in the industry by relating its financial ratios to
industry norms or a subset of the companies in an industry. When
industry norms are used to make judgments, care must be taken,because
(a) many ratios are industry specific, but not all ratios are important to
all industries; (b) companies may have several lines of business, which
distorts aggregate financial ratios and makes it preferable to examine
industry-specific ratios by lines of business; (c) differences in accounting
methods can distort financial ratios; and (d) differences in corporate
strategies can affect certain financial ratios.
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FIGURE 5. 2 Trends in Asset Growth, by Period
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 Economic conditions. Financial ratios tend to improve when the econ-
omy is strong and to weaken during recessions. Therefore, financial
ratios should be examined in light of the phase of the business cycle in
which the economy is traversing.
 Experience. An analyst with experience obtains an intuitive notion of
the meaning of transformed data.
Common-Size Analysis
An analytical technique of great value is relative analysis, which is achieved
by converting all financial statement items to a percentage of a given finan-
cial statement item such as total assets or total revenue. (see also figure 5.1).
Common-size analysis: Balance sheet structure
The structure of the balance sheet may vary significantly depending on
the bank’s business orientation, market environment, customer mix, or
economic environment. The composition of the balance sheet is nor-
mally a result of risk management decisions.
The analyst should be able to assess the risk profile of the business
simply by analyzing the relative share of various assets and changes in
their proportionate share over time. For example, if short-term trade
finance jumps from 33 to 43 percent of on-balance-sheet assets (see table
5.4), one would question whether the business’s credit risk management
systems are adequate to handle the increased volume of transactions and
the short-term trade finance portfolio. In addition, such a jump could
disclose a shift from another area of risk. Likewise, an increase or decrease
in trading securities would indicate a change in the level of market risk to
Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks
82
TABLE 5.4 Balance-Sheet Composition of Assets 
(Percent of total assets)
Assets year 1 year 2
Cash and balances with central banks 10.1 6.6
International murabahat, short term 33.0 43.0
Islamic financing and investing assets 48.5 39.8
Real estate assets 5.9 7.1
Trading investments 0.0 0.0
Other assets 2.5 3.5
Total assets 100.0 100.0
which the institution is exposed. Such an assessment is possible prior to
undertaking a detailed review of the management of either credit or
market risk. When linked to the amount of net income yielded by each
category of assets, this analysis increases in importance, enabling a chal-
lenging assessment of risk versus reward.
Common-size analysis: Income statement structure
Common-size analysis can be used effectively on the income statement
as well. The emphasis in the income statement would be on the sources
of revenue and their sustainability. A question worth asking pertains to
the proportion of income earned in relation to the amount of energy
invested through the deployment of assets. When analyzing the income
structure of a business, analysts should give appropriate consideration to
and acquire an understanding of the following aspects:
 Trends in and the composition and accuracy of reported earnings;
 The quality, composition, and level of income and expense components;
 Dividend payout and earnings retention;
 Major sources of income and the most profitable business areas;
 Any income or expenditure recognition policies that distort earnings;
 The effect of intergroup transactions, especially those related to the
transfer of earnings and asset-liability valuations.
Cross-Sectional Analysis
Ratios are not meaningful when used on their own, which is why financial
analysts prefer trend analysis (the monitoring of a ratio or group of ratios
over time) and comparative analysis (the comparison of a specific ratio for
a group of companies in a sector or for different sectors). This compari-
son becomes a useful tool in establishing benchmarks for performance
and structure.
Cross-sectional (or relative) analysis of common-size financial state-
ments makes it easier to compare an entity to other entities in the same
sector, even though the entities might be of different sizes and operate in
different currencies. If the examples given in figure 5.1 or table 5.3
referred to two different banks, rather than simply the same bank over
more than one year, then the conclusions would compare the relative
levels of liquidity, structure of assets, between the two banks.
However, the analyst has to be realistic when comparing entities,
because size does influence business results, and entities are seldom
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exactly the same. Differences in currency are eliminated in the percentage
presentation, but the analyst must keep in mind the macroeconomic
environment that influences variables such as competition and inflation
across currency and national boundaries.
Cross-sectional analysis is not the solution to all problems, as different
accounting policies and methods will influence the allocation of transac-
tions to specific line items on the financial statements. For example, some
companies could include depreciation in the cost of sales, while others
could show it separately. However, if all these aspects are kept in mind,
cross-sectional analysis offers the analyst a powerful analytical tool.
Trend Analysis
The trend of an amount or a ratio, which shows whether it is improving
or deteriorating, is as important as its current absolute level. Trend analy-
sis provides important information regarding historical performance and
growth and, given a sufficiently long history of accurate seasonal infor-
mation, can be of great assistance as a planning tool for management. In
table 5.5, the last two columns of the trend analysis incorporate both cur-
rency and percentage changes for the past two years. A small percentage
change could hide a significant currency change and vice versa, prompt-
ing the analyst to investigate the reasons despite one of the changes being
relatively small. In addition, past trends are not necessarily an accurate
predictor of future behavior, especially if the economic environment
changes. These caveats should be borne in mind when using past trends
in forecasting.
Variations of Trend Analysis
Changes in currency and percentages focus the analysis on material items.
A variation of growth in terms of common-size financial statements is to
combine currency and percentage changes. Even when a percentage
change might seem insignificant, the magnitude of the amount of cur-
rency involved might be significant and vice versa. Such combined analy-
sis is therefore a further refinement of the analysis and interpretation of
annual changes.
Annual growth (from year to year)
Any business that is well positioned and successful in its market can be
expected to grow. An analysis of balance sheets can be performed to
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TABLE 5.5 Balance-Sheet Growth, Year on Year
(Percent)
Change 
Assets 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2005–06
Cash and balances with central banks Base –16.0 6.6 65.6 74.2 –11.9 (476,251)
International murabahat, short term Base 48.9 13.7 8.0 –24.6 165.0 9,333,398
Islamic financing and investing assets Base 20.6 21.0 42.9 61.9 24.6 6,949,535
Real estate assets Base 53.4 –9.9 8.2 –4.6 137.4 1,776,357
Trading investments Base 119.2 2,502,443
Other assets Base 76.9 40.2 106.8 –16.6 82.0 1,350,175
Total assets Base 27.8 16.2 34.4 40.5 49.9 21,435,657
determine growth rates and the type of structural changes that have
occurred in a business. Such an analysis indicates the general type of busi-
ness undertaken by the enterprise and requires an understanding of the
structure of its balance sheet and the nature of its assets and liabilities.
Even when growth overall is not significant, individual components of the
balance sheet normally shift in reaction to changes in the competitive
market or economic or regulatory environment (as illustrated in table 5.4).
As the balance sheet structure changes, inherent risks also change. The
structure of a balance sheet should therefore form part of an assessment of
the adequacy and effectiveness of policies and procedures for managing
risk exposures. In normal situations, the growth of a business’s assets is
determined by an increase in the earnings base and access to stable exter-
nal funding or investment, at a cost that is acceptable to the business.
Businesses that grow too quickly tend to take unjustified risks, and their
administrative and management information systems often cannot keep up
with the rate of expansion. Businesses that grow too slowly can likewise take
risks that are unusual or poorly understood by them. Even well-managed
businesses can run into risk management problems arising from excessive
growth, especially concerning management of their working capital.
Cumulative growth from a base year
The analysis that can be performed using this technique is not signifi-
cantly different from looking at year-on-year growth. Reviewing the
cumulative effects of change over time, compared to a base year, drama-
tizes change and the need for remedial action when change outstrips the
ability of risk management and administrative systems to keep up with
growth or the enterprise’s ability to finance its expansion.
Regression Analysis
Regression analysis uses statistical techniques to identify relationships (or
correlation) between variables. An example of such a relationship could
be sales and medium-term trade finance over time or hotel occupancies
compared to hotel revenues. In addition to analyzing trends over time,
regression analysis enables analytic review as well as identification of
items or ratios that are not behaving as they should be, given the statisti-
cal relationships that exist between ratios and variables.
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The goal of financial risk management is to maximize the value of abank, as determined by its level of profitability and risk. Since risk is
inherent in banking and unavoidable, the task of the risk manager is to
manage the different types of risk at acceptable levels and sustainable
profitability. Doing so requires the continual identification, quantification,
and monitoring of risk exposures, which in turn demands sound policies,
adequate organization, efficient processes, skilled analysts, and elaborate
computerized information systems. In addition, risk management requires
the capacity to anticipate changes and to act in such a way that a bank’s
business can be structured and restructured to profit from the changes or
at least to minimize losses. Regulatory authorities should not prescribe
how business is conducted; instead they should maintain prudent over-
sight of a bank by evaluating the risk composition of its assets and by
insisting that an adequate amount of capital and reserves is available to
safeguard solvency.
Until the 1970s, conventional banking business consisted primarily
of the extension of credit—in other words, a simple intermediation of
deposits that had been raised at a relatively low cost—and bank managers
faced fairly simple decisions concerning loan volumes, pricing, and
investments. The key managerial challenges of the past were controlling
asset quality, loan losses, and overhead expenditures. In the context of
recession, volatile interest rates, and inflation during the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the management of both assets and liabilities became neces-
sary in order to maintain satisfactory margin performance. Balance-sheet
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Key Messages
• The composition of a bank’s balance-sheet assets and liabilities is one of the key factors that
determine the level of risk faced by the institution.
• Growth in the balance sheet and resulting changes in the relative proportion of assets or liabili-
ties affect the risk management process.
• Changes in the relative structure of assets and liabilities should be a conscious decision of a
bank’s policy makers: the board of directors.
• Monitoring key components of the balance sheet may alert the analyst to negative trends in the
relationships between asset growth and capital retention capability.
• It is important to monitor the growth of low, nonearning, and off-balance-sheet items.
• Balance-sheet structure lies at the heart of the asset-liability management process.
management became even more complex as a result of deregulation in the
1980s, with growing competition for funds becoming a primary concern
of management.
The era of deregulation and increased competition continued in the
1990s, involving financial institutions other than banks. This environment
underscored the need for competitive pricing and, in practical terms, for
an increase in and engagement of liabilities in a manner that maximizes
spreads between costs and yields on investments and controls exposure to
related risks. Due to the inverse relationship of these two goals, a balancing
act between maximizing the spreads and controlling risk exposures has
become a focal point in the financial management, regulation, and super-
vision of banks.
This chapter highlights the importance of the structure and compo-
sition of liabilities and assets, as well as the related income statement items.
In addition, it illustrates the ways in which a bank’s risk managers and
analysts can analyze the structure of balance sheets and income state-
ments, as well as individual balance-sheet items with specific risk aspects,
such as liquidity in the case of deposit liabilities or market risk in the case
of traded securities. In this process, the interaction between various types
of risk must be understood to ensure that they are not evaluated in isola-
tion. Finally, the key principles of effective risk management are discussed.
Figure 6.1 and table 6.1 both illustrate the detailed composition of a
typical bank’s balance sheet. The structure of a typical balance sheet has
demand deposits and investment accounts from customers on the liability
side (see table 9.2) and Islamic financing and investing accounts (loans to
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FIGURE 6.1 Composition of an Islamic Bank’s Balance Sheet
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TABLE 6.1 Composition of an Islamic Bank’s Balance Sheet
Balance-sheet item 2005 2006
Assets
Cash and balances with central and commercial banks 3,995,220 3,518,969
International murabahat, short term 5,657,841 14,991,239
Islamic financing and investing assets–net 28,305,912 35,255,447
Real estate assets 1,292,445 3,068,802
Trading portfolio 2,099,402 4,601,845
Fixed and other assets 1,647,459 2,997,634
Total assets 42,998,279 64,433,936
Liabilities
Customers’ deposits (investment and current accounts) 33,391,950 47,732,482
Due to banks and other financial institutions 4,099,357 4,649,900
Other liabilities 1,628,155 3,155,269
Accrued zakat (charitable donations) 39,612 72,035
Total equity 3,839,205 8,824,250
Total liabilities and equity 42,998,279 64,433,936
customers in conventional banking terms) on the asset side. This pattern
reflects the nature of banks as intermediaries, with ratios of capital to
liabilities at such a low level that their leverage would be unacceptable to any
business outside the financial services industry.
COMPOSITION OF ASSETS
The structure of individual balance sheets may vary significantly depend-
ing on business orientation, market environment, customer mix, or
economic environment. Figures 6.2 to 6.4 illustrate different ways of
observing or analyzing the structure and growth of the asset components
of a bank over time.
The analyst should be able to assess the risk profile of the bank simply
by analyzing the relative share of various asset items and changes in their
proportionate share over time. For example, if the Islamic financing and
investing asset portfolio drops from 66 to 55 percent, while international
short-term commodity finance (murabahat) jumps from 13 to 23 percent
(figure 6.2), one would question whether the bank’s risk management
systems are adequate to handle the increased volume of commodities
transactions. Normally, such a jump would reflect a shift from another
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FIGURE 6.2 Structure of an Islamic Bank’s Assets 
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area of risk. In this case, cash also declined from 9 to 5 percent, affecting
the liquidity of the bank. Likewise, an increase or decrease in trading
securities would indicate a change in the level of market risk to which the
institution is exposed. Such an assessment is possible at a macro level,
prior to any detailed review of credit, liquidity, or market risk manage-
ment. When linked to the amount of net income yielded by each category
of assets, this analysis increases in importance, enabling a challenging
assessment of risk versus reward.
Liquid Assets
Liquid assets are needed to accommodate expected and unexpected fluc-
tuations in the balance sheet. In environments where markets are not devel-
oped and the liquidity of different claims still depends almost exclusively
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FIGURE 6.3 Structural Change and Asset Growth, 2001–06
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FIGURE 6.4 Growth of Assets, Year on Year 
−4,000,000
−2,000,000
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
12,000,000
2001
A
m
o
u
n
t
Cash and balances
with central and
commercial banks
International
murabahat, short term
Islamic financing and
investing assets
Real estate assets
Trading portfolio
Other assets2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Balance-Sheet Structure
93
on their maturity rather than on the ability to sell them, banks tend to keep
a relatively high level of liquid assets that yield little or no income. In such
environments, liquid assets typically account for at least 10 percent, or in
extreme situations as much as 20 percent, of total assets. Increasing market
orientation, the growth of financial markets, and the greater diversity of
financial instruments worldwide entail greater short-term flexibility in
liquidity management, which in turn reduces the need to hold large
amounts of liquid assets. In banking environments with developed finan-
cial markets, liquid assets typically account for only about 5 percent of
total assets. However, realizing assets in times of liquidity crises might not
be as easy in an Islamic as in a conventional banking environment. An
appraisal of whether the level of liquid assets is satisfactory must there-
fore be based on a thorough understanding of money and banking mar-
ket dynamics in the particular country, as certain assets that appear liquid
in good times may not be liquid in more difficult periods.
Cash Balances
Cash balances represent the holdings of highly liquid assets, such as bank
notes, gold coin, and bullion, as well as deposits with the central bank.
A percentage of deposits is normally required to be held in order to meet
the central bank’s reserve requirements and to serve as a tool to reflect mon-
etary policy. Flat-rate reserve requirements are used to control the amount
of money that a bank is able to extend as credit. However, when banks are
required to hold reserve assets in excess of the amount they normally
would, particularly when the assets yield no income, the cost to banks
increases. This creates incentives for banks to devise instruments that are
not subject to reserve requirements, encourages intervention through new
channels, and may give a competitive advantage to institutions that do not
have reserve requirements. Such options tend to reduce the effectiveness
and the importance of reserve requirements as a monetary policy tool.
Regulators have tried to make reserve requirements more difficult
to circumvent and have reduced the incentives for doing so. For example,
regulators have reduced the level, type, and volatility of reserve hold-
ings or increased the various types of compensation made to banks for
maintaining reserves.
Financing and Investing Assets 
Islamic financing and investing assets are normally the most significant
component of an Islamic bank’s assets. In conventional banking, these
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include loans for general working capital (overdrafts), investment lending,
asset-backed installment and mortgage loans, financing of debtors
(accounts receivable and credit card accounts), and tradable debt such
as acceptances and commercial paper. Islamic financing and investing
assets are extended in domestic and foreign currency and are provided
by banks as financing for public or private sector investments. Such
investments could include the items listed in table 6.2.
In the past decade, innovation has increased the marketability of bank
assets through the introduction of sales of assets such as mortgages, auto-
mobile loans,and export credits used as backing for marketable securities (a
practice known as securitization and highly appropriate in an Islamic bank-
ing environment as providing a real underlying investment; see chapter 2).
An analysis of this trend may highlight investment or spending activity
in various sectors of the economy, while an analysis of a foreign currency
loan portfolio may indicate expectations regarding exchange rate and inter-
est rate developments. Further, evaluation of trade credits may reveal
important trends in competitiveness of the economy and its terms of trade.
TABLE 6.2 Islamic Financing and Investing Assets – Gross 
Assets 2005 2006
Financing assets
Commodities murabahat 5,322,281 7,091,886 
International murabahat 3,763,437 3,598,780 
Vehicles murabahat 3,006,849 3,877,829 
Real estate murabahat 1,905,860 3,499,405 
Total murabahat 13,998,427 18,067,900 
Istisnah 2,636,913 4,452,347 
Ijarah 5,154,076 6,038,210 
Others 161,060 
Total financing assets 21,789,416 28,719,517 
Investing assets
Sukuks 1,420,012 5,764,652 
Musharakahs 5,827,754 2,832,292 
Mudarabahs 2,100,232 3,053,780 
Investment funds 0 0 
Wakalah 153,749 185,257 
Total investing assets 9,501,747 11,835,981
Trading Portfolios 
Trading assets, such as sukuks (bonds), represent the bank’s trading books
in securities, foreign currencies, equities, and commodities.
Although similar securities are involved, trading portfolios are often
divided into different liquidity tranches (portfolios with different liquidity
and yield objectives). In conventional banking, proprietary trading is aimed
at exploiting market opportunities with leveraged funding (for example,
through the use of repurchase agreements), whereas a portfolio funded by
deposit taking could be traded as a stable liquidity portfolio. The same
principles could be applied equally to Islamic banks.
Trading portfolios are valued in terms of International Accounting
Standard (IAS) 39 and can be classified as trading, available for sale, or held
to maturity. However, trading assets would normally be disclosed at fair
value (marked to market) in the bank’s financial statements (see chapter 12
for IFRS and AAOIFI disclosure).
In many developing countries, banks have been or are obligated to pur-
chase government bonds or other designated claims, usually to ensure that
a minimum amount of high-quality liquidity is available to meet deposit
demands. Frequently, requirements are intended to ensure a predictable
flow of finance to designated recipients. Government is the most frequent
beneficiary, often with an implicit subsidy. Such obligatory investments
may diminish the availability and increase the cost of credit extended to the
economy (and the private sector).
In developed countries and financial markets, an increase in bank
trading portfolios generally reflects the growing orientation of a bank to
nontraditional operations. In risk management terms, such an orientation
would mean that a bank has replaced credit risk with market price risk.
Other Assets 
Other assets could comprise a bank’s longer-term ownership investments,
such as equities held in the bank’s long-term investment portfolio. These
include equity investments in subsidiaries, associates, and other listed and
unlisted entities. The percentage of a portfolio that is devoted to this type
of instrument varies among countries, although not necessarily as a result
of a bank’s own asset-liability management decisions. Such assets are also
valued in terms of IAS 39 and are normally classified as available for sale
or held to maturity.
For equity investments, the balance sheet should be reviewed on a
consolidated basis to ensure a proper understanding of the effect of such
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investments on the structure of the bank’s own balance sheet and to assess
the asset quality of the bank.
Fixed Assets 
Fixed assets represent the bank’s infrastructure resources and typically
include the premises under which the bank operates, other fixed property,
computer equipment, vehicles, furniture, and fixtures. In certain circum-
stances, banks may have a relatively high proportion of fixed assets, such as
houses, land, or commercial space. These holdings would be the result of
collections on collateral that, under most regulations, banks are required to
dispose of within a set period of time. They may also reflect the deliberate
decision of a bank to invest in real estate, if the market is fairly liquid and
prices are increasing. In some developing countries, investments in fixed
assets reach such high proportions that central banks may begin to feel
obliged to limit or otherwise regulate property-related assets. A bank
should not be in the business of investing in real estate assets, and therefore
a preponderance of these assets would affect the assessment of the bank. In
more developed countries, real estate assets not acquired in the normal
course of banking business would be booked in a subsidiary at the holding
company level in order to protect depositors from associated risks.
Other assets often include intangible assets. These vary with regard to
the predictability of income associated with a particular asset, the exis-
tence of markets for such assets, the possibility of selling the assets, and the
reliability of the assessments of the asset’s useful life. The treatment of
assets in evaluating capital adequacy can be controversial. For example,
specific assets may include suspense accounts, which have to be analyzed
and verified to ensure that the asset is indeed real and recoverable.
COMPOSITION OF LIABILITIES
The relative share of various components of the balance sheet—liabilities,
in this instance—is a good indication of the levels and types of risk to
which a bank is exposed.
An increase in the level of nonretail deposits or funding could expose
a conventional bank to greater volatility in satisfying its funding require-
ments, requiring increasingly sophisticated liquidity risk management.
Certain funding instruments also expose a bank to market risk.
The business of banking is traditionally based on the concept of low
margins and high leverage. Consequently, a special feature of a bank’s
balance sheet is its low ratio of capital to liabilities, which would normally
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be unacceptable to any other business outside the financial services
industry. The acceptable level of risk associated with such a structure
is measured and prescribed according to risk-based capital requirements,
which are, in turn, linked to the composition of a bank’s assets.
While the types of liabilities present in an Islamic bank’s balance
sheet are nearly universal, their exact composition varies greatly depending
on the particular bank’s business and market orientation, as well as the
prices and supply characteristics of different types of liabilities at any
given point in time. The funding structure of a bank directly affects its
cost of operation and therefore determines a bank’s potential profit and
level of risk. The structure of a bank’s liabilities also reflects its specific
asset-liability and risk management policies.
Customer Deposits 
Customer deposits—amanah (trust), investment accounts, and special
investment accounts—usually constitute the largest proportion of a bank’s
total liabilities. Deposits from customers—the amount due to other
customers and investors—represent money accepted from the general
public, such as demand and investment deposits, and funding products,
such as savings, fixed and notice, and foreign currency deposits in
conventional banks. The structure and stability of the deposit base are of
utmost importance. Broader trends also come into play.An analysis of pri-
vate sector deposits (including deposits from repurchase agreements and
certificates of deposit) highlight economic trends related to the level of
spending, as well as its effect on inflation. Furthermore, growth in money
supply is calculated using total deposits in the banking system. A change
in the level of deposits in the banking system is therefore one of the
variables that influences monetary policy.
Within the deposit structure, some items are inherently more risky
than others. For example, large corporate deposits are less stable than
household deposits, not only because they are more concentrated but also
because they are managed more actively. A large proportion of nonretail
or nonstandard deposits can be unstable, which tends to indicate that the
bank’s investment and partnership accounts holders may be paying
higher “rates” than they would at another bank or that depositors may be
attracted by liberal credit policies. Cash collateral and various types of
loan escrow accounts may also be counted as deposits, although these
funds can only be used for their stated purpose.
Competition for funds is a normal part of any banking market, and
depositors, both households and corporations, often aim to minimize idle
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funds. A bank should therefore have a policy for attracting and maintain-
ing deposits and procedures for analyzing, on a regular basis, the volatility
and character of the deposit and investment account structure so that
funds can be used productively even when the probability of withdrawal
exists. Analysts of the deposit structure should determine the percentage
of hard-core, stable, seasonal, and volatile deposits.
Amounts Due to Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
These include all deposits, loans, and advances extended between banks
and are normally regarded as volatile sources of funding. An analysis of
interbank balances may point to structural peculiarities in the banking
system; for example, when funding for a group of banks is provided by
one of its members.
International borrowing may occur in the same form as domestic
banking, except that it normally exposes a bank to additional currency
risk. Direct forms of international borrowing include loans from foreign
banks, export promotion agencies in various countries, and international
lending agencies, as well as nostro accounts. Indirect forms include notes,
acceptances, import drafts, and trade bills sold with the bank’s endorse-
ment, guarantees, and notes or trade bills rediscounted with central banks
in various countries. The existence of foreign funding is generally a good
indicator of international confidence in a country and its economy.
Given the volatility of such funding sources, however, if a bank is an
extensive borrower its activities should be analyzed in relation to other
aspects of its operations that influence borrowing. The acceptable reasons
for reliance on interbank funding include temporary or seasonal loan or
cash requirements and the matching of large and unanticipated with-
drawals of customer deposits. Money centers or large regional banks
engaged in money market transactions tend to borrow on a continuous
basis. Otherwise, heavy reliance on interbank funding indicates that a
bank carries a high degree of funding risk and is overextended in relation
to its normal volume of deposits.
Other Liabilities
Other liabilities would normally include trade creditors and other sundry
items. In an Islamic bank, the unpaid portion of depositors’ share of profits
would be an important component. Amounts owed to the central bank
may also appear among the bank’s liabilities. The most frequent reason
for borrowing from the central bank is that changes have occurred in
the volume of required reserves as a result of fluctuations in deposits.
These shifts occur when banks have not correctly forecasted their daily
reserve position and have been forced to borrow to make up the difference—
that is, they help banks to meet temporary requirements for funds. Longer-
term credit from the central bank indicates an unusual situation that may
be the result of national or regional difficulties or problems related to the
particular bank in question. Historically, central bank financing was often
directed toward a special purpose determined by government policies, for
example, in the areas of agriculture or housing, but this type of activity is
increasingly out of date.
EQUITY
The capital of a bank represents the buffer available to protect creditors
against losses that may be incurred by managing risks imprudently.
According to international norms, banks normally have primary and
secondary capital components—tier 1 and tier 2 capital (see chapter 13
for further discussion of this point). The key components of bank capital
are common shares or stock, retained earnings, and perpetual preferred
stock, all of which are counted as primary capital. Otherwise, to qualify
for tier 1 or tier 2 capital, a capital instrument should have long maturity
and not contain or be covered by any covenants, terms, or restrictions
that are inconsistent with sound banking. For example, instruments that
result in higher dividends or interest payments when a bank’s financial
condition deteriorates cannot be accepted as part of capital. Secondary
capital components will normally mature at some point, and a bank
must be prepared to replace or redeem them without impairing its
capital adequacy. When determining capital adequacy, the remaining
maturity of the components of secondary capital should also be assessed.
BALANCE-SHEET GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
A bank that is well positioned and successful in its market can be expected
to grow. An analysis of the balance sheet can be performed to determine
growth rates and the type of structural changes that occur in a bank. Such
an analysis indicates the general type of business undertaken by a bank
and requires an understanding of the structure of its balance sheet and the
nature of its assets and liabilities. Even when overall balance-sheet growth
is not significant, individual components normally shift in reaction
to changes in the competitive market or economic or regulatory envi-
ronments (as illustrated by figures 6.3 and 6.4, as well as table 6.3). As the
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structure of the balance-sheet changes, inherent risks also change.
Therefore, the structure of a balance sheet should be assessed along with
the adequacy and effectiveness of policies and procedures for managing
risk exposures.
Figure 6.5 illustrates the overall growth of a hypothetical bank’s assets
and capital. In addition, it highlights the extent to which a bank’s growth
is balanced or the extent to which the bank has been able to maintain regu-
latory capital requirements in relation to total assets and risk-weighted
asset growth. A graph of this kind can indicate capital adequacy problems
to come, perhaps as a result of rapid expansion.
In normal situations, the growth of a bank’s assets is justified by an
increase in the stable funding base at a cost that is acceptable to the bank as
well as by profit opportunities. The spread between investment liability
accounts and investment and long-term partnership accounts on the asset
side should normally be stable or increasing. In a stable market environ-
ment, increasing margins may indicate the acceptance or presence of higher
risk. In order to avoid increased lending risk, emphasis is often placed on
fee-generating income, which does not involve the bank’s balance sheet.
Banks that grow too quickly tend to take unjustified risks and often
find that their administrative and management information systems
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TABLE 6.3 Percentage Composition of the Balance Sheet, 2001–06 
(Percent)
Composition of the balance sheet 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Cash and balances with central and 
commercial banks 10.1 6.6 6.1 7.5 9.3 5.5
International murabahat, short term 26.8 31.2 30.5 24.5 13.2 23.3
Islamic financing and investing assets 54.7 51.6 53.7 57.1 65.8 54.7
Real estate assets 5.9 7.1 5.5 4.4 3.0 4.8
Trading portfolio 0 0 0 0 4.9 7.1
Other assets 2.5 3.5 4.2 6.5 3.8 4.7
Total assets 100 100 100 100 100 100
Customers’ deposits 86.0 86.7 87.3 81.5 77.7 74.1
Due to banks and other financial institutions 1.4 1.2 1.4 4.6 9.5 7.2
Other liabilities 4.4 4.0 3.8 4.2 3.8 4.9
Accrued zakat (charitable donation) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1
Shareholder’s equity 8.1 8.1 7.5 9.8 8.9 13.7
Total liabilities and capital 100 100 100 100 100 100
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cannot keep up with the rate of expansion. Banks that grow too slowly can
likewise take risks that are different or not clearly understood by them. Even
well-managed banks can run into risk management problems arising from
excessive growth, especially concerning their loan portfolios.
In some countries, the conduct of monetary policy may limit or
significantly affect the rate of growth and the structure of a bank’s assets.
Despite the shift away from reliance on portfolio regulations and adminis-
trative controls, credit ceilings have been and still are a relatively common
method of implementing monetary policy in some transitional economies,
especially in countries with less developed financial markets.An alternative
method of indirectly manipulating the demand for and level of credit in
the economy has traditionally been to influence the cost of credit.
Changes in banking and finance mean that the scope for circum-
venting credit ceilings and interest rate regulations has increased signifi-
cantly. A loss of effectiveness, and concerns over the distortions that credit
ceiling and interest rate manipulations generate, are the reasons why these
instruments are increasingly abandoned in favor of open-market inter-
ventions. The use of credit ceilings in countries where such monetary
policies have been pursued for long periods of time may have reduced the
competitive ability of banks, encouraged innovation, and fostered the
creation of alternative instruments or channels of financial intermedia-
tion. In other words, they have inadvertently shaped the evolution of
banking systems.
FIGURE 6.5 Hypothetical Growth of Assets 
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Profitability, in the form of retained earnings, is typically one of the keysources of capital generation. A sound banking system is built on
profitable and adequately capitalized banks. Profitability is a revealing
indicator of a bank’s competitive position in banking markets and of the
quality of its management. It allows a bank to maintain a certain risk
profile and provides a cushion against short-term problems.
The income statement, a key source of information on a bank’s prof-
itability, reveals the sources of a bank’s earnings and their quantity and
quality, as well as the quality of the bank’s loan portfolio and the targets of
its expenditures. Income statement structure also indicates a bank’s busi-
ness orientation. Traditionally, the major source of conventional banking
income has been interest, but the increasing orientation toward nontradi-
tional business is also reflected in income statements. For example, income
from trading operations and fee-based income accounts for an increas-
ingly high percentage of earnings in modern banks. This trend implies
higher volatility of earnings and profitability. It also implies a different risk
profile from that of a traditional bank.
Changes in the structure and stability of banks’ profits have some-
times been motivated by statutory capital requirements and monetary
policy measures such as obligatory reserves. In order to maintain confi-
dence in the banking system, banks are subject to minimum capital
requirements. The restrictive nature of this statutory minimum capital
may cause banks to change their business mix in favor of activities and
assets that entail a lower capital requirement. However, although such
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Key Messages
• Profitability indicates a bank’s capacity to carry risk or to increase its capital.
• Regulators should welcome profitable banks as contributors to stability of the banking system.
• Profitability ratios should be seen in context, and the potential yield on the “free” equity portion
of capital should be deducted prior to drawing conclusions about profitability. 
• The components of income could change over time, and core costs should be compared to
assumed core income to determine whether such costs are indeed fully covered.
• Management should understand which assets they are spending their energy on and how this
relates to the income generated from such assets.
assets carry less risk, they may earn lower returns. Excessive obligatory
reserves and statutory liquidity requirements damage profits and may
encourage disintermediation. They also may result in undesirable banking
practices. For example, the balance sheets of banks in many developing
and transitional economies contain large proportions of fixed assets, a
trend that adversely affects profitability. Regulatory authorities should
recognize the importance of profits and, to the extent possible, avoid
regulations that may unduly depress profitability.
Taxation is another major factor that influences a bank’s prof-
itability as well as its business and policy choices, because it affects the
competitiveness of various instruments and different segments of the
financial markets. For example, taxation of investment and partnership
income, combined with a tax holiday for capital gains, can make
deposits and investment accounts less attractive than equity invest-
ments. In general, banks adjust their business and policy decisions to
minimize the taxes to be paid and to take advantage of any loopholes in
tax laws. Beyond the level and the transparency of profit taxation, key
areas to consider when assessing the business environment and profit
potential of a bank are if and how fiscal authorities tax unrealized gains
and interest income and whether or not they allow provisions before
taxation. Many fiscal authorities also apply direct taxes to banking
transactions and margins.
A thorough understanding of the source of profits and changes in the
income-profit structure of both an individual bank and the banking
system as a whole is important to all key players in the risk management
process. Supervisory authorities should, for example, view bank prof-
itability as an indicator of stability and as a factor that contributes to
depositor confidence. Maximum sustainable profitability should therefore
be encouraged, since healthy competition for profits indicates an efficient
and dynamic financial system.
COMPOSITION OF THE INCOME STATEMENT
A bank’s income statement is a key source of information regarding the
sources and structure of its income. An example of an analytical
income statement is shown in table 7.1. In the last two columns of this
example, the various components of income and expenses (even gross
interest income and gross interest expenses) are disclosed as a per-
centage of the total income. In a conventional bank, the equivalent
items would relate mostly to net interest income and trading income
with the former often constituting a relatively minor component of
overall income, especially when the volume of activity to generate the
net interest income is taken into account (see also figure 7.1).
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TABLE 7.1 Composition of the Income Statement, 2005–06
Amount Percent
Composition 2005 2006 2005 2006
Income
Income from Islamic financing and investing assets 1,733,647 2,441,532 64 53
Income from international murabahat, short term 196,409 525,153 7 11
Income from investment properties 149,906 153,203 6 3
Income from sale of properties under construction, net 141,626 412,710 5 9
Commissions, fees, and foreign exchange income 401,294 906,716 15 20
Sundry income 73,161 137,143 3 4
Total income 2,696,043 4,576,457 100 100
Expenses
General and administrative expenses (569,464) (1,148,174) 21 25
Provisions and reversals of impairment (130,173) (76,467) 5 2
Depreciation of investment properties (11,612) (10,240) 0 0
Total expenses (711,249) (1,234,881) 26 27
Profit before depositors’ share and tax 1,984,794 3,341,576 74 73
Depositors’ share of profits (918,405) (1,757,611) – 34 – 38
Profit for the year before tax 1,066,389 1,583,965 40 35
Income tax (3,015) (6,122) – 00.28 – 00.39
Financing and Investing Income
Islamic financing and investing income originates from Islamic products
intermediated by an Islamic financial institution. Such income is normally
recognized on a time-apportioned basis over the period of the contract on
the principal amounts outstanding, meaning that a bank calculates
income due for each period of time covered by the income statement,
regardless of whether or not the income has been received or paid.
Accounting policies should normally require that an investment or part-
nership account be accorded nonaccrual status if a client is overdue by a
specified period of time or deemed to be potentially unable to pay, at
which point all previously accrued but unpaid income should be reversed
out of income. In the absence of such a policy, banks end up overtstating
their income and profits.
Significant income sources should be subdivided further. For example,
investing and financing accounts can be analyzed by assets provided to the
government, to state enterprises, and to private enterprises or by product
revenue. This subdivision may be required for supervisory or statistical
purposes. It may also be the result of a bank’s internal organization, as
modern, cost-conscious banks often develop elaborate pricing and costing
systems for their various business and product lines to ensure that the con-
tribution of each product to the bottom line is clearly understood.
Depositors’ Share of Proﬁts and Losses
Depositors’ share of profits and losses comprises payments related to
investments and partnership income received for customers’ current
savings and investment deposits. A breakdown of expenses provides an
understanding of a bank’s sources of funding and the corresponding
funding cost. The subdivision of expenses is typically based on instru-
ments as well as the maturity structure of funding instruments, such as
demand deposits, investment accounts, and special investment accounts.
A conventional bank with low expenses and thus low funding costs is
clearly better positioned than one with high expenses, as it would be able
to intermediate at market rates with a higher profit margin. The smaller
deposit-related expenses, however, often involve higher operating
expenses. For example, household deposits and investment accounts typ-
ically involve lower expenses, but branch networks are needed to collect
them, and these are expensive to maintain. This is why some banks pre-
fer funding by large corporate (wholesale) deposits, even if this implies
higher profit-sharing costs.
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Trading Income
Trading income comprises income from dealings and brokerage busi-
nesses as well as income from trading and from investments in securities,
foreign currencies, equities, and commodities. This income is mostly
due to the difference between the purchase and sale price of the under-
lying instruments but also includes dividend payments. The stability or
sustainability of trading income affects the viability of a bank and is
critically related to the quality of a bank’s market risk management
function, the effectiveness of the corresponding functional processes,
and the proper information technology support. Trading assets would
normally be disclosed at fair value (marked to market) in the bank’s
financial statements.
Investment Income
Investment income comprises income from a bank’s longer-term equity-
type investments, such as equities and interest-bearing (recapitalization
or non-trading) bonds held in the bank’s long-term investment port-
folio, as well as dividend income from subsidiaries and similar types of
investments. Proprietary investment income depends on the contractual
rate and, for equity investments, on the financial performance of the
respective companies. By its nature, the income from equity investments
is difficult to predict accurately. Investment assets could be shown on the
balance sheet as assets available for sale or assets held to maturity. Marked-
to-market income on the revaluation of such assets would then not flow
through the income statement but be taken directly to a reserve account
in the balance sheet.
Sundry Other Banking-Related Operating Income
Other banking-related operating income could include the following:
 Knowledge-based or fee-based income received from nontraditional
banking business such as merchant banking or financial advisory
services.
 Fee-based income derived from various services to clients, such as
account or fund management services and payment transaction
services. This class of income is generally desirable, as it does not
imply exposure to any financial risk and does not inherently carry any
capital charges.
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 Gains (losses) on revaluation of assets, which indicate changes in the
value of assets held in a bank’s trading book. The trading book includes
the bank’s position in financial instruments that are intentionally held
for short-term resale. Banks take on such positions with the intention
of benefiting in the short term from actual or expected differences
between their buying and selling prices or from variations in the price
or interest rate.
 Foreign exchange gains (losses), which often appear in the income
statements of banks in developing countries, since such banks are fre-
quently funded by foreign loans. Gains or losses result from changes
in the exchange rate that, depending on whether a bank’s net position
is long or short and whether the domestic currency has depreciated or
appreciated, result in a gain or loss to the bank.
Proﬁt for the Year
Profit for the year is the difference between a bank’s asset-related
income and expenses. The aim of any bank would normally be to derive
stable and growing operating income from its core business. In the case
of an Islamic bank, table 7.1 can be rearranged to include “depositors’
share of profits” under expenses, providing a more transparent view of
operating expenditure.
General and Administrative Expenses
General and administrative expenses include costs related to staff, rent
and utilities, auditing and consulting, computer and information tech-
nology systems, and general administration. Impairment provisions,
included in operating expenses, have the most significant impact on the
cost of intermediation and are one of the most controllable items. The
level of operating expenses is generally related to a bank’s efficiency.
Efficient management of these expenses requires balancing short-term
cost-minimization strategies with investments in human and physical
resources—especially the banking technology necessary for effective
management of banking risks and for long-term maintenance of the
bank’s competitive position.
Salaries and staff-related expenses, such as social security, pensions,
and other benefits, are normally the largest cost item for a bank, because
banking is a knowledge- and staff-intensive business. Computers and
information technology–related expenses, such as software licenses and
application system development and maintenance, are also becoming
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major expense items, especially in modern or internationally oriented
banks that are critically dependent on information support for identifying
market opportunities, for processing transactions, and for managing and
reporting risk.
Provisions for Losses or Impairment
Provisions for losses or impairment are expenses related to the credit risk
inherent in granting investing assets and long-term partnerships.Provisions
are made to compensate for the impaired value of the related investing and
financing assets and profits due. They may include write-offs and recoveries
(that is, amounts recovered on assets previously written off), or these items
may be shown as a separate line in the income statement. The exact position
of investing and financing impairments on a bank’s income statement
depends on the tax treatment of provisions. In countries where the provi-
sions before taxation are not allowed, loss provisions normally appear after
taxation. This category also comprises loss provisions for all other assets
where the value of the asset could be impaired; for example, the assets in a
bank’s investment portfolio. In many countries, prudential requirements
mandate that a bank carry assets at the lower of the nominal value or the
market value (in which case, loss provisions need to be made) and recognize
any appreciation in value only when the investment is liquidated.
Depreciation
Depreciation is a cost due to the reduction in value of a bank’s fixed assets.
It is conceptually similar to provisions. Banks typically depreciate build-
ings over 25 to 50 years, movable assets and office equipment over three
to five years, and computers over two to three years.
When analyzing a bank’s income structure, an analyst should give
appropriate consideration to and acquire an understanding of the
following aspects:
 Trends in and the composition and accuracy of reported earnings;
 The quality, composition, and level of income and expense components;
 Dividend pay-out and earnings retention;
 Major sources of income and the most profitable business areas;
 The manner and extent to which accrued but uncollected interest is
absorbed into income, in particular when such interest relates to
loans that are or should be placed into risk categories of substandard
or worse;
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 The extent to which collateral values (rather than operating cash flows)
are the basis for decisions to capitalize interest or roll over extensions
of credit;
 Any income or expenditure recognition policies that distort earnings;
 The effect of intergroup transactions, especially those related to the
transfer of earnings and asset-liability valuations.
INCOME STRUCTURE AND EARNINGS QUALITY
In today’s environment, markets that have traditionally been the sole
domain of conventional banks have opened up to competition from
other institutions. Banks, in turn, have diversified into nontraditional
markets and no longer perform a simple intermediation function—that
is, deposit taking and lending. In fact, an overview of the industry’s profit
structure in most developed countries reveals that the traditional bank-
ing business is only marginally profitable and that income from other
sources has become a significant contributor to the bottom line. Bank
profitability appears to be largely attributable to fee income generated
from knowledge-based activities, including merchant banking, corporate
financing, and advisory services and from trading-based activities in
securities, equities, foreign exchange, and money markets.
This change in the profit structure of banks has had the effect of
improving profitability without increasing the traditional credit risk that
results from investing and financing portfolios. For example, many blue-
chip corporate clients are increasingly able to attract funding in their own
name through the issuance of commercial paper. Instead of conventional
banks maintaining large corporate loans on their balance sheets, banks
increasingly underwrite or service issues of their large corporate clients
or perform a market-making function. Doing so generates fee income
without increasing credit risk exposure. However, income generated in
this manner (for example, through securities trading and merchant
banking) is by its nature less stable and predictable because it depends on
market conditions and trading performance. The trading portfolio is also
subject to market risk, which can be substantial.
Components of Income
The analysis of profitability starts by considering the structure of a bank’s
income and its components (see table 7.2)—investing and financing asset
income, transactions-based fee income, trading income, and other sources
of income—and the trends over the observation period.
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The information contained in a bank’s income statement provides
an understanding of the institution’s business focus and the structure
and stability of its profits. In order to facilitate a comparison between
different types of banking institutions, various income statement items,
such as profit margins, fee and investment income, and overhead are
usually expressed as a percentage of total assets. By using the asset base
as a common denominator, banks are able to compare themselves to
the sector average and to other types of banks. When aggregated, such
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TABLE 7.2 Percentage Composition of Islamic Products’ Revenues over Time 
(Percent)
Financing and investing assets 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Financing assets
Commodities murabahat 39.07 36.74 35.18 26.91 23.73 28.85
Vehicles murabahat 15.13 17.14 18.72 14.87 10.66 9.46
Istisnah 27.94 25.84 20.94 13.42 8.04 5.85
Ijarah 1.41 3.83 6.04 9.80 11.15 12.94
Total financing assets 83.54 79.74 80.88 65.00 53.58 57.10
Investing assets
Musharakah 10.06 11.03 8.20 7.39 8.71 9.36
Mudarabah 3.64 3.91 2.88 3.26 3.99 6.86
Wakalah 0.36 2.00 2.55 1.02 2.92 9.51
Sukuks 0 0 0 0 3.13 8.65
Investment funds 0 0.19 2.56 5.26 4.62 1.66
Others 0.76 1.59 0.89 1.21 0.55 2.30
Total investing assets 14.83 18.71 17.08 18.13 23.91 38.33
Investment in companies
Dividend income 0.60 0.86 1.34 1.42 1.99 1.60
Loss on trading investments 0 0 0 0 –0.15 –1.45
Gain on sale of investments  1.03 0.69 0.69 15.45 5.98 6.57
carried at fair value through 
income statement
(Loss) gain on revaluation of 0 0 0 0 14.70 –2.16
investments carried at fair value 
through income statement
Total investment in companies 1.63 1.55 2.03 16.87 22.51 4.56
Total income from Islamic financing 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
and investing assets
information can also highlight changes taking place within a peer group
or the banking sector.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the composition of a bank’s gross income. Such a
graph enables an analyst to determine the quality and stability of a bank’s
profit, including its sources and any changes in their structure. The purpose
of this comparison is to determine exactly how the assets of a bank are
engaged and whether or not the income generated is commensurate with
the proportion of assets committed to each specific asset category (in other
words, whether the income is earned where the energy is spent). Assets
should normally be engaged in product categories that provide the highest
income at an acceptable level of risk. The same analysis can be performed
to identify categories of assets that might be generating proportionately
lower yields.
Similarly, liabilities make up the source of funding to which various
expenses are related. An analytical comparison of classes of expenses
with related liability categories highlights a bank’s exposure to specific
sources of funding and reveals whether structural changes are taking
place in its sources of funding. A similar type of graph and analysis can
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FIGURE 7.1 Asset Structure versus Income Structure
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be used to assess whether or not the components of the total expendi-
tures are of the same proportions as the related liabilities. Expensive
categories of funding would be clearly highlighted on such a graph, and
the reasons for the specific funding decisions would need to be explained.
In the long term, this type of analysis would be able to highlight if and
what sort of structural changes are taking place in the income and expen-
diture structure of a bank and whether or not they are justified from the
profitability perspective.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the next step: the analysis of how a bank’s income
covers its operating expenses. In the case illustrated, as expected, the income
from Islamic assets contributes significantly to the bank’s profitability and
its capacity to cover its operating costs. Both the gross income and the oper-
ating expenses have shown proportionate growth in the observation
period, with expenses now almost equaling core Islamic asset income. The
bank’s core income has remained fairly stable (although the structure of
which assets generated the income has changed). In conventional banking
terms, non-core fee and trading income is generally considered to be less
stable than core operating (that is, intermediation) income.
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FIGURE 7.2 Relationship of Income to Expenses, 2001–06
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Operating expenses are one of the items on a bank’s income statement
that can be controlled. One acceptable reason for the increase in operating
expenses can always be that required investments in human resources and
banking infrastructure are expected to pay off in the future. If no such rea-
sons can be found, the bank should be asked to rethink its business strategy.
Internal Performance Measurement System
In such an intensively competitive business, modern banks can no longer
afford to carry insufficiently profitable products, services, or lines of
businesses. International banks and financial conglomerates especially
must organize their internal relationships in a way that enables them to
establish the exact contribution to the bottom line of their many con-
stituent parts. In the last decade, more refined systems for measuring
profitability and performance have been developed to address this need.
The conclusions drawn by internal performance measurement sys-
tems directly affect the products offered and their pricing and can shape
the bank’s decision to enter or exit particular products or services. Inter-
nal measurement techniques usually take into account the underlying
risks (which may negatively affect the bank’s expenses). Therefore, they
enhance the bank’s risk management techniques and the application of a
consistent incentive compensation system based on achievement rather
than on meritocracy.
A good performance measurement framework comprises a number
of elements, including an effective organization that allows a clear allo-
cation of income and expenses to business units related to different lines
of a bank’s business, products, or market segments; an internal transfer
pricing system to measure the contribution of various business units to
the bottom line; and an effective and consistent means to incorporate the
elements of risk into the performance measurement framework. Once
the net contributions are known, by business lines, products, or markets,
it can be clearly established which customer segments are the most
promising and which products should be scrutinized concerning their
revenue-generating capacity. A good performance measurement frame-
work also allows analysis of the net contribution that a relationship with
a large customer makes to the bank’s bottom line.
Internal Transfer Pricing System
The internal transfer pricing system refers to the cost of funds as they are
moved from one business unit to another. A sophisticated internal transfer
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pricing system also covers the allocation of overhead costs to business units
and includes transfer prices for internal services such as accounting or legal
services. Internal transfer prices could, in principle, reflect market prices,
including maturities, and the repricing characteristics of the corresponding
assets or liabilities. In practice, most banks choose a weighted average based
on their specific funding mix. For consistent application of such a system,
a bank must also have a supporting management accounting system.
There are a number of ways to incorporate the risk element into this
framework. For the lending function, as an example, the internal cost of
funds could reflect the credit risk of the asset being funded, with a higher
transfer price being allocated to lower-quality assets. Assets with higher
risk could be expected to generate higher returns. Most banks apply a uni-
form transfer price for all assets, and the risk element is accommodated
by requiring higher returns on lower-quality loans.
Another step is to determine how much equity should be assigned to
each of the different business or product lines. The key issue is not to
determine the right amount of capital to be assigned to each business
unit, but to assign equity to all businesses in a consistent manner and
based on the same principles. In practice, it is often unnecessary to meas-
ure risk using sophisticated modeling techniques for all bank business
lines and products in order to determine the appropriate coefficients, and
in any case it is nearly impossible to do it in a practical, consistent, and
meaningful manner. Instead, banks typically use much simpler calcula-
tions of return on risk equity. A practical approach followed by some
conventional banks is to use the weights provided under the Basel Accord
(IFSB regulations can be substituted) as a basis for calculations.
Transfer pricing should be scrutinized when the bank belongs to a
banking group or a holding company, especially if the group is domiciled
abroad. In some cases, internal transfer prices have been set that allow the
parent to take profits from a bank, for example, by charging more than
the applicable market price for funds borrowed by the bank from other
business units or members of the conglomerate or by paying less than the
market price for funds provided by the same bank. Such cases are espe-
cially frequent in countries where there are limits to or complications
with dividend repatriation.
PROFITABILITY INDICATORS AND RATIO ANALYSIS
Profit is the bottom line or ultimate performance result showing the net
effects of bank policies and activities in a financial year. The trends in
stability and growth of profit are the best indicators of a bank’s performance
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in both the past and the future. Profitability is usually measured by all or
part of a set of financial ratios, as shown in table 7.3.
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate another way of viewing trends in the
level of operating expenses in relation to total assets and gross operat-
ing income. This approach could provide the analyst with information
on the relationship between a bank’s expenses and earning capacity, as
well as on whether or not the bank has optimized its potential. Income
and expenses are presented in relation to total assets. When compared
with industry norms, such a view could yield important conclusions—
for example, that a bank’s expenses are high because it is overstaffed.
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TABLE 7.3 Profitability Ratios, 2001–06
(Percent)
Profitability ratios 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Profit as a percent of total 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.5 2.5 2.4
assets (ROA)
Expenses as a percent 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9
of total assets
Gross income as a 5.4 4.5 4.5 4.8 6.3 7.1
percent of total assets
Basic and diluted earnings 1.52 1.58 2.32 4.00 0.59 0.71
per share attributable to
shareholders of the parent
Profit as a percent of 12.3 10.6 14.0 15.4 27.7 17.9
total equity (ROE)
Expenses as a percent 26.2 30.9 26.3 30.8 26.4 27.0
of gross income
Provisions and 16.5 9.5 –16.6 19.6 18.3 6.2
impairments as a 
percent of expenses
Expenses, including 4.4 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.8 4.6
amounts owed to 
depositors, as a 
percent of total assets
Expenses, including 81.7 80.9 76.7 68.6 60.4 65.4
amounts owed to 
depositors, as a
percent of gross income
Amount
Expenses, including 681,525 713,580 785,949 1,008,985 1,629,654 2,992,492
amounts owed to
depositors 
The ratio of operating expenses including amounts owed to depositors,
to gross operating income is also very useful, as it clearly indicates the
bank’s profitability.
Key indicators include the return on average equity, which measures
the rate of return on shareholder investment, and the return on assets,
Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks
116
FIGURE 7.3 Select Profitability Ratios, 2001–06
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Profit as % of total assets (ROA)
Expenses as % of total assets
Gross income as % of total assets
Expenses – including amounts owed to
depositors – as % of total assets
FIGURE 7.4 Additional Profitability Ratios, 2001-06
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which measures the efficiency of use of the bank’s potential. Other ratios
measure the profitability of a bank’s core business (for example, margin
ratios), the contribution to profit of various types of activities, the effi-
ciency with which the bank operates, and the stability of its profits. Ratios
are observed over a period of time in order to detect trends in profitability.
An analysis of changes of various ratios over time reveals changes in bank
policies and strategies or in its business environment.
Numerous factors may influence a bank’s profitability. In some cases,
inflation may increase operating costs faster than income. Marking the
value of assets to market requires that unrealized gains are recognized as
income; since these gains are yet to be realized, this may negatively affect
the quality of earnings. Given the traditional fixed margin on which
banks operate, a change in the level of their profit rates will trigger
changes in the gross profit. Because banks are influenced by the high level
of competition in the banking sector, many have made significant invest-
ments in infrastructure-related assets, especially with regard to informa-
tion technology. Investments such as these have both increased the
overhead cost of banking and negatively affected profitability.
Viewed in the context of the financial items to which they are related,
operating ratios enable an analyst to assess the efficiency with which an
institution generates income. Industry efficiency norms facilitate a
comparison between individual banks and the banking system. A review
of investment and financing income allows an analyst to determine the
return on the loan assets. Similarly, a comparison of investment account
expenses indicates the relative cost of “funding.”
The ratios also can be used in a broader context. The cost and rev-
enue structure of the banking system can be assessed by calculating and
analyzing provisions and the profit-loss margin to gross income; invest-
ment income to investments; and overhead to net funding income. The
value added by the banking system can be determined by calculating net
income after taxes in relation to total average assets (that is, the return on
average assets) and net income after taxes in relation to owner equity
(that is, the return on equity).
Modern bankers pay a great deal of attention to the message that is
revealed by ratio analysis. Banks usually manage profitability by trying to
beat market averages and keep profits steady and predictable; which in
turn attracts investors. Ratios are therefore extremely useful tools, but as
with other analytical methods, they must be used with judgment and
caution, since they alone do not provide complete answers about the
bottom-line performance of banks. In the short run, many tricks can be
used to make bank ratios look good in relation to industry standards.
An assessment of the operations and management of a bank should
therefore be performed to provide a check on profitability ratios.
The need to generate stable and increasing profits also implies the
need to manage risk. For that reason, asset-liability management has
become an almost universally accepted approach to profitability (risk)
management. Since capital and profitability are intimately linked, a major
objective of asset-liability management is to ensure sustained profitability
so that a bank can maintain and augment its capital resources.
Bottom-line profitability ratios—the return on equity and assets—
indicate the net results of a bank’s operations in a financial year or over a
period of time. Figure 7.5 illustrates how to adjust these profitability
ratios by deducting an assumed cost of capital to show the real profit of a
bank. By comparing the return on equity to the after-tax return on risk-
free government securities, one can determine whether equity invested in
the bank has earned any additional returns, as compared to risk-free
investments. The result may disclose that it is better for shareholders
simply to invest in risk-free government securities or for the bank
concerned to cease its intermediation function and close its doors.
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FIGURE 7.5
Example: Return on Assets (ROA) and on Equity (ROE), Adjusted for
the Cost of Captial
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Credit or counterparty risk is the chance that a debtor or issuer ofa financial instrument—whether an individual, a company, or a 
country—will not repay principal and other investment-related cash
flows according to the terms specified in a credit agreement. Inherent to
banking, it means that payments may be delayed or not made at all, which
can cause cash flow problems and affect a bank’s liquidity. Despite inno-
vation in the financial services sector, more than 70 percent of a bank’s
balance sheet generally relates to this aspect of risk management. For this
reason, credit risk is the principal cause of bank failures.
The techniques used by Islamic banks to mitigate credit risk are
similar to those used by conventional banks. However, in the absence of
credit-rating agencies, banks rely on the client’s track record with the
bank and gather information about the creditworthiness of the client
through informal sources and local community networks.
FORMAL POLICIES FOR MANAGING CREDIT RISK
Bank supervisors place considerable importance on formal policies laid
down by the board of directors and diligently implemented or adminis-
tered by management. A lending or financing policy should outline the
scope and allocation of a bank’s credit facilities and the manner in which
a credit portfolio is managed—that is, how investment and financing
assets are originated, appraised, supervised, and collected. A good policy
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Key Messages
• Credit risk management lies at the heart of survival for the vast majority of banks.
• Credit risk can be limited by reducing connected-party lending and large exposures to related
parties.
• Asset classification and subsequent provisioning against possible losses affect not only the value
of the investing and financing asset portfolio but also the underlying value of a bank’s capital.
• The profile of customers (who has been lent to) must be transparent.
• Risks associated with the key banking products (what has been lent) must be understood and
managed.
• The maturity profile of investing and financing asset products (for how long the loans have been
made) interacts strongly with liquidity risk management.
• A bank’s capacity for risk management contributes significantly to the quality of its risk manage-
ment practices.
is not overly restrictive and allows for the presentation of proposals to the
board that officers believe are worthy of consideration but that do not
fall within the parameters of written guidelines. Flexibility is needed to
allow for fast reaction and early adaptation to changing conditions in a
bank’s mix of assets and the market environment.
Virtually all regulatory environments prescribe minimum standards
for managing credit risk; see box 8.1 for the Islamic Financial Services
Board (IFSB) principles of credit risk. These cover the identification of
existing and potential risks, the definition of policies that express the
bank’s risk management philosophy, and the setting of parameters
within which credit risk will be controlled.
Specific measures typically include three kinds of policies. One set
aims to limit or reduce credit risk. These include policies on concentration
and large exposures, diversification, lending to connected parties, and
overexposure to sectors or regions. The second aims to classify assets.
These mandate periodic evaluation of the collectibility of the portfolio
of credit instruments. The third aims to provision loss or make allowances
at a level adequate to absorb anticipated loss.
POLICIES TO REDUCE CREDIT RISK
In an effort to reduce or limit credit risk, regulators pay close attention
to three issues: exposure to a single customer, related-party financing, and
overexposure to a geographic area or economic sector.
Single-Customer Exposure
Modern prudential regulations usually stipulate that a bank refrain from
investing in or extending credit to any individual entity or related group
of entities in excess of an amount representing a prescribed percentage of
the bank’s capital and reserves. Most countries impose a single-customer
exposure limit of between 10 and 25 percent of capital. The threshold at
which reporting to supervisory authorities becomes necessary should
normally be set somewhere below the maximum limit. Supervisors can
then devote special attention to exposures above the threshold and
require banks to take precautionary measures before concentration
becomes excessively risky.
The main difficulty in defining exposure is to quantify the extent to
which less direct forms of credit exposure should be included within the
exposure limit. As a matter of principle, contingent liabilities and credit
substitutes, such as guarantees, acceptances, letters of credit, and all
future commitments, should be included, although the treatment
of specific instruments may vary. For example, a financial obligation
guarantee may be treated differently than a performance risk guaran-
tee. The treatment of collateral is another contentious issue, as the
valuation of collateral can be highly subjective. As a matter of prudence,
collateral should not be considered when determining the size of
an exposure.
Another conceptual question is the definition of the term “single
client.”According to international practice, a single client is an individual,
legal person, or a connected group to which a bank is exposed. Single
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BOX 8.1 IFSB Principles of Credit Risk
Principle 2.1. [Islamic financial institutions] shall have in place a strategy for financing,
using the various Islamic instruments in compliance with Shariah, whereby they recognize the
potential credit exposures that may arise at different stages of the various financing agreements. 
Principle 2.2. [Islamic financial institutions] shall carry out a due diligence review in
respect of counterparties prior to deciding on the choice of an appropriate Islamic financing
instrument. 
Principle 2.3. [Islamic financial institutions] shall have in place appropriate methodolo-
gies for measuring and reporting the credit risk exposures arising under each Islamic financing
instrument. 
Principle 2.4. [Islamic financial institutions] shall have in place Shariah-compliant credit
risk–mitigating techniques appropriate for each Islamic financing instrument.
clients are mutually associated or control other clients, either directly
or indirectly, normally through a voting right of at least 15–20 percent,
a dominant shareholding, or the capacity to control policy making and
management. In addition, the exposure to a number of single clients
may represent a cumulative risk if financial interdependence exists and
their expected source of repayment is the same (see figure 8.1 for a
hypothetical example).
In practical terms, a large exposure usually indicates a bank’s commit-
ment to support a specific client. Here the risk is that a bank that extends
credit to a large corporate client may not be objective in appraising the risks
associated with such credit.
The management of large exposures involves an additional aspect:
the bank’s ability to identify common or related ownership, to exercise
effective control, and to rely on common cash flows to meet its own obli-
gations. Particularly in the case of large clients, banks must pay attention
to the completeness and adequacy of information about the debtor.
Bank credit officers should monitor events affecting large clients and
their performance on an ongoing basis, regardless of whether or not they
are meeting their obligations. When external events present a cause for
concern, credit officers should request additional information from the
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FIGURE 8.1 Exposure to 20 Largest Exposures (Hypothetical Example)
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debtor. If there is any doubt that the person or group receiving the
investment or financing might have difficulty meeting its obligation to
the bank, the concerns should be raised with a higher level of credit risk
management, and a contingency plan on how to address the issue should
be developed.
Related-Party Financing
Dealing with connected parties is a particularly dangerous form of credit
risk exposure. Related parties typically include a bank’s parent, major
shareholders, subsidiaries, affiliate companies, directors, and executive
officers. Such parties are in a position to exert control over or influence a
bank’s policies and decision making, especially concerning credit deci-
sions. A bank’s ability to identify and track extensions of credit to insiders
is crucial (see table 8.1).
The issue is whether credit decisions are made on a rational basis
and according to the bank’s policies and procedures. An additional
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TABLE 8.1 Related-Party Lending 
Amount of loans
not in the A 
Amount of Amount of (pass) category, 
loans not in loans, as as percentage 
Amount of the A (pass) percentage of of qualifying Collateral 
Type of related entity loans category qualifying capital capital held
Shareholders holding more 
than 5 percent of shares
Shareholders holding less 
than 5 percent of shares
Shareholders of any 
shareholders
Board of directors
Executive management
Entities controlled by 
the bank
Entities that have control 
over the bank
Close relative to any of 
the above
Total
concern is whether credit is based on market terms or on terms that are
more favorable with regard to amount, maturity, rate, and collateral than
those provided to the general public.
Most regulators establish limits for related parties, typically stipulat-
ing that total credit to related parties cannot exceed a certain percentage
of Tier 1 or total qualifying capital. If prudential regulations have not
established such a limit, the bank should maintain one as a matter of
board policy. Prudent banking practice would require board approval of
all facilities extended to related parties.
Overexposure to Geographic Areas or Economic Sectors
Another dimension of risk concentration is the exposure of a bank to a
single sector of the economy or a narrow geographic region. This makes a
bank vulnerable to weaknesses in a particular industry or region and poses
a risk that it will suffer from simultaneous failures among several clients for
similar reasons. This concern is particularly relevant for regional and
specialized banks or banks in small countries with narrow economic pro-
files, such as those with predominantly agricultural economies or exporters
of a single commodity.
It is often difficult to assess the exposure of a bank to various sectors
of the economy, as most bank reporting systems do not produce such
information. For example, a holding company of a large diversified group
could be used to finance projects in various industries in which the
company operates. In any case, banks should have well-developed 
systems to monitor sector risks, assess the impact of adverse trends on
the quality of their portfolio and income statements, and deal with
increased risk.
Banks engaged in international lending face additional risks, the
most important of which are country (or sovereign) and transfer risks.
The country risks encompass the entire spectrum of risks posed by the
macroeconomic, political, and social environment of a country that may
affect the performance of clients. Transfer risks are the difficulties that a
client might have in obtaining the foreign exchange needed to service a
bank’s obligations. The classification of international loans should
normally include both country and transfer risks. A bank may be asked
to provision for international loans on a loan-by-loan basis, whereby the
level of necessary provisions is raised to accommodate additional risk.
Alternatively, a bank may determine aggregate exposures to country and
transfer risks on a country-by-country basis and provide special reserves
to accommodate risk exposures.
Credit Risk Management
125
CREDIT RISK SPECIFIC TO ISLAMIC BANKS
The unique characteristics of the financial instruments offered by Islamic
financial institutions result in the following special credit risks (for a
detailed explanation, please refer to IFSB Standard on Risk Management
for Islamic Financial Institutions and Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007).
 In murabahah transactions, Islamic banks are exposed to credit 
risks when the bank delivers the asset to the client but does not
receive payment from the client in time. In case of a nonbinding
murabahah, where the client has the right to refuse delivery of the
product purchased by the bank, the bank is further exposed to price
and market risks.
 In bay’ al-salaam or istisnah contracts, the bank is exposed to the risk
of failure to supply on time, to supply at all, or to supply the quality of
goods as contractually specified. Such failure could result in a delay or
default in payment, or in delivery of the product, and can expose
Islamic banks to financial losses of income as well as capital.
 In the case of mudarabah investments, where the Islamic bank enters
into the mudarabah contract as rab al-mal (principal) with an external
mudarib (agent), in addition to the typical principal-agent problems,
the Islamic bank is exposed to an enhanced credit risk on the amounts
advanced to the mudarib. The nature of the mudarabah contract is
such that it does not give the bank appropriate rights to monitor the
mudarib or to participate in management of the project, which makes
it difficult to assess and manage credit risk. The bank is not in a
position to know or decide how the activities of the mudarib can be
monitored accurately, especially if losses are claimed. This risk is espe-
cially present in markets where information asymmetry is high and
transparency in financial disclosure by the mudarib is low 
Credit risk management for Islamic banks is complicated further
by additional externalities. Especially in the case of default by the coun-
terparty, Islamic banks are prohibited from charging any accrued
interest or imposing any penalty, except in the case of deliberate
procrastination. Clients may take advantage by delaying payment,
knowing that the bank will not charge a penalty or require extra pay-
ments. During the delay, the bank’s capital is stuck in a nonproductive
activity and the bank’s investors-depositors are not earning any income.
Another example is where the bank’s share in the capital invested
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through a mudarabah or musharakah contract is transformed into a
debt obligation in case of proven negligence or misconduct of the
mudarib or the musharakah’s managing partner. As a result, the rules to
recover a debt are applied, and these are different from the rules of
mudarabah and musharakah investment.
Using collateral and pledges as security against credit risk is a com-
mon practice among all Islamic banks. The bank might ask the client to
post additional collateral before entering into a murabahah transaction.
In some cases, the subject matter of murabahah is accepted as collateral.
Posting collateral as security is not without difficulties, especially in
developing countries. Typical problems include illiquidity of the collat-
eral or inability of the bank to sell the collateral, difficulties in determin-
ing the fair market value on a periodic basis, and legal hindrances and
obstacles in taking possession of the collateral. Due to weak legal institu-
tions and slow processing, it becomes difficult for the bank to claim the
collateral. In addition to collateral, personal and institutional guarantees
are also accepted to minimize credit risk.
ANALYZING CREDIT RISK IN THE ASSET PORTFOLIO
The detailed composition of assets usually provides a good picture of a
bank’s business profile and business priorities as well as the type of
intermediation risk that the bank is expected and willing to take. Any
analysis should include an overview of what products have been invested
in, to whom, and for how long. Figures 8.2 and 8.3 illustrate the customer
profile and composition of investment and financing products, and tables
8.2 to 8.4 provide an overview of the customer and maturity profile.
Analysis of the aggregate portfolio should therefore include the
following:
 A summary of the major types of investment and financing assets,
including details of the number of customers or customer types,
average maturity, and average earnings;
 A review of the distribution of the portfolio, including various per-
spectives on the number of investment and financing assets and total
amounts, for example, according to currency, short-term (less than
one year) and long-term (more than one year) maturities, industrial
or other pertinent economic sectors, state-owned and private clients,
and corporate and retail lending;
 A list of government or other guarantees;
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FIGURE 8.2 Customer Profile: Who Are We Investing In?
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TABLE 8.2 Customer Profile: Who Are We Investing In?
Customer assets 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Financial 1,383,365 1,762,418 236,178 1,432,294 5,113,612 3,602,506
institutitions
Real estate 4,839,918 4,900,108 5,456,906 6,439,081 8,362,403 13,869,026 
Trade 667,627 810,398 2,609,638 2,812,415 2,406,786 6,633,344 
Government 521,217 642,546 777,502 2,799,965 8,370,227 3,719,212 
Manufacturing 513,257 730,259 3,106,754 3,626,226 2,314,940 7,933,024
and services
Personal financing 2,999,433 3,621,295 2,380,118 2,896,943 4,723,195 4,798,386
and others
Total 10,924,817 12,467,024 14,567,096 20,006,924 31,291,163 40,555,498
TABLE 8.3 Composition of Products: What Are We Investing In?
(Percent of total)
Assets 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Financing
Commodities murabahat 25 20 21 18 17 17
International murabahat 8 9 8 14 12 9
Vehicles murabahat 11 13 13 12 10 10
Real estate murabahat 7 7 5 5 6 9
Total murabahat 52 55 47 48 45 45
Istisnah 28 21 17 11 8 11
Ijarah 3 6 17 24 16 15
Others 1 1 0 0 0 0
Total financing assets 83 76 81 83 70 71
Investing
Sukuk 0 0 0 0 5 14
Musharakat 10 9 9 9 19 7
Mudarabat 4 5 7 7 7 8
Investment funds 2 5 0 0 0 0
Wakalat 0 0 3 1 0 0
Gross investing assets 17 19 19 17 30 29
Projects in Progress 0.08 4.21
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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TABLE 8.4 Maturity Profile of Total Assets: For How Long Are We Investing?
Maturity profile 
of assets 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Less than 3 months 8,440,268 9,306,606 10,272,647 11,497,545 15,203,780 31,725,644
3 months to 1 year 1,748,961 1,779,905 2,946,684 6,068,174 5,896,048 10,908,547
Over 1 year 5,144,749 8,511,279 9,558,988 13,047,642 21,898,451 21,799,745
15,333,978 19,597,790 22,778,319 30,613,361 42,998,279 64,433,936
 A review of accounts by risk classification;
 An analysis of nonperforming accounts.
The portfolio reflects a bank’s market position and demand, its
business and risk strategy, and its credit extension capabilities. When
feasible, the portfolio review (examination) should include a random
sampling of accounts so that a major percentage of the total portfolio
and a statistically significant number of accounts are covered. A detailed
credit portfolio review should include the following:
 All customers with an aggregate exposure larger than 5 percent of the
bank’s capital;
 All exposures to shareholders and connected parties;
 All investment and financing assets for which the financing schedule
has been rescheduled or otherwise altered since the granting of the
facility;
 All investment and financing assets classified as substandard, doubtful,
or loss.
In each case, a credit review should consider documentation in the
client’s file and be accompanied by a discussion of the client’s business,
near-term prospects, and credit history with the responsible credit officer
(see box 8.2). When the total amount due exceeds 5 percent of a bank’s
capital, the analysis should also consider the client’s business plans for
the future and the potential consequences for debt service capacity and
principal repayment.
The specific objective of these reviews is to assess the likelihood that
the credit will be repaid, as well as whether or not the classification of the
loan proposed by the bank is adequate. Other considerations include the
quality of collateral held and the ability of the client’s business to gener-
ate the necessary cash.
Interbank Deposits
Interbank deposits are an important category of bank assets. They may
account for a significant percentage of a bank’s balance sheet, particularly
in countries that lack convertibility but allow citizens and economic
agents to maintain foreign exchange deposits. Other reasons for inter-
bank deposits are to facilitate fund transfers and the settlement of secu-
rities transactions or to take advantage of the ability of other banks to
perform certain services more economically or efficiently due to their size
or geographic location.
A review of interbank (lending) transactions typically focuses on the
following aspects:
 The establishment and observation of counterparty credit limits,
including a description of the existing credit limit policy;
 Any interbank credits for which specific provisions should be made;
 The method and accuracy of reconciliation of nostro and vostro
accounts;
 Any interbank credits with terms of pricing that are not the market norm;
 The concentration of interbank exposure with a detailed listing of
banks and amounts outstanding as well as limits.
Interbank deposits should be treated like any other credit risk exposure.
A bank’s policy should require that correspondent banks be reviewed
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BOX 8.2 Content of an Investment and Financing Asset Review File
For each of the assets reviewed, a summary file should be made showing the following:
• Entrepreneur’s name and line of business; 
• Use of proceeds; 
• Date credit granted; 
• Maturity date, amount, currency, and terms of the investment; 
• Principal source of repayment; 
• The nature and value of collateral or security (or valuation basis, if a fixed asset); 
• Total outstanding liabilities in cases where the bank is absorbing the credit risk; 
• Delinquency or nonperformance, if any; 
• Description of monitoring activities undertaken; 
• Financial information, including current financial statements and other pertinent informa-
tion; 
• Specific provisions that are required and available.
carefully with regard to their exposure limits as well as their ability to provide
adequate collateral. Banks from regulatory environments that are strict,
well supervised, and in tune with international standards are customarily
treated as a lesser risk than banks from developing countries.
Off-Balance-Sheet Commitments
All off-balance-sheet commitments that incur credit exposure should be
reviewed. An assessment should be made of the adequacy of procedures
for analyzing credit risk and the supervision and administration of
off-balance-sheet credit instruments, such as guarantees. An off-balance-
sheet portfolio review should be carried out with the same principles
and in a manner similar to a portfolio review. The key objective is to
assess the ability of the client to meet particular financial commitments
in a timely manner.
Nonperforming Assets
Nonperforming assets are assets that are not generating income. As a first
step, loans are often considered to be nonperforming when principal or
interest on them is due and left unpaid for 90 days or more (this period
may vary by jurisdiction). Asset classification and provisioning entail
much more than simply looking at amounts overdue. The investment
cash flow and overall ability to repay amounts owed are significantly more
important than whether the payment is overdue or not.
For financial reporting purposes, the principal balance outstanding,
rather than delinquent payments, is used to identify a nonperforming
portfolio. The nonperforming portfolio indicates the quality of the total
portfolio and ultimately of a bank’s credit decisions. Another indicator is
the bank’s collection ratio.
When assessed within the context of nonperforming assets, the aggre-
gate level of provisions indicates the capacity of a bank to accommodate
credit risk. The analysis of a nonperforming portfolio should cover a
number of aspects, as follows:
 Classifications, broken down by type of customer and branch of eco-
nomic activity, to determine overall trends and whether or not all
customers are affected equally;
 Reasons for the deterioration of the portfolio quality, which can help
to identify possible measures to reverse a given trend;
 A list of nonperforming accounts, including all relevant details, assessed
on a case-by-case basis, to determine if the situation is reversible, exactly
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what can be done to improve repayment capacity, and whether or not
workout or collection plans have been used;
 Provision levels, to determine the bank’s capacity to withstand defaults;
 The impact on profit- and loss-sharing accounts, to determine exactly
how the bank will be affected by the deterioration in asset quality.
There can be a number of reasons for deteriorating portfolio quality.
It is unavoidable that banks make mistakes in judgment. However, for
most failed banks, the real problems are systemic in nature and rooted in
the bank’s credit culture. Box 8.3 illustrates the kinds of problems that indi-
cate distortion in a bank’s credit culture.
ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND LOSS PROVISIONING POLICIES
Asset classification is a process whereby an asset is assigned a grade for
credit risk, which is determined by the likelihood that obligations will be
serviced and liquidated according to the terms of the contract. In general,
all assets for which a bank is taking a risk should be classified, including
advances, accounts receivable, investment and financing assets, equity
participations, and contingent liabilities.
Asset classification is a key tool of risk management.Assets are classified
at the time of origination and then reviewed and reclassified as necessary
(according to the degree of credit risk) a few times a year. The review should
consider service performance and the client’s financial condition.Economic
trends and changes in the market for and the price of goods also affect eval-
uation of loan repayment. Assets classified as “pass” or “watch” are typically
reviewed twice a year, while critical assets are reviewed at least each quarter.
Banks determine classifications by themselves but follow standards
that are normally set by regulatory authorities. Box 8.4 outlines the
standard rules for asset classification that are currently used in most
industrial countries.
The primary emphasis is placed on the client’s ability and willingness
to meet obligations out of prospective operating cash flow. Some jurisdic-
tions require that all credit extended to an individual client should be
assigned the same risk classification, while differences in classification
should be noted and justified. Other jurisdictions recommend that each
asset be assessed on its own merits. In cases where assets may be classified
differently depending on whether subjective or objective criteria are used,
the more severe classification should generally apply. If supervisory author-
ities, and in many cases external auditors, assign more stringent classifica-
tions than the bank itself, the bank is expected to adjust the classification.
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Box 8.3 Signs of a Distorted Credit Culture
In its commercial bank examination manual, the U.S. Federal Reserve system cites the
following problems as signs of a distorted credit culture. These principles could also be applied
to discover signs of distortion in an Islamic financial institution:
Self-dealing arises when too much credit is extended to directors and large share-
holders or to their interests, compromising sound credit principles under pressure from
related parties. Self-dealing has been the key issue in a significant number of problem
banks. 
Compromise of credit principles arises when loans that have undue risk or are
extended under unsatisfactory terms are granted with full knowledge that they violate
sound credit principles. The reasons for the compromise typically include self-dealing,
anxiety over income, competitive pressures in the bank’s key markets, or personal conflicts
of interest.
Anxiety over income arises when concern over earnings outweighs the soundness of
lending decisions, underscored by the hope that risk will not materialize or lead to loans with
unsatisfactory repayment terms. This is a relatively frequent problem since a loan portfolio is
usually a bank’s key revenue-producing asset. 
Incomplete credit information indicates that loans have been extended without proper
appraisal of borrower creditworthiness. 
Complacency is a frequent cause of bad loan decisions. Complacency is typically
manifested in a lack of adequate supervision of old, familiar borrowers, dependence on oral
information rather than reliable and complete financial data, and an optimistic interpreta-
tion of known credit weaknesses because the borrower survived a distressed situation in
the past. In addition, banks may ignore warning signs regarding the borrower, economy,
region, industry, or other relevant factors or fail to enforce repayment agreements, includ-
ing a lack of prompt legal action.
Lack of effective supervision invariably results in a lack of knowledge about the
borrower’s affairs over the lifetime of the loan. Consequently, initially sound loans may develop
problems and losses because of a lack of effective supervision. 
Technical incompetence includes a lack of technical ability among credit officers to ana-
lyze financial statements and obtain and evaluate pertinent credit information. 
Poor selection of risks typically involves the following: (a) the extension of loans with
initially sound financial risk to a level beyond the reasonable payment capacity of the
borrower, which is a frequent problem in unstable economies with volatile interest rates; (b)
loans where the bank-financed share of the total cost of the project is large relative to the
equity investment of the owners and loans for real estate transactions where equity
ownership is narrow; (c) loans based on the expectation of successful completion of a
business transaction, rather than on the borrower’s creditworthiness, and loans made for the
speculative purchase of securities or goods; (d) loans to companies operating in economically
distressed areas or industries; (e) loans made because of large deposits in a bank, rather than
sound net worth of collateral; (f) loans predicated on collateral of problematic liquidation
value or collateral loans that lack adequate security margins.
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BOX 8.4 Asset Classification Rules 
According to international standards, assets are normally classified in the following
categories.
Standard or pass. When debt service capacity is considered to be beyond any doubt. In
general, assets that are fully secured by cash or cash substitutes (for example, bank
certificates of deposit and treasury bills and notes) are usually classified as standard regard-
less of arrears or other adverse credit factors. 
Specially mentioned or watched. Assets with potential weaknesses that may, if not
checked or corrected, weaken the asset as a whole or jeopardize the client’s capacity to meet
obligations in the future. This, for example, includes credit given through an inadequate loan
agreement, a lack of control over collateral, or a lack of proper documentation. Clients oper-
ating under economic or market conditions that may affect them negatively in the future
should receive this classification. This also applies to borrowers with an adverse trend in their
operations or an unbalanced position in the balance sheet, but which have not reached a point
where repayment is jeopardized. 
Substandard. Well-defined credit weaknesses when the primary sources of repayment are
insufficient and the bank must look to secondary sources, such as collateral, the sale of a fixed
asset, refinancing, or fresh capital. Substandard assets are typically assets whose cash flow
may not be sufficient to meet current cash flow commitments; or intermediation to borrowers
that are significantly undercapitalized. They may also include short-term assets to borrowers
for which the inventory-to-cash cycle is insufficient to repay the debt at maturity. Nonperform-
ing assets that are at least 90 days overdue are normally classified as substandard, as are rene-
gotiated loans and advances for which the borrower has paid delinquent interest from his own
funds prior to renegotiations and until sustained performance under a realistic repayment
program has been achieved. 
Doubtful. Such assets have the same weaknesses as substandard assets, but their
collection in full is questionable on the basis of existing facts. The possibility of loss is present,
but certain factors that may strengthen the asset defer its classification as a loss until a more
exact status may be determined. Nonperforming assets that are at least 180 days past due are
also classified as doubtful, unless they are sufficiently secured. 
Loss. Certain assets are considered uncollectible and of such little value that the
continued definition as bankable assets is not warranted. This classification does not mean
that an asset has absolutely no recovery or salvage value, but rather that it is neither practical
nor desirable to defer the process of writing it off, even though partial recovery may be possi-
ble in the future. Nonperforming assets that are at least one year past due are also classified
as losses, unless such assets are very well secured.
In some advanced banking systems, banks use more than one rating
level for assets in the category of pass or standard. The objective of this
practice is to improve the ability to differentiate among different types of
credit and to improve the understanding of the relationship between
profitability and rating level.
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Asset classification provides a basis for determining the adequate level
of provisions for possible losses. Such provisions, together with general
loss reserves that are normally counted as Tier 2 capital in conventional
banks and are not assigned to specific assets, form the basis for estab-
lishing a bank’s capacity to absorb losses. In determining an adequate
reserve, all significant factors that affect the collectibility of the portfolio
should be considered. These factors include the quality of credit poli-
cies and procedures, prior loss experiences, quality of management, col-
lection and recovery practices, changes in national and local economic
and business conditions, and general economic trends. Assessments of
asset value should be performed systematically, consistently over time,
and in conformity with objective criteria. They should be supported by
adequate documentation.
Loss provisioning may be mandatory or discretionary, depending on
the banking system. The tax treatment of provisions also varies consid-
erably from country to country, although many economists believe that
provisions should be treated as business expenses for tax purposes. Tax
considerations should not, however, influence prudent risk management
policies. In some highly developed countries, it is left to the banks to
determine the prudent level of provisions. While some merit exists in
estimating loss potential on a case-by-case basis, particularly for large
clients, it may be more practical to assign a level of required provisions
based on each classification category. In many countries, in particular
those with fragile economies, regulators have established mandatory
levels of provisions that are related to asset classification.
The established level of mandatory provisions is normally deter-
mined by certain statistics. In countries where the legal framework for
debt recovery is highly developed, such as the United States, approxi-
mately 10 percent of substandard assets eventually deteriorate into loss.
The percentages for doubtful and loss classifications are approximately
50 and 100 percent, respectively. In developing countries where the legal
framework and tradition of collection may be less effective, provisions
in the range of 20 to 25 percent for substandard assets may be a more
realistic estimate of loss potential. Table 8.5 presents the level of provi-
sions in countries with less developed legal frameworks. Additional
charts that the analyst might want to prepare include pie charts on asset
classification, loss experience over time as a percentage of assets invested,
and provisioning as a percentage of substandard assets.
Two approaches exist for dealing with loss assets. One is to retain
them on the books until all remedies for collection have been exhausted.
This is typical for banking systems based on the British tradition; in this
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case, the level of loss reserve may appear unusually large. The second
approach requires all loss assets to be written off promptly against the
reserve, that is, be removed from the books. This approach is typical of
the U.S. tradition and is more conservative in that loss assets are
considered to be not bankable but not necessarily nonrecoverable. By
immediately writing off loss assets, the level of the reserve will appear
smaller in relation to the outstanding portfolio. In evaluating the level of
provisions established by a bank, the analyst must clearly understand
whether the bank is aggressively writing off its losses or is simply
providing for them.
Estimates of the level of necessary loss provisions include a degree
of subjectivity. However, management discretion should be exercised in
accordance with established policies and procedures (see appendix B for
the IFSB standard on risk management). At a minimum, the following
aspects of the overall allowance for losses should be taken into account:
 A survey of the bank’s existing provisioning policy and the methodology
used to carry it out, considering, in particular, the value attributed to
collateral and its legal or operational enforceability;
 An overview of asset classification procedures and the review process,
including the time allotted for review;
 Any current factors that are likely to cause losses associated with a bank’s
portfolio and that differ from the historical experience of loss, including
changes in a bank’s economic and business conditions or in its clients,
external factors, or alterations of bank procedures since the last review;
 A trend analysis over a longer period of time, which serves to highlight
any increases in overdue amounts and the impact of such increases;
 An opinion of the adequacy of the current policy and, on the basis of
the loans reviewed, extrapolation of additional provisions necessary to
bring the bank’s total loan-loss provisions in line with International
Accounting Standards (IAS).
TABLE 8.5 Recommended Provisions
Classification Recommended provisions Qualification
Pass 1–2 percent (Tier 2) General loss reserve, if disclosed
Watch 5–10 percent Specific provision
Substandard 10–30 percent Specific provision
Doubtful 50–75 percent Specific provision
Loss 100 percent Specific provision
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Workout Procedures
Workout procedures are an important aspect of credit risk management.
If timely action is not taken to address problem accounts, opportunities
to strengthen or collect on these poor-quality assets may be missed, and
losses may accumulate to a point where they threaten a bank’s solvency.
An assessment of workout procedures should consider the organization
of this function, including departments and responsible staff, and assess
the performance of the workout units by reviewing attempted and success-
ful recoveries (in terms of both number and volume) and the average
time for recovery. The workout methods used and the involvement of
senior management should also be evaluated.
During a workout process, each account and client should be consid-
ered on its own merits. Typical workout strategies include the following:
 Reducing the credit risk exposure of a bank—for example, by having
the client provide additional capital, funds, collateral, or guarantees;
 Working with the client to assess problems and find solutions such as
the provision of advice, the development of a program to reduce oper-
ating costs or increase earnings, the selling of assets, the design of a
restructuring program, or the change in account terms;
 Arranging for a client to be bought or taken over by a more credit-
worthy party or arranging for some form of joint-venture partnership;
 Liquidating exposure by settling out of court or by taking legal action,
calling on guarantees, foreclosing, or liquidating collateral.
REVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
An overall review of credit risk management evaluates a bank’s policies and
practices for managing credit risk. This entails evaluating a bank’s capac-
ity to assess, administer, supervise, enforce, and recover investment and
financing assets, advances, guarantees, and other credit instruments. It also
entails determining the adequacy of financial information used as the
basis for investing in the financial instrument or extending credit.
Investing and Financing Islamic Products
When carrying out its duties on behalf of both depositors, investment
account holders, and shareholders, the board of directors must ensure
that a bank’s investing function fulfills three fundamental objectives:
(a) investment and financing assets should be intermediated on a sound
and collectible basis; (b) funds should be invested profitably for the benefit
of shareholders and the protection of depositors; and (c) the legitimate
credit (intermediation) needs of economic agents or households should
be satisfied.
The review of investing operations evaluates whether the process meets
these criteria. In other words, it is crucial to assess whether investment
and financing assets are well structured, policies are well reflected in inter-
nal procedures and manuals, staffing is adequate and diligent in following
established policies and guidelines, and the information normally available
to participants in the process is timely, accurate, and complete. An analyst
should question management about any wild fluctuations in asset classes
to determine what strategy is being followed. Table 8.6 and figure 8.4 facil-
itate such analysis.
The integrity and credibility of the process depend on objective
credit decisions that ensure an acceptable level of risk in relation to the
expected return. A review of the process should analyze credit manuals
and other written guidelines applied by various departments of a bank
and the capacity and performance of all departments involved in the
credit function. It should also cover the origination, appraisal, approval,
disbursement, monitoring, collection, and handling procedures for the
various credit functions provided by the bank. Specifically, the review
should encompass the following:
 A detailed credit analysis and approval process, including samples of
client application forms, internal credit summary forms, internal credit
manuals, and client files;
 Criteria for approving client’s requests, for determining return policies
and limits for assets at various levels of the bank’s management, and for
handling assets distributed through the branch network;
 Collateral policy for all types of financial instruments and actual
methods and practices concerning revaluation of collateral and files
related to collateral;
 Administration and monitoring procedures, including responsibilities,
compliance, and controls;
 A process for handling exceptions.
Human Resources
Clearly defined levels of authority for credit approval help to ensure that
decisions are prudent and within defined parameters. All staff involved in
credit origination, appraisal, supervision, and other credit processes need
to be trained in Islamic products and fundamental Shariah principles
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TABLE 8.6 Year-on-Year Fluctuations in Growth of Portfolio Components
Asset 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Financing
Commodities murabahat Base –9% 23% 16% 49% 33%
International murabahat Base 21% 2% 152% 36% –4%
Vehicles murabahat Base 28% 14% 30% 26% 29%
Real estate murabahat Base 11% –6% 19% 106% 84%
Total murabahat Base 7% 13% 42% 45% 29%
Istisnah Base –14% –6% –8% 15% 69%
Ijarah Base 180% 224% 85% 10% 17%
Others Base –18% –73% –15% –100%
Total financing assets Base 5% 24% 41% 31% 32%
Less: Deferred income Base –6% 2% 4% 21% 75%
Down payments from Base –80% 2948% 23% –100%
Istisnah customers
Contractors and Base –19% –95% –42% 4785% 209%
consultants’ Istisnah 
Provisions for impairment Base 9% –8% 10% 13% 11%
Base 9% 32% 49% 33% 24%
Investing Base
Sukuk Base 306%
Musharakat Base 5% 18% 33% 241% –51%
Mudarabat Base 34% 45% 40% 59% 45%
Investment funds Base 140% –100%
Wakalat Base 127% 1074% –41% –47% 20%
Gross investing assets Base 34% 13% 22% 186% 25%
Less: Provisions for impairment Base –34% 14% 6% 52% –17%
Net investing assets Base 37% 13% 22% 189% 25%
Total Islamic financing Base 21% 21% 43% 62% 25%
and investing assets, net
pertaining to defaults, penalties, and investor rights. Specifically, their
number, level, age, experience, and responsibilities should be identified
and evaluated. Staff organization, skills, and qualifications should be
analyzed in relation to policies and procedures. All ongoing training
programs for a bank’s credit staff should be reviewed and their adequacy
assessed. The quality and frequency of staff training are often a good
indicator of the level of credit skills.
Information Flows and Disclosure
A bank must have efficient systems for monitoring adherence to established
guidelines. This can best be accomplished through an internal review and
reporting system that informs the board of directors and senior manage-
ment of how policies are being carried out and that provides them with
sufficient information to evaluate the performance of lower-echelon officers
and the condition of the portfolio. Since information is the basic element of
the investment and financing management process, its availability, quality,
and cost-effectiveness should be analyzed. In addition, because the infor-
mation needed may be dispersed in different parts of the bank, an analysis
should pay attention to information flows, in particular, whether the infor-
mation supplied is complete and available in a timely and cost-effective
manner. Such an analysis is linked closely to a review of human resources,
organizational and control structures, and information technology.
Different countries have different classification rules, provisioning
requirements, and methods of treating problem accounts, and different
banks exercise judgment to different degrees. This makes adequate disclo-
sure essential, as it allows supervisors and other interested third parties
to evaluate the true financial condition of a bank. Regulatory authorities
need to mandate principles of disclosure related to sound credit risk,
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FIGURE 8.4 Year-on-Year Fluctuations in Growth of Portfolio Components
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as recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Specifically, these include disclosure of information about the following:
 Policies and methods used to account for impairments (that is,
provisions);
 Risk management and control policies and practices;
 Allowances (loss reserves) and specific allowances (provisions) by
major categories of clients and geographic regions and reconciliation
of movements in the allowances for impairment;
 Large exposures and concentration of exposures to connected parties;
 Balances and other pertinent information on accounts that have been
restructured or are otherwise irregular with respect to the original
agreement.
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As financial instruments and markets have become more complex andprocessing has been automated, the treasury function of financial
intermediaries has been expanded and made more complex.1 Typical
treasury functions include, but are not limited to, the following:
 The overall policy framework, including (a) general policy guidance
and directions, (b) ALM (asset-liability management), (c) strategic
asset allocation, (d) benchmark approval, and (e) use of external port-
folio managers;
 Funding and liquidity management;
 Investment and cash flow management, referred to as asset management;
 Risk analysis and compliance, which includes (a) model validation,
(b) risk measurement (liquidity, counterparty or credit, market, com-
modity, and currency risk), (c) performance measurement, analysis,
and reporting, (d) compliance with broad investment guidelines, and
(e) quantitative strategies and risk research (model development,
benchmark construction);
 Treasury operations, including (a) correspondent bank accounts (bank-
ing relations), (b) settlements, (c) accounting, and (d) information
systems and services.
This list of treasury functions exposes the financial institution to a
new breed of risks that have to be managed. These include asset-liability
management, liquidity, and market risks. Generally, risk management is
ALM, Liquidity, and 
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Key Messages
• Islamic banks should theoretically be less exposed to asset-liability mismatches than their con-
ventional counterparts. This comparative advantage is rooted in the “pass-through” and the “risk-
sharing” nature of Islamic banks.
• Liquidity management is a key banking function and an integral part of the asset-liability
management process. 
• Banks are particularly vulnerable to liquidity problems, on an institution-specific level and from a
systemic or market viewpoint. 
• Liquidity management policies should comprise a risk management (decision-making) structure, a
liquidity management and funding strategy, a set of limits for liquidity risk exposures, and a set
of procedures for liquidity planning under alternative scenarios, including crisis situations.
• Market risk results from the volatility of positions taken in the four fundamental economic markets:
return-sensitive debt securities, equities, currencies, and commodities.
• The volatility of each of these markets exposes banks to fluctuations in the price or value of 
marketable financial instruments.
• The treasury function is normally divided into a portfolio management unit (front office), a risk 
analytics and compliance unit (middle office), and an operations unit (back office).
• Allocation of tasks between the units may differ from bank to bank, but risk management principles
for the various functions do not change. 
• Compliance with laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines is paramount, as it is the culture of
compliance that determines the environment within which trading decisions are made. 
• The objective of risk management is to provide an independent measurement and monitoring of
market risks and other risks being undertaken across various treasury businesses.
part of the treasury function of the financial institution, making the
inability to manage risks properly a risk in and of itself. Due to the small
size of the majority of Islamic financial institutions, the treasury function
is limited to cash management. These institutions cannot benefit from
economies of scale and therefore cannot afford to invest in the infrastruc-
ture required for a robust risk and treasury management framework. This
is a source of further exposure.
Like conventional banks, Islamic banks are also exposed to some
form of asset-liability mismatch risk. In addition, typical treasury risks
for Islamic banks are liquidity, market, rate-of-return, equity-investment,
and hedging risks. Market risks are similar to the market risks of conven-
tional banks, except that there is no interest rate risk. Instead of interest
rate risk, Islamic banks are exposed to markup (cost-plus margin charged
in trade financing contracts) risks and are further exposed to the risks of
changes in the benchmark indexes used to determine markup rates and
other rates on return. Another risk specific to Islamic banks is exposure
due to differences in the expected and actual rate of returns passed on to
the investment account holders. By design, Islamic banks should be keep-
ing a handsome portion of their assets in equity investments, but in prac-
tice this share is modest. Nevertheless, any investment in equity-based or
profit- and loss-sharing partnerships exposes Islamic banks to equity
investment risks that are not applicable to conventional banks. Finally, in
the absence of any derivative products, Islamic banks are unable to hedge
their exposures to price, rate-of-return, and foreign exchange risks.
This chapter discusses asset-liability mismatch, liquidity risk and
market risk, before addressing the measurement and management of
market risk.
ASSET-LIABILITY MANAGEMENT
Asset-liability management involves the raising and use of funds. More
specifically, it comprises strategic planning, implementation, and con-
trol processes that affect the volume, mix, maturity, profit rate sensiti-
vity, quality, and liquidity of a bank’s assets and liabilities. The primary
goal of asset-liability management is to produce a high-quality, stable,
large, and growing flow of net interest income. This goal is accomplished
by achieving the optimum combination and level of assets, liabilities,
and financial risk.
Asset-liability management risk results from the difference in maturity
terms and conditions of a bank’s portfolio on its assets and liabilities sides.
According to theory, Islamic banks should be less exposed to asset-liability
mismatch and therefore to equity duration risk, than their conventional
counterparts. This comparative advantage is rooted in the “pass-through”
nature of Islamic banks, which act as agents for investors-depositors and
pass all profits and losses through to them. In addition, the risk-sharing
feature, in which banks participate in the risks of their counterparties and
investors-depositors share the risks of the banking business, plays a crit-
ical role. Direct market discipline, one of the three main pillars recently
emphasized by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in enhanc-
ing the stability of the international financial market, is embedded in this
risk-sharing principle.
Following the theoretical model, any negative shock to an Islamic
bank’s asset returns is absorbed by both shareholders and investors-
depositors. While depositors in the conventional system have a fixed claim
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on the returns to the bank’s assets (receiving a predetermined interest rate
in addition to their guaranteed principal, irrespective of the bank’s prof-
itability on its assets side), holders of profit-sharing investment accounts in
the Islamic system share in the bank’s profits and losses alongside the
shareholders and are exposed to the risk of losing all or part of their initial
investment. The assets and liabilities are matched as a result of the “pass-
through” structure.
In practice, however, the risk-sharing and pass-through features are
not fully followed. For example, rather than strictly sharing profits and
losses with depositors, banks distribute profits, even if there are no or
low profits, which creates distortions and puts strains on the equity
shareholders (providers of capital). Further mismatches arise from the
heavy dependence on short-term trade financing and limited use of
partnership-based agreements. The outcome is the dominance of short-
term, low-profit, and fixed-income assets, that is, markup-based trade
financing, which limits the amount of funds that can be invested in
longer-term, more profitable, riskier assets. In short, although in theory
there should be no mismatch between assets and liabilities of an Islamic
bank, current practices have introduced distortions that expose banks to
asset-liability mismatch risk, especially when they have no liquid assets
with which to hedge such risks.
Table 9.1 presents a theoretical balance sheet (see also table 2.1, panel
B). On the “liabilities” side, it is common practice to accept deposits on
the basis of profit and loss sharing; it is on the assets side that practice
diverges from the theoretical model. At least three major deviations
between the theory and the practice have direct or indirect implications
for the overall riskiness of the banking environment, modifying the theo-
retical balance sheet shown in table 9.1.
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TABLE 9.1 Theoretical Balance Sheet of an Islamic Bank Based on Functionality
Assets Liabilities
Cash balances Demand deposits (amanah)
Financing assets (murabahah, salaam, Investment accounts (mudarabah)
ijarah, istisnah)
Investment assets (mudarabah, musharakah) Special investment accounts (mudarabah, 
musharakah)
Fee-based services (joalah, kifalah, and so forth) Reserves
Non-banking assets (property) Equity capital
Trend toward Less Risky Short-Term Assets
On the assets side, the majority of Islamic banks have limited themselves to
trade financing assets, which tend to be less risky and of shorter maturity.
This aspect is a significant deviation from what theoretical models and
basic principles of Islamic finance posit that the structure should be.
On the assets side of the balance sheet, Islamic banks clearly prefer asset-
backed financial claims resulting from sale and trade. This preference is
due to the fact that sales-related securities are considered low risk and
resemble conventional fixed-income securities in terms of the risk-return
profile. In addition to trade-based instruments, Islamic banks prefer leas-
ing, considered to carry a lower risk and have less uncertain returns than
partnership-based instruments. In a typical case, sale- and lease-based
transactions dominate the assets portfolio and can exceed 80 percent,
with the remainder allocated to profit-sharing arrangements. On average,
as a mode of financing, murabahah (41 percent) is the first choice of Islamic
banks, followed by musharakah (11 percent), mudarabah (12 percent),
ijarah (10 percent), and others (26 percent).
Islamic banks’ overdependence on trade- and commodity-financing
instruments has limited their choice of maturity structure; as a result, a
major portion of their financing is of short-term maturity.Whereas the the-
oretical models expect financial intermediaries to participate in a full range
of maturity structures to obtain the benefits of portfolio diversification,
Islamic banks shy away from instruments requiring a medium- or long-term
commitment.A review of data on asset maturities collected from six Islamic
banks as of 2003 shows that 54 percent of their assets had a maturity of less
than one year and 39 percent had a maturity of less than six months. Islamic
banks tend not to invest in longer-maturity assets due to their lack of liq-
uidity. Since they rely on short-term maturity, Islamic banks are very
restricted in their ability to offer long-term investment opportunities.
Low Participation in Proﬁt- and Loss-Sharing 
Arrangements 
Whereas the theoretical model advocates the promotion of profit- and
loss-sharing arrangements, banks’ participation in these instruments is
low. Banks are reluctant to indulge in profit- and loss-sharing instru-
ments for several reasons, such as the inherit riskiness and additional
costs of monitoring such investments, low appetite for risk on the part of
both banks and their depositors, and lack of transparency in markets
within which Islamic banks are operating. This lack of willingness to take
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on risk could reflect the lack of transparency in the banking system, which
dampens the confidence of depositors. A low level of transparency in the
system leads to a low level of trust between investors-depositors and the
banks. The result is that depositors tend to be risk averse, and so banks
become risk averse; although they may have good investment opportunities
on the basis of profit and loss sharing, they may not be able to find deposi-
tors willing to take this risk.
Islamic banks often complain that the institutional infrastructure to
support profit and loss sharing does not exist. There are no supporting
institutions to maintain good-quality information on the credit standing
of borrowers and entrepreneurs. There are very few credible trade associa-
tions to conduct common monitoring and to share information about
debtors. In the presence of informational asymmetry in the system, banks
tend to shy away from equity- and partnership-based instruments. Conse-
quently, bank portfolios often are not diversified either geographically or
by product. They are exposed to specific sectors or geographic regions,
which is not healthy and raises the level of banking environment risk.
Lack of Clarity between Shareholders 
and Investors-Depositors
In theory, the contractual agreement between the bank and the investors-
depositors should be based on a “pass-through” mechanism in which all
profits and losses are passed to the depositors-investors. Thus the prob-
lem of asset-liability mismatch should not exist. It has been argued that
this type of financial intermediation contributes to the stability of the
financial system.
However, the practice is very different from the theory. There is no
clear differentiation between the shares of investors-depositors and those
of equity holders. The means of determining each stakeholder’s share is
not transparent, as policies and procedures for computing and declaring
profits and losses are poorly defined. In some cases, the practice is not truly
a pass-through arrangement, and profits are distributed to investment
account holders despite losses on the assets, so that the profits are paid out
of equity. This phenomenon is termed “displaced commercial risk.”
All of these deviations between theory and practice mean that the
system is not functioning at its full potential and has adapted itself to a
limited functionality. In fact, due to these deviations, the banking system
is exposed to risks that it is not supposed to be. These deviations and
other bank practices have created heightened risk or at least the percep-
tion of it at the institutional and systematic level.
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LIQUIDITY RISK
Liquidity is necessary for banks to compensate for expected and unex-
pected balance sheet fluctuations and to provide funds for growth (Iqbal
and Mirakhor 2007). It represents a bank’s ability to accommodate the
redemption of deposits and other liabilities and to cover the demand for
funding in the loan and investment portfolio. A bank is said to have ade-
quate liquidity potential when it can obtain needed funds (by increasing
liabilities, securitizing, or selling assets) promptly and at a reasonable cost.
The price of liquidity is a function of market conditions and the market’s
perception of the inherent riskiness of the borrowing institution.
The amount of liquid or readily marketable assets that a bank should
hold depends on the stability of its deposit structure and the potential for
rapid expansion of the asset portfolio. Generally, if deposits are composed
primarily of small, stable accounts, a bank will need relatively low liquidity.
A much higher liquidity position normally is required when a substantial
portion of the loan portfolio consists of large long-term loans, when a
bank has a somewhat high concentration of deposits, or when recent
trends show reductions in large corporate or household deposit accounts.
Situations also can arise in which a bank should increase its liquidity posi-
tion; for example, when large commitments have been made on the assets
side and the bank expects the client to start using them.
The liquidity management policies of a bank normally comprise a
decision-making structure, an approach to funding and liquidity opera-
tions, a set of limits to liquidity risk exposure, and a set of procedures for
planning liquidity under alternative scenarios, including crisis situations.
The decision-making structure reflects the importance that management
places on liquidity: banks that stress the importance of liquidity normally
institutionalize the structure of liquidity risk management in the asset-
liability committee and assign ultimate responsibility for setting policy and
reviewing liquidity decisions to the bank’s highest level of management.
The bank’s strategy for funding and liquidity operations should be
approved by the board and should include specific policies for particular
aspects of risk management, such as the target liabilities structure, the use
of certain financial instruments, or the pricing of deposits.
Liquidity needs usually are determined by the construction of a
maturity ladder that comprises expected cash inflows and outflows over
a series of specified time bands. The difference between the inflows and
outflows in each period (that is, the excess or deficit of funds) provides a
starting point from which to measure a bank’s future liquidity excess or
shortfall at any given time (table 9.2 and figure 9.1 ).
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TABLE 9.2 Maturity Profile of Assets and Liabilities
Customers’ Deposits 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(a) By Type:
Current accounts 2,134,736 2,622,921 3,291,478 4,762,526 7,015,356 9,264,286 
Savings accounts 2,020,814 2,510,461 3,185,930 3,778,598 5,654,891 5,733,414 
Investment deposits 8,858,505 11,660,201 13,133,625 16,100,128 20,403,363 32,065,814 
Margins 107,616 103,128 146,206 173,662 182,885 579,724 
Profit equalization provision (Note 37) 70,938 90,098 126,014 126,102 135,455 89,244 
13,192,609 16,986,809 19,883,253 24,941,016 33,391,950 47,732,482
(b) By maturity:
Demand deposits 4,263,166 5,239,612 6,749,628 8,840,888 12,988,587 14,887,667 
Deposits due within 3 months 2,834,854 3,885,662 4,926,099 6,826,450 5,250,220 18,668,425 
Deposits due within 6 months 2,468,876 3,254,781 3,606,573 4,199,553 1,164,639 5,058,889 
Deposits due within 1 year 3,625,713 4,606,754 4,600,953 5,074,125 13,988,504 9,117,501 
13,194,610 16,988,811 19,885,256 24,943,020 33,393,955 47,734,488 
(c) By geographical areas:
Within country 12,977,281 16,746,302 19,883,253 24,941,016 31,615,164 39,722,859 
Outside country 215,328 240,507 - - 1,776,786 8,009,623 
13,192,609 16,986,809 19,883,253 24,941,016 33,391,950 47,732,482 
(continued)
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TABLE 9.2 continued
Customers’ Deposits 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(d) By currency
Local 12,649,387 16,625,476 19,538,058 24,539,418 30,306,345 36,444,847 
Other currencies 543,222 361,333 345,195 401,598 3,085,605 11,287,635
Local and U.S. dollars
13,192,609 16,986,809 19,883,253 24,941,016 33,391,950 47,732,482 
Maturity profile
Assets
Less than 3 months 8,440,268 9,306,606 10,272,647 11,497,545 15,203,780 31,725,644
3 months to 1 year 1,748,961 1,779,905 2,946,684 6,068,174 5,896,048 10,908,547
Over 1 year 5,144,749 8,511,279 9,558,988 13,047,642 21,898,451 21,799,745
Total assets 15,333,978 19,597,790 22,778,319 30,613,361 42,998,279 64,433,936
Liabilities
Less than 3 months 7,861,928 9,924,646 12,533,008 18,103,033 21,738,876 38,536,352
3 months to 1 year 6,308,929 8,059,233 8,520,962 9,498,927 17,543,080 17,638,551
Over 1 year  1,163,121 1,613,911 1,724,349 3,011,401 3,716,323 8,259,033
Total liabilities 15,333,978 19,597,790 22,778,319 30,613,361 42,998,279 64,433,936
Liquidity Gaps
Less than 3 months 578,340 –618,040 –2,260,361 –6,605,488 –6,535,096 –6,810,708
3 months to 1 year –4,559,968 –6,279,328 –5,574,278 –3,430,753 –11,647,032 –6,730,004
Over 1 year 3,981,628 6,897,368 7,834,639 10,036,241 18,182,128 13,540,712
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FIGURE 9.1
Liquidity Mismatches (Derived from Maturity Profile of Assets and 
Liabilities)
Liquidity mismatches - Cash inflows vs Cash outflows
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Once its liquidity needs have been determined, the bank must decide
how to fulfill them (see figure 9.2). Liquidity management is related to a
net funding requirement; in principle, a bank may increase its liquidity
through asset management, liability management,or (and most frequently)
a combination of both. In practice, a bank may meet its liquidity needs
by disposing of highly liquid assets or assets that are nearly liquid, such as
assets in the trading portfolio, or by selling less liquid assets, such as excess
property or other investments. On the liabilities side, this can be achieved
by increasing short-term borrowings or short-term deposit liabilities, by
increasing the maturity of liabilities, and ultimately by increasing capital.
See box 9.1 for the IFSB guidance on liquidity risk.
FIGURE 9.2 Cash Flows (Derived from Cash Flow Statements)
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BOX 9.1 IFSB Principles of Liquidity Risk
Principle 5.1. [Islamic financial institutions] shall have in place a liquidity management
framework (including reporting) taking into account separately and on an overall basis their
liquidity exposures in respect of each category of current accounts, unrestricted investment
accounts, and restricted investment accounts. 
Principle 5.2. [Islamic financial institutions] shall undertake liquidity risk commensurate
with their ability to have sufficient recourse to Shariah-compliant funds to mitigate such risk.
Liquidity risk results when the bank’s ability to match the maturity of
assets and liabilities is impaired. Such risk results from the mismatch
between maturities on the two sides of the balance sheet, creating either a
surplus of cash that must be invested or a shortage of cash that must be
funded. Lack of liquidity adversely affects the bank’s ability to manage port-
folios in a diversified fashion and to enter or exit the market when needed.
Liquidity risk as it applies to Islamic banks can be of two types: lack of
liquidity in the market and lack of access to funding. In the first type, illiq-
uid assets make it difficult for the financial institution to meet its liabilities
and financial obligations. In the second, the institution is unable to borrow
or raise funds at a reasonable cost, when needed. Liquidity risk is one of the
most critical risks facing Islamic banks for the following reasons:
 Limited availability of a Shariah-compatible money market and intra-
bank market is the leading cause of liquidity risk. Prohibition by
Shariah law from borrowing on the basis of interest in case of need and
the absence of an active interbank money market have restricted
Islamic banks’ options to manage their liquidity positions efficiently.
 Shallow secondary markets are another source of liquidity risk. The
financial instruments that can be traded in the secondary market are
limited, and the Shariah imposes certain limitations on the trading of
financial claims, unless such claims are linked to a real asset. Therefore,
there is a need to develop asset-backed tradable securities, known as
sukuk. Even where instruments are available, the number of market
participants is limited.
 Typical avenues of liquidity management available to conventional
banks—the interbank market, secondary market for debt instruments,
and discount windows from the lender of last resort (central bank)—
are all considered as based on riba (interest) and, therefore, are not
acceptable. Conventional banks have access to borrowing with overnight
to extended short-term maturity through well-developed and efficient
interbank markets. This access is vital for meeting the institution’s
need for short-term cash flow.
 Certain characteristics of some Islamic instruments give rise to liquid-
ity risks for Islamic banks. For example, liquidity becomes a problem
given the cancellation risks in murabahah or the inability to trade
murabahah or bay’ al-salaam contracts, which can be traded only at par.
 Islamic banks hold a considerable proportion of funds as demand
deposits in current accounts, and these can be withdrawn at any time.
Banks guarantee repayment of the principal deposited, and account
holders do not have rights to a share in the profits. Some Islamic banks
invest only a small fraction of the current account holders’ funds and,
in the absence of liquid short-term instruments, maintain a high level
of idle cash.
These factors have raised Islamic banks’ exposure to liquidity risk and
limited their ability to invest in long-term and illiquid, but more profitable,
assets. Several developments have taken place with a view to meeting this
challenge. First, the introduction of sukuk (Islamic bonds) is a good
development that can provide the foundation for the development of
secondary markets. The Central Bank of Sudan has introduced Shariah-
compatible securities to provide liquidity in the market. Second, progress
has been made in establishing an institutional framework to address this
problem. In this respect, establishment of International Islamic Financial
Markets and the Liquidity Management Center are vital steps toward
managing liquidity more effectively.
Malaysia also has taken steps to promote Islamic banks and reduce
liquidity risk. The central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia, introduced the
Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) in early 1994. The activities of
the IIMM include the purchase and sale of Islamic financial instruments
among market participants (including the central bank), interbank invest-
ment activities through the mudarabah interbank investment scheme, and
a check clearing and settlement system. The Islamic financial instruments
that are currently being traded in the market on the basis of bay’ al-dayn
(sale of debt) are the green bankers acceptances, Islamic bills, Islamic
mortgage bonds, and Islamic private debt securities. In addition, financial
institutions can sell government investment issues to the central bank, as
and when required, to meet their liquidity needs. In turn, financial institu-
tions can buy Shariah-compliant investment issues from the central bank.
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Whereas the contract of bay’ al-dayn is commonly accepted and
practiced in the Malaysian financial markets, it is not accepted by a
majority of Shariah scholars outside Malaysia, who maintain that debt
can be traded only at par. If trade is not at par, they feel that the practice
opens the door to riba. Shariah scholars in other jurisdictions need to
become proactive in finding solutions for reducing liquidity risk.
MARKET RISK 
Market risk is the risk that a bank may experience loss due to unfavorable
movements in market prices. Realizing its significance, in December 2005
the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) issued a comprehensive docu-
ment on standards for risk management (see box 9.2). Exposure to market
risk may arise as a result of the bank taking deliberately speculative posi-
tions (proprietary trading) or may ensue from the bank’s market-making
(dealer) activities.
Market risk results from changes in the prices of equity instruments,
commodities, fixed-income securities, and currencies. Its major compo-
nents are therefore equity position risk, commodities risk, rate-of-return
risk, and currency risk. Each component of risk includes a general aspect
of market risk and a specific aspect of risk that originates in the portfolio
structure of a bank. In addition to standard instruments, market risk
also applies to various derivatives instruments, such as options, equity
derivatives, and currency and interest rate derivatives.
The price volatility of most assets held in investment and trading
portfolios is often significant. Volatility prevails even in mature markets,
although it is much higher in emerging or illiquid markets. The presence
of large institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies,
or investment funds,also has had an impact on the structure of markets and
on market risk. Institutional investors adjust their large-scale investment
and trading portfolios through large-scale trades, and in markets with
rising prices, large-scale purchases tend to push prices up. Conversely,
markets with downward trends become more volatile when large blocks of
Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks
156
BOX 9.2 IFSB Principle of Market Risk
Principle 4.1. [Islamic financial institutions] shall have in place an appropriate framework
for market risk management (including reporting) in respect of all assets held, including those
that do not have a ready market or are exposed to high price volatility.
securities are sold. Ultimately, this widens the amplitude of price variances
and increases market risk.
As banks diversify their business away from the traditional interme-
diation function and toward market-making and proprietary trading
activities, whereby they set aside “risk capital” for deliberate risk-taking
activities, their exposure to market risk deepens. The proprietary trading
portfolio, therefore, must be distinguished from the investment portfolio.
Proprietary trading is aimed at exploiting market opportunities with
leveraged funding (for example, through the use of repurchase agree-
ments), whereas the investment portfolio is held and traded as a buffer
because its liquidity is relatively stable. Still, both proprietary trading and
investment portfolios are subject to market risk.
To summarize, market risk for a financial institution arises in the
form of unfavorable price movements, such as yields (rate-of-return
risk), benchmark rates (rate-of-return risk), foreign exchange rates (FX
risk), and equity and commodity prices (price risk), which have a
potential impact on the financial value of an asset over the life of the
contract. Islamic banks are further exposed to market risk due to the
volatility in the value of tradable, marketable, or leasable assets. The
risks relate to the current and future volatility of the market value of
specific assets.
Markup Risk 
Islamic banks are exposed to markup risk, as the markup rate used in
murabahah and other trade-financing instruments is fixed for the dura-
tion of the contract, while the benchmark rate may change. This means
that the prevailing markup rate may rise beyond the rate the bank has
locked into a contract, making the bank unable to benefit from higher
rates. In the absence of an Islamic index of rate of return, Islamic banks
often use the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as the benchmark,
which aligns their market risk closely with the movement in LIBOR rates.
Price Risk
In case of bay’ al-salaam (forward sale), Islamic banks are exposed to
commodity price volatility during the period between delivery of the
commodity and its sale at the prevailing market price. This risk is similar
to the market risk of a forward contract if it is not hedged properly. In
order to hedge its position, the bank may enter into a parallel (off-setting)
bay’ al-salaam contract. In such cases, the bank is exposed to price risk if
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there is default on the first contract and is obligated to deliver on the
second contract.
Leased Asset Value Risk 
In case of an operating ijarah, the bank is exposed to market risk due to
a fall in the residual value of the leased asset at the expiry of the lease term
or, in case of early termination due to default, over the life of the contract.
Currency Risk 
Currency risk arises from a mismatch between the value of assets and that
of capital and liabilities denominated in foreign currency (or vice versa)
or from a mismatch between foreign receivables and foreign payables that
are expressed in a domestic currency. Currency risk is of a “speculative”
nature and can therefore result in a gain or a loss, depending on the direc-
tion of exchange rate shifts and whether a bank is net long or net short in
the foreign currency. For example, in the case of a net long position,
domestic currency depreciation will result in a net gain for a bank and
currency appreciation will produce a loss. Under a net short position,
exchange rate movements will have the opposite effect.
Foreign exchange rate movement is another transaction risk arising
from the deferred trading nature of some contracts offered by Islamic
banks, as the value of the currency in which receivables are due may
depreciate or the currency in which payables are due may appreciate. In
the absence of any tradable derivatives with which to hedge currency risk,
Islamic financial institutions are further exposed to this risk. This is
another reason why financial institutions shy away from either exposing
themselves to or helping their clients to hedge currency risks.
Securities Price Risk 
With a growing market for Islamic bonds (sukuks), Islamic banks invest
a portion of their assets in marketable securities. However, the prices of
such securities are exposed to current yields in the market. Similar to a
fixed-income security, the prices go down as yields go up and vice versa.
Islamic banks holding such securities are exposed to volatility in yield,
unless they hold the security until maturity. Furthermore, the secondary
market for such securities may not be very liquid, exposing Islamic banks
to distorted prices.
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Rate-of-Return Risk 
The rate-of-return risk stems from uncertainty in the returns earned by
Islamic banks on their assets (see box 9.3 for IFSB guidance on rate-of-
return risk). This uncertainty can cause a divergence from the expecta-
tions that investment account holders have on the liabilities side. The
larger the divergence, the bigger is the rate-of-return risk. Another way
of looking at this is to consider the risk generally associated with over-
all balance sheet exposures, in which mismatches arise between the
assets of the bank and the balances of the depositors. For example, an
Islamic bank may expect to earn 5 percent on its assets, which is passed
on to the investors-depositors. Meanwhile, if current market rates rise
up to 6 percent, which is higher than what the bank may earn on its
investment, the investors-depositors may also expect to earn 6 percent
on their deposits.
The rate-of-return risk is different from the interest rate risk in two
ways. First, since conventional banks operate on interest-based, fixed-
income securities on the assets side, there is less uncertainty in the rate of
return earned on investments held until maturity. Since Islamic banks
have a mix of markup-based and equity-based investments, this uncer-
tainty is higher. Second, the return on deposits in conventional banks is
predetermined; in contrast, the return on deposits in Islamic banks is
anticipated, but not agreed beforehand. In addition, the return on some
investments—that is, those based on equity partnerships—are not known
accurately until the end of the investment period. Islamic banks have to
wait for the results of their investment to determine the level of return that
investors-depositors will earn. If, during this period, the prevailing yields
or expected rates of return change, the investors may expect to receive
similar yields from the bank.
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BOX 9.3 IFSB Principles of Rate-of-Return Risk
Principle 6.1. [Islamic financial institutions] shall establish a comprehensive risk man-
agement and reporting process to assess the potential impacts of market factors affecting
rates of return on assets in comparison with the expected rates of return for investment
account holders.
Principle 6.2. [Islamic financial institutions] shall have in place an appropriate framework
for managing displaced commercial risk, where applicable.
Equity Investment Risk 
On the assets side, Islamic financial institutions are exposed to equity
investment risk in profit- and loss-sharing investments (see box 9.4 for
the IFSB guidelines on equity investment risk). These include partner-
ship-based mudarabah and musharakah investments. Typical examples of
equity investments are holdings of shares in the stock market, private
equity investments, equity participation in specific projects, and syndi-
cation investment.
This risk is somewhat unique to Islamic financial institutions, con-
sidering that conventional commercial banks do not invest in equity-
based assets. Equity investments can lead to volatility in the financial
institution’s earnings due to the liquidity, credit, and market risks asso-
ciated with equity holdings. Although there is credit risk in equity-based
assets, there is also considerable financial risk: capital may be lost due to
business losses.
Equity investment risk has some distinct features:
 The nature of equity investment requires enhanced monitoring to
reduce informational asymmetries. These measures include proper
financial disclosure, closer involvement with the project, transparency
in reporting, and supervision during all phases of the project, from
appraisal to completion. Therefore, Islamic banks need to play an
active role in monitoring.
 Both mudarabah and musharakah are profit- and loss-sharing con-
tracts and are subject to loss of capital despite proper monitoring. The
degree of risk is relatively higher than in other investments, and
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BOX 9.4 IFSB Principles of Equity Investment Risk
Principle 3.1. [Islamic financial institutions] shall have in place appropriate strategies,
risk management, and reporting processes in respect of the risk characteristics of equity
investments, including mudarabah and musharakah investments.
Principle 3.2. [Islamic financial institutions] shall ensure that their valuation method-
ologies are appropriate and consistent and shall assess the potential impacts of their methods
on the calculation and allocation of profit. The methods shall be mutually agreed between the
institution and the mudarib or musharakah partners. 
Principle 3.3. [Islamic financial institutions] shall define and establish the exit strategies
in respect of their equity investment activities, including extension and redemption conditions
for mudarabah and musharakah investments, subject to the approval of the institution’s
Shariah board.
Islamic banks should take extreme care in evaluating and selecting the
projects, in order to minimize potential losses.
 Equity investments other than stock market investments do not have
organized secondary markets, which raises the costs of an early exit.
Illiquidity of such investments can cause financial losses to the bank.
 Equity investments may not generate steady income, and capital gain
might be the only source of return. The unscheduled nature of cash
flows makes it difficult to forecast and manage them.
Mudarabah and musharakah facilities are equity-type facilities that
typically constitute a very small share of total assets, reflecting the signifi-
cant investment risks they carry. In a sample of Islamic banks examined,
the share of mudarabah and musharakah facilities and traded equities
varied from 0 to 24 percent, with a median share of about 3 percent (Grais
and Piligrani 2006). A measure of the potential loss in equity exposures
that are not traded can be derived from the standard recommended in
Basel II (para. 350). Given net equity exposures, the loss can be estimated
using the probability of default corresponding to a debt exposure to the
counterparties whose equity is being held and applying a fairly high loss
given default, such as 90 percent. A measure of both expected and un-
expected loss could then be computed from these parameters. In addition,
the mudarabah facility may have to be assigned an additional unexpected
loss due to operational risk factors, with the extent of operational risk
adjustment depending on the quality of internal control systems available
to monitor mudarabah facilities on the assets side. High-quality monitoring
is very important in Islamic banks, since the provider of finance cannot
interfere in management of the project funded on a mudarabah basis. In
the case of musharakah, the need for operational risk adjustment may be
less, insofar as the bank exercises some control over management. If the
banks’ equity interest in a counterparty is based on regular cash flow rather
than capital gains and is long term in nature and linked to a customer rela-
tionship, a different supervisory treatment and a lower loss given default
could be used. If, however, equity interest is relatively short term and relies
on capital gains (for example, traded equity), a value-at-risk approach,
subject to a minimum risk weight of 300 percent, could be used to meas-
ure capital at risk (as proposed in Basel II).
In profit- and loss-sharing activities, use of mudarabah on the assets
side of the balance sheet gives rise to moral hazard problems. While the
Islamic bank bears all the losses in case of a negative outcome, it cannot
oblige users of the funds (mudarib) to take the appropriate action or exert
the required level of effort needed to generate the expected level of
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returns. Such situations can be exploited by the users of funds (Lewis and
Algaoud 2002). Also, the bank does not have the right to monitor or to
participate in management of the project and hence may lose its principal
investment in addition to its potential share of profit if the entrepreneur’s
books show a loss (Errico and Farahbaksh 1998).
Mudarabah can also expose an Islamic bank to principal-agent prob-
lems when the bank enters into the contract as rab al-mal (principal) and
the user of funds is also the agent. The user of funds may have incentives
to expand the expenditures on the projects and to increase the consump-
tion of nonpecuniary benefits at the expense of pecuniary returns, since
the increased consumption is borne partly by the bank, while the benefits
are consumed entirely by the entrepreneur. A similar problem arises on
the liabilities side, when investment account holders place their money
with the Islamic bank on a mudarabah basis.2
The moral hazard problem would be reduced in musharakah, where
the capital of the partner is also at stake. Furthermore, an equity partner-
ship would minimize the problem of informational asymmetry, as the
Islamic bank would have the right to participate in management of the
project in which it is investing.3 However, the musharakah asset class has
an associated cost in the form of adverse selection and therefore requires
extensive screening, information gathering, and monitoring. Each
musharakah contract requires careful analysis and negotiation of profit-
and loss-sharing arrangements, leading to higher costs of intermediation.4
As a result of the problems associated with both types of contracts, Islamic
banks tend to allocate limited funds to these asset classes. This implies an
increased reliance on asset-backed securities, which limits the choice of
investment and ultimately may hamper the bank’s ability to manage risks
and diversify its portfolio.
Hedging Risk 
Hedging risk is the risk of failure to mitigate and manage different types
of risks. This increases the bank’s overall risk exposure. In addition to the
absence of derivative products with which to hedge risks, illiquid, nonex-
istent, and shallow secondary markets are other sources of the increasing
hedging risk of Islamic banks.
Benchmark Risk 
Benchmark risk is the possible loss due to a change in the margin
between domestic rates of return and the benchmark rates of return,
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which may not be linked closely to domestic returns. Many Islamic
banks use external benchmarks such as the LIBOR to price the markup
in murabahah contracts, in part reflecting the lack of reliable domestic
benchmark rates of return. If domestic monetary conditions change,
requiring adjustments in the returns on deposits and loans, but the
margin between external benchmark and domestic rates of return
shifts, there could be an impact on asset returns. This is a form of “basis
risk” that should be taken into account when computing the rate-of-
return risk in the banking book (and also market risks). Existence of
this basis risk highlights the importance of developing a domestic rate-
of-return benchmark so that both deposits and assets can be aligned to
similar benchmarks.
Business Risk
Business risk is associated with a bank’s business environment, including
macroeconomic and policy concerns, legal and regulatory factors, and the
overall financial sector infrastructure such as payment systems and audi-
tors. Business risk also includes the risk of becoming insolvent due to
insufficient capital to continue operations. While Islamic financial insti-
tutions are very much exposed to the regular business environment,
solvency, and financial sector infrastructure risks, they are particularly
exposed to rate-of-return risk.
MARKET RISK MEASUREMENT 
Given the increasing involvement of banks in investment and trading
activities and the high volatility of the market environment, the timely
and accurate measurement of market risk is a necessity. This includes
measurement of the exposures on a bank’s investment and trading 
portfolios and on- and off-balance-sheet positions. A simplistic
approach to market risk assessment treats every market to which the
bank is exposed as a separate entity and does not take into account the
relationships that may exist among various markets (see table 9.3 and
figure 9.3).
Each risk is therefore measured on an individual basis. A more com-
prehensive approach assumes risk assessment from a consolidated per-
spective, which takes into consideration the relationships among markets
and the fact that a movement in one market may affect several others. For
example, a fluctuation in the exchange rate may also affect the price of
bonds issued in a particular currency.
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Value at Risk (VAR) 
VAR is a modeling technique that typically measures a bank’s aggregate
market risk exposure and, given a probability level, estimates the amount
a bank would lose if it were to hold specific assets for a certain period of
time. Inputs to a VAR-based model include data on the bank’s positions
and on prices, volatility, and risk factors. The risks covered by the model
should include all markup risk, currency, equity, and commodity posi-
tions inherent in the bank’s portfolio, for both on- and off-balance-sheet
Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks
164
TABLE 9.3 Sample Approach to Market Risk Disclosure: Value-at Risk by Category
and for Entire Institution
Values during period
Type of risk or asset classes High Median Low End of period
Sukuk (Islamic bonds)
Equity 
Currency 
Commodity 
Diversification effect 
Aggregate VAR or other measure of risk 
FIGURE 9.3 Exposure to Marketable Securities, 2001–06
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positions. VAR-based models typically combine the potential change in
the value of each position that would result from specific movements in
underlying risk factors with the probability of such movements occurring.
The changes in value are aggregated at the level of trading book segments
or across all trading activities and markets. The VAR may be calculated
using one of a number of methodologies. The measurement parameters
include a holding period, a historical time horizon at which risk factor
prices are observed, and a confidence interval that allows for the prudent
judgment of the level of protection. The observation period is chosen
by the bank to capture market conditions that are relevant to its risk
management strategy. The following is taken into account:
 Value at risk, broken down by type of risk or asset class and in the
aggregate, estimated for one-day and two-week holding periods and
reported in terms of high, median, and low values over the reporting
interval and at period end.
 Information about risk and return in the aggregate, including a compar-
ison of risk estimates with actual outcomes, such as a histogram of daily
profit or loss divided by daily value at risk or some other representation
of the relationship between daily profit or loss and daily value at risk.
 Qualitative discussion and the comparison of profit or loss and VAR,
including a description of differences between the basis of the profit
or loss and the basis of VAR estimates.
 Quantitative measure of firm-wide exposure to market risk, broken
down by type of risk, that in the bank’s judgment best expresses exposure
to risk, reported in terms of high, medium, and low values over the
reporting period and at period end.
The capacity to assess and measure risk systematically and to man-
age the net open position effectively is crucial. Methods range from cal-
culation of the net open position (or market factor sensitivity) to value at
risk and other more sophisticated estimates of risk. Table 9.4 provides an
example of a simplistic but practical method of aggregating assets, as
reflected on the balance sheet, to arrive at a net open position. Once for-
ward and unsettled transactions have been taken into account, a projected
position is determined at book value, translated into market value, and
then disclosed in terms of a common denominator representing the
equivalent position in the cash markets. This methodology belongs to the
static type of market risk measurement known as standard or table-based
tools. Based on the net open position, it is possible to estimate the poten-
tial earnings or capital at risk by multiplying the net open position
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(market risk factor sensitivity) by price volatility. This estimate provides
a simple, one-factor value at risk; it does not, however, take into consid-
eration the correlation between positions.
Risk is based on probabilistic events, and no single measurement tool
can capture the multifaceted nature of market risk. Even the simplest
aspects of market risk management can present a problem in real-life
situations, particularly when a bank does not have adequate portfolio
systems. At an absolute minimum, marking to market is a fundamental
measure that should be taken to protect a bank’s capital. Both the invest-
ment portfolio and the trading book should be marked to market on a
daily basis to maintain the real value of positions.
The techniques for measuring market risk in Islamic banks, however,
are likely limited to traded equities, commodities, foreign exchange posi-
tions, and, increasingly, various forms of sukuks. A large share of assets
also consists of cash and other liquid assets, with such short-term assets
typically exceeding short-term liabilities by a large margin. Against this
background, exposure to various forms of market risk can be measured
by the traditional indicators of exposure:
 Net open position in foreign exchange;
 Net position in traded equities;
 Net position in commodities;
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TABLE 9.4 Simplistic Calculation of Net Effective Open Positions (Assuming Uniform 
Instruments in Every Market) 
Position Commodities Fixed-income Equities Currencies 
Net book value of assets per balance sheet 
Forward transactions 
Position at book value 
Position at market value before 
transactions in derivatives 
Position in derivatives (delta-equivalent 
position in options) 
Net effective open position after 
transactions in derivatives 
Possible movements in market prices 
(price volatility) 
Impact on earnings and capital 
 Rate-of-return gap, measured by currency of denomination;
 Various duration measures of assets and liabilities in the trading book.
Most Islamic banks compute and disclose measures of the liquidity
gap—that is, the gap between assets and liabilities at various maturity
buckets—and hence the rate-of-return or repricing gap should be fairly
easy to compute. More accurate measures of duration gap may also be
available in some banks. (For a discussion of gap and duration measures
and their availability in banking statistics, see IMF 2004; for a discussion
of gap and duration measures in the context of Islamic banking, see
Baldwin 2002.) Duration measures are considered core indicators of
financial soundness, but they are not readily available in many banking
systems. The impact on earnings of a change in exchange rate, equity
price, commodity price, or rates of return can be obtained directly by
multiplying the appropriate gap or other indicators of exposure by the
corresponding change in price. Such a simple approach will not, how-
ever, suffice for computing the impact of changes in interest rates on
equity-type exposures of fixed maturity (such as mudarabah and
musharakah). The impact of changes in the rates of return on the
expected rate of profits (that is, income) needs to be computed first, or
the equity exposures should be adjusted by a multiplicative factor (that
a supervisor can specify) before gaps in each maturity bucket are com-
puted. In the presence of longer-maturity assets and liabilities, change in
the present value of assets (in the sense of discounted value of projected
future cash flow) due to shifts in rates of return would be a more accu-
rate measure of market risk than the estimated change in earnings in a
reference period.
In most Islamic banks, the rate-of-return risk is likely to be much more
important than market risk. The rate-of-return gap and duration gap
applied to the banking book measure the exposure to changes in bench-
mark rates of return and the impact on bank earnings of present values.
For example, a simple stress test of applying a 1 percentage point increase
in rates of return on both assets and liabilities maturing, or being reprised,
at various maturity buckets yields a measure of potential loss 
(or gain) due to a uniform shift in the term structure of the rate of return.
Alternatively, the impact of shifts in the rate of return can be calculated
directly from duration measures as follows: Impact of change in the rate
of return = (DA – DL) Δ ir, where DA = duration of assets, DL = duration
of liabilities, and Δ ir = change in the rate of return.
It therefore becomes the responsibility of Islamic banks to manage the
expectations of their investors-depositors, which makes the rate-of-return
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risk an issue of strategic risk. In addition, rate-of-return risk has two
subcategories: displaced commercial risk and withdrawal risk.
MARKET RISK MANAGEMENT 
By its very nature, market risk requires constant management attention
and adequate analysis. Prudent managers should be aware of exactly how
a bank’s market risk exposure relates to its capital (see figure 9.4). Market
risk management policies should specifically state a bank’s objectives and
the related policy guidelines that have been established to protect capital
from the negative impact of unfavorable market price movements. Policy
guidelines should normally be formulated within restrictions provided
by the applicable legal and prudential framework. While policies related to
market risk management may vary among banks, certain types of policies
typically are present in all banks.
Marking to Market 
This refers to the (re)pricing of a bank’s portfolios to reflect changes in
asset prices due to market price movements. This policy requires that the
asset be (re)priced at the market value of the asset in compliance with
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39. The volume and nature of
the activities in which a bank engages generally determine the frequency
of pricing. It is considered prudent for a bank to evaluate and (re)price
positions related to its investment portfolio on at least a monthly basis.
Since assets in a trading portfolio are sold and bought on an ongoing
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FIGURE 9.4 Simplistic Impact on Equity of Marking to Market 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
Potential impact on equity - assuming  20%
MTM adjustment
MTM adjustment
ALM, Liquidity, and Market Risks
169
basis, price positions related to a bank’s trading portfolio should be
evaluated and marked to market at least once a day. The reports prepared
in this process should be submitted to and reviewed by the senior
bank managers responsible for the bank’s investment, asset-liability, and
risk management.
Due to the shortage of marketable Shariah-compliant securities, the
trading portfolio of Islamic banks is either very small or nonexistent.
With the emergence of Islamic bonds (sukuks), this trend is changing,
and more and more Islamic banks are maintaining trading portfolios.
A shallow secondary market for Islamic bonds encourages hold-to-
maturity behavior. Increased activity in the trading book should be
accompanied by the above-mentioned analysis.
Financing assets like murabahah and salaam are not negotiable or
tradable once the initial sale has taken place, which makes marking to
market difficult. Since Islamic banks are still exposed to price risk in
situations where the client refuses to take delivery of the underlying
assets, Islamic banks should mark to market such assets and make doing
so part of regular risk monitoring. Other financing assets based on ijarah
and istisah are also not negotiable and not liquid, which makes the task
of marking to market more difficult.
It is common practice for Islamic banks to invest their equity capital
with the assets of investment account holders. In other words, they co-
mingle equity capital with the assets of investment account holders,
which makes it difficult to perform any meaningful analysis of equity’s
exposure to market movements. Given the importance of such analysis,
it is strongly recommended that such funds be ring-fenced from the
funds of investment account holders and a more formal analysis of
different exposures be performed.
The policy regarding marking to market should also address respon-
sibility for pricing and the method used by a bank to determine the new
(market) price of an asset. Risk management policy should stipulate that
prices be determined and that marking to market be executed by officers
who are independent of the dealer or trader and his or her managers.
Some jurisdictions have enacted prudential regulations that specifically
cover the process of marking to market the value of a bank’s assets,
sometimes with a high level of detail. In practice, the pricing of positions
is less effective if independent, third-party price quotes are not taken
into consideration. A bank should routinely acquire from external
sources the latest information on the price and performance of assets
held in its portfolios.
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Position Limits 
A market risk management policy should provide for limits on positions
(long, short, or net), bearing in mind the liquidity risk that could arise on
execution of unrealized transactions such as open contracts or commit-
ments to purchase and sell securities (for example, option contracts or
repurchase agreements). Such position limits should be related to the
capital available to cover market risk. Banks, especially those with large
investment or trading portfolios, would also be expected to set limits on
the level of risk taken by individual traders or dealers. These limits are
related to several factors, including the specific organization of investment
or trading functions and the technical skill level of individual dealers or
traders.The sophistication and quality of analytical support that is provided
to the dealers or traders also may play a role, as do the specific characteris-
tics of a bank’s investment or trading portfolios and the level and quality of
its capital. This type of policy should specify the manner and frequency
of position valuations and position limit controls.
Stop-Loss Provisions
Market risk management policy should also include stop-loss sale or
consultation requirements that relate to a predetermined loss exposure
limit (risk budget). The stop-loss exposure limit should be determined
with regard to a bank’s capital structure and earning trends as well as
to its overall risk profile. When losses on a bank’s positions reach unac-
ceptable levels, either the positions should be automatically closed or
consultations should be initiated with risk management officers or the
asset-liability committee in order to establish or reconfirm the stop-
loss strategy.
Limits to New Market Presence
Financial innovations involve profits that are much higher than those of
standard instruments, because profit is a key factor motivating innovation.
In a highly competitive market environment, innovation also pressures
competitors to engage in new business in an effort to make profits or not
to lose market presence. However, innovation involves a special kind of
risk taking, requiring that a bank be willing to invest in or trade a new
instrument even though its return and variance may not have been tested
in a market setting or even though the appropriate market for the instru-
ment may not yet exist.
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A prudent bank should have risk management policies that address
its presence in new markets and its trading in new financial instruments.
Limits related to a new market presence should be reviewed frequently
and adjusted as needed. Because the high spreads initially available in new
market segments attract competitors, markets may pick up at a fast pace.
Increasing use of a new instrument also helps to increase the breadth and
depth of secondary markets and thus their liquidity. Once a market
becomes established and sufficiently liquid, a bank should readjust the
limits to levels applicable to mature markets.
Due to the fast-changing nature of a bank’s trading book and the com-
plexity of risk management, banks engaged in trading must have market
risk measurement and management systems that are conceptually sound
and implemented with high integrity. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision’s capital adequacy standard for market risk specifies a set of
qualitative criteria that must be met for a bank to be eligible for application
of the minimum multiplication factor for market risk capital charges.
An independent risk control unit should be responsible for the design
and implementation of the bank’s market risk management system. The
unit should be independent from business trading units and should
report directly to senior management of the bank. It should produce daily
reports on and analysis of the relationship between the measures of risk
exposure and trading limits.
Board and senior management need to be involved actively in the risk
control process and regard risk control as an essential aspect of business.
Managers who have sufficient seniority and authority should review the
daily reports prepared by the independent risk control unit and be will-
ing to enforce reductions in the positions taken by individual traders and
in the bank’s overall risk exposure.
The market risk measurement system should be closely integrated
into the daily risk management process of a bank and be actively used in
conjunction with trading and exposure limits. The risk measurement
system should be subject to regular back-testing—that is, to ex post com-
parison of the risk measure generated by the bank’s internal model
against daily changes in portfolio value and against hypothetical changes
based on static positions. The ultimate test is to compare actual profits or
losses with budgeted profits.
A routine and rigorous program of stress testing is needed to supple-
ment the risk analysis provided by the model. The results of stress testing
should be subject to review by senior management and be reflected in the
policies and limits regarding market risk exposure, especially where stress
tests reveal particular vulnerability to a given set of circumstances.
Finally, a process is needed to ensure compliance with a documented
set of bank policies, controls, and procedures concerning the trading
activities and operation of the risk measurement system.
NOTES
1. For detailed discussion on different risks and exposure of Islamic banks, see
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007).
2. This gives rise to fiduciary risk, as discussed previously.
3. Khan (1994) claims that Islamic banks can invest in large enterprises because
users of the funds who own large stakes in the business would not put the
bank in a disadvantageous position. This might reduce risk overall and
improve the profitability of the bank.
4. Sadr and Iqbal (2000) provide empirical evidence that increased monitoring
of an Islamic bank resulted in an increase in the share of musharakah con-
tracts on the assets side of the balance sheet. Additional monitoring produced
higher returns, which recovered the costs of monitoring.
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Operational risk has received considerable attention in the literatureand is now part of the integrated risk management framework of all
financial institutions. Islamic banks are also exposed to such risks. In addi-
tion, they are exposed to several risks that are very specific to Islamic
banks. Such specific risks stem from the nature of their business, business
environment, competition, and certain prevailing practices. These risks
include displaced commercial risk, withdrawal risk, fiduciary risk, Shariah
risk, and reputational risk, which are discussed in detail in this chapter.
OPERATIONAL RISK
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from the inade-
quacy or failure of internal processes, as related to people and systems,
or from external risks. Operational risk also includes the risk of failure of
technology, systems, and analytical models. It is argued that operational
risks are likely to be significant for Islamic banks due to their specific
contractual features and the general legal environment. Specific aspects
of Islamic banking could raise the operational risks of Islamic banks:
 Cancellation risks in the nonbinding murabahah (partnership) and
istisnah (manufacturing) contracts;
 Failure of the internal control system to detect and manage potential
problems in the operational processes and back-office functions as
well as technical risks of various sorts;
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 Potential difficulties in enforcing Islamic contracts in a broader legal
environment;
 Need to maintain and manage commodity inventories often in illiquid
markets;
 Failure to comply with Shariah requirements;
 Potential costs and risks of monitoring equity-type contracts and the
associated legal risks.
People risk is another type of operational risk arising from incompe-
tence or fraud. An internal control problem cost the Dubai Islamic Bank
$50 million in 1998 when a bank official did not conform to the bank’s
credit terms. This resulted in a one-day run on the bank’s deposits to the
tune of $138 million, representing 7 percent of the bank’s total deposits
(Warde 2000).
Technology risk is another type of operational risk. It is associated
with the use of software and telecommunications systems that are not
tailored specifically to the needs of Islamic banks. The quality of man-
agement processes raises specific risks for Islamic banks. As an emerging
industry that is required to abide by particular rules, Islamic finance faces
the risk of securing management skills fully conversant with the princi-
ples of conventional and Islamic finance. Familiarity with either finance
rules or Shariah rules may not be an issue, but individuals with knowledge
Key Messages
• Islamic banks are perceived to be more exposed to operational risks associated with the failure
of controls, procedures, information technology systems, and analytical models.
• Distinct features of Islamic financial instruments require enhanced controls and information tech-
nology systems. Compliance with Shariah also demands better controls and monitoring.
• Displaced commercial risk is considered a special risk for Islamic banks, which are exposed to the
risk of paying profits out of equity in periods when actual profits are lower than expected. 
• Withdrawal risk exposes banks to the risk of losing deposits to competition from other Islamic or
conventional banks when actual rates of return are lower than expectations or the prevailing rates
of return offered by competitors.
• Lack of standardized practices by the Shariah boards in different jurisdictions and the challenge
of compliance with Shariah expose Islamic banks to Shariah risk.
• Investors-depositors and the users of funds place a special trust in Islamic banks to be fully com-
pliant with Shariah. A breach of trust by a single institution can affect all institutions by exposing
them all to reputational risk.
of both are hard to find. In addition, compliance with Shariah rules requires
management information systems that are scarce.
Operational risk is considered high on the list of risk exposures for
Islamic banks. A survey conducted by Khan and Ahmed (2001) shows
that the managers of Islamic banks perceive operational risk as the most
critical risk after markup risk. The survey finds that operational risk is
lower in the fixed-income contracts of murabahah (cost-plus sales) and
ijarah (leasing) and higher in the deferred sales contracts of salaam (agri-
culture) and istisnah (manufacturing). The relatively higher rankings of
the instruments indicate that banks find these contracts complex and
difficult to implement.
The three methods of measuring operational risk proposed in Basel
II would have to be adapted considerably if they were to apply to Islamic
banks. The use of gross income as the basic indicator of operational risk
could be misleading in Islamic banks, insofar as the large volume of trans-
actions in commodities and the use of structured finance raise opera-
tional exposures that are not captured by gross income. In contrast, the
standardized approach that allows for different business lines would be
better suited, but it would have to be adapted to the needs of Islamic banks.
In particular, agency services under mudarabah and commodity inventory
management need to be considered explicitly.
RISKS SPECIFIC TO ISLAMIC BANKING
Islamic banks face unique challenges in the following areas: displaced
commercial risk, withdrawal risk, governance, fiduciary risk, transparency,
Shariah risk, and reputational risks. This section deals with each in turn.
Displaced Commercial Risk
The Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institu-
tions (AAOIFI) has identified displaced commercial risk as the risk when
an Islamic bank is under pressure to pay its investors-depositors a rate of
return higher than what should be payable under the “actual” terms of the
investment contract. This can occur when a bank underperforms during
a period and is unable to generate adequate profits for distribution to
the account holders.
To mitigate displaced commercial risk, Islamic banks may decide to
waive their portion of profits and thus dissuade depositors from with-
drawing their funds. Islamic banks often engage in this self-imposed
practice. An extreme example is the International Islamic Bank for
Investment and Development in Egypt, which distributed all of its profits
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to investment account holders and nothing to shareholders from the
middle to late 1980s (Warde 2000). In 1988 the bank distributed to its
depositors an amount exceeding its profits, and the difference appeared
in the bank’s accounts as “loss carried forward.” The practice of forgoing
part or all of the shareholders’ profits may adversely affect the bank’s own
capital, which can lead to insolvency risk in extreme cases.
The experience gained from the attempt to mitigate displaced risk
has led to the development of two standard practices in the industry. The
first practice is for the financial institution to maintain a profit equaliza-
tion reserve (PER). This reserve is funded by setting aside a portion of
gross income before deducting the bank’s own share (as agent). The
reserve provides a cushion to ensure smooth future returns and to
increase the owners’ equity for bearing future shocks. Similar to PER, an
investment risk reserve (IRR) is maintained out of the income of
investors-depositors after allocating the bank’s share, in order to dampen
the effects of the risk of future investment losses. It has been suggested
that the basis for computing the amounts to be appropriated should be
predefined and fully disclosed.
In its most general form, risk is uncertainty associated with a future
outcome or event. To an investment account holder in an Islamic bank,
the risk is the expected variance in the measure of profits that are
shared with the depositor. This variance could arise from a variety of
both systemic and idiosyncratic (that is, bank-specific) factors. Actual
risk in the investment account is dampened in practice by holding PER
to reduce or eliminate the variability of return on investment deposits
and offer returns that are aligned to market rates of return on conven-
tional deposits or other benchmarks. In addition, banks may use IRR to
redistribute over time the income accrued to the investment accounts.
Nevertheless, from an investor’s point of view, the true risk of mudarabah
investment in a bank can be measured by a simple measure of profit at
risk (PAR). For example, the standard deviation of the monthly profit as
a percentage of assets, σp, provides the basis for a simple measure of the
risks of holding an investment account.
From a monthly time series of mudarabah profits (as a share of
assets), its variance (and the standard deviation σp) can be calculated;
assuming normality, profit at risk can be calculated as PAR Zα σp √T,
where Zα is the constant that gives the appropriate one-tailed confi-
dence interval with a probability of 1 – α for the standard normal distri-
bution (for example, Z . . . 01 2.33 for 0.99 percent confidence
interval), and T holding period or maturity of investment account as
a fraction of month (Sundarajan 2004).
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Such aggregate PAR for a bank as a whole provides a first-cut estimate
of the risks in unrestricted mudarabah accounts. Such calculations could
also be applied to individual business units within the bank (and to specific
portfolios linked to restricted investment deposits). In addition, if specific
risk factors that affect the variation in mudarabah profits can be identified,
σp can be decomposed further in order to estimate the impact of indi-
vidual risk factors, and this would help to refine the PAR calculation. In
practice, however, Islamic banks use profit equalization reserves to smooth
the return on investment accounts. As a result, banks themselves absorb
the risks in investment accounts insofar as profit equalization reserves are
strongly, positively correlated with net return on assets (gross return on
assets minus provisions for loan losses). That is, PER is raised or lowered
when the return on assets rises or falls, and hence the investment accounts
are insulated from both gains and losses. The correlation between PER
and return on assets could, therefore, be viewed as a measure of displaced
commercial risk.
The practice of maintaining reserves to ensure smooth income over a
period of time is becoming common practice,but it has attracted objections
as well.While this practice is in alignment with prudent risk management,
it raises a governance issue that needs attention. First, limited disclosure of
such reserves makes investment account holders uneasy.Second, investment
account holders do not have the rights to influence the use of such reserves
and to verify the exposure of overall investments. Third, investment
account holders with long-term investment objectives may welcome this
practice, but investors with a short-term view may feel that they are
subsidizing the returns of long-term investors. Finally, some banks
require investment account holders to waive their rights to these reserves.
Islamic financial institutions should standardize the practice, and the
rights of investment account holders to these reserves should be clearly
stated and explained to the depositors. One suggestion is that the profits
should be deducted only from long-term depositors, who are more likely
to be exposed to such risk, and not from short-term depositors, who are
not exposed to it.
Withdrawal Risk
Another type of business risk is “withdrawal risk,” which results mainly
from the competitive pressures an Islamic bank faces both from other
Islamic banks and from conventional banks with Islamic windows. An
Islamic bank could be exposed to the risk that depositors will withdraw
their funds if they are receiving a lower rate of return than they would
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receive from another bank. If an Islamic bank is run inefficiently and
keeps producing lower returns, depositors eventually will decide to move
their money, eroding the franchise value of the bank.
Governance Risk
The importance of governance and the risks associated with poor gov-
ernance have recently attracted the attention of researchers and policy
makers. Governance risk refers to the risk arising from a failure to govern
the institution, negligence in conducting business and meeting contractual
obligations, and a weak internal and external institutional environment,
including legal risk, whereby banks are unable to enforce their contracts.
Fiduciary Risk
Fiduciary risk is the risk that arises from an institution’s failure to per-
form in accordance with explicit and implicit standards applicable to its
fiduciary responsibilities. Fiduciary risk leads to the risk of facing legal
recourse if the bank breaches its fiduciary responsibility toward deposi-
tors and shareholders. As fiduciary agents, Islamic banks are expected to
act in the best interests of investors-depositors and shareholders. If and
when the objectives of investors and shareholders diverge from the
actions of the bank, the bank is exposed to fiduciary risk.
The following are some examples of fiduciary risk:
 In case of partnership-based investment in the form of mudarabah
and musharakah on the assets side, the bank is expected to perform
adequate screening and monitoring of projects, and any deliberate or
intentional negligence in evaluating and monitoring the project can lead
to fiduciary risk. It becomes incumbent on management to perform due
diligence before committing the funds of investors-depositors.
 Mismanagement of the funds of current account holders, which are
accepted on a trust (amanah) basis, can expose the bank to fiduciary
risk as well. It is common practice for Islamic banks to use the funds
of current account holders without being obliged to share the profits
with them. However, in the case of heavy losses on the investments
financed by the funds of current account holders, the depositors can
lose confidence in the bank and decide to seek legal recourse.
 Mismanagement in governing the business by incurring unnecessary
expenses or allocating excessive expenses to investment account holders
is a breach of the implicit contract to act in a transparent fashion.
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Fiduciary risk can lead to dire consequences. First, it can cause reputa-
tional risk,creating panic among depositors,who may rush to withdraw their
funds. Second, it may require the bank to pay a penalty or compensation,
which can result in a financial loss. Third, it can have a negative impact
on the market price of shareholders’ equity. Fourth, it can affect the bank’s
cost and access to liquidity. Finally, it may lead to insolvency if the bank
is unable to meet the demands of current investment account holders.
Fiduciary risk emanates directly from the profit- and loss-sharing
feature of Islamic finance. AAOIFI (1999) defines fiduciary risk as being
legally liable for a breach of the investment contract either for noncom-
pliance with Shariah rules or for mismanagement of investors’ funds. Such
legal liability would expose the bank to both direct and indirect losses.1 In
addition, negligence or misconduct would damage the reputation of the
bank. Even a financially sound bank risks losing the confidence—and
thus the funds—of its depositors (Ali 2002). Fiduciary risk also exposes
equity holders and investment depositors to the risk of economic losses,
as they would not receive their share of profits.2
In this context, information disclosure facilitates market discipline and
enables different stakeholders to protect their own interests by allowing
depositors to withdraw their funds, shareholders to sell their shares, and
regulators to take the necessary actions in case of mismanagement or mis-
conduct. However, the differences in accounting treatment between Islamic
banks have reduced the comparability, consistency, and transparency of
financial statements (Archer and Ahmed 2003). This creates uncertainty
and limits the potential role of market discipline.
Transparency Risk 
Transparency is defined as “the public disclosure of reliable and timely
information that enables users of that information to make an accurate
assessment of a bank’s financial condition and performance, business
activities, risk profile, and risk management practices” (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 1998). Accordingly, lack of transparency creates
the risk of incurring losses due to bad decisions based on incomplete or
inaccurate information. Lack of transparency arises from two sources: the
use of nonstandard conventions for reporting Islamic financial contracts
and the lack of uniform standards of reporting among banks. Islamic
financial instruments require different conventions of reporting to reflect
the bank’s true financial picture. Transparency also demands that all
banks in the system use a uniform set of standards, which is not the
current practice.
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The disclosure regime for Islamic banks needs to become more com-
prehensive and transparent, with a focus on the disclosure of risk profile,
risk-return mix, and internal governance. This requires coordinating the
rules of supervisory disclosure and accounting standards with the proper
differentiation between consumer-friendly disclosure to assist investment
account holders and market-oriented disclosure to inform the markets.
Shariah Risk 
Shariah risk is related to the structure and functioning of Shariah boards
at the institutional and systemic level. This risk could be of two types; the
first is due to nonstandard practices in respect of different contracts in
different jurisdictions, and the second is due to the failure to comply with
Shariah rules. Differences in the interpretation of Shariah rules result in
differences in financial reporting, auditing, and accounting treatment. For
instance, while some Shariah scholars consider the terms of a murabahah
or istisnah contract to be binding on the buyer, others argue that the buyer
has the option to decline even after placing an order and paying the
commitment fee. While different schools of thought consider different
practices to be acceptable, the bank’s risk is higher in nonbinding cases
and may lead to litigation in the case of unsettled transactions.
The relationship between the bank and the investors-depositors is
not only that of an agent and principal; it is also based on an implicit trust
between the two that the agent will respect the desires of the principal to
comply fully with the Shariah. This relationship distinguishes Islamic
banking from conventional banking and is the sole justification for the
existence of Islamic banks. If the bank is unable to maintain this trust and
the bank’s actions lead to noncompliance with the Shariah, the bank risks
breaking the confidence of the investors-depositors. Therefore, the bank
should give high priority to ensuring transparency in compliance with
the Shariah and take actions to avoid lack of compliance.
Some Shariah scholars have suggested that, if a bank fails to act in
accordance with the Shariah rules, the transaction should be considered
null and void, and any income derived from it should not be included in
the profits to be distributed to the investors-depositors.
REPUTATIONAL RISK
Reputational risk, or “headline risk,” is the risk that the irresponsible
actions or behavior of management will damage the trust of the bank’s
clients.Although the fiduciary and Shariah risks also stem from negligence
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and noncompliance, reputational risk is the risk that the irresponsible
behavior of a single institution could taint the reputation of other banks
in the industry. Negative publicity can have a significant impact on an
institution’s market share, profitability, and liquidity. The Islamic financial
services industry is a relatively young industry, and a single failed institution
could give a bad name to other banks that are not engaged in irresponsible
behavior. Nevertheless, all Islamic banks in a given market are exposed to
such risk. Close collaboration among financial institutions, standardization
of contracts and practices, self-examination, and establishment of industry
associations are some of the steps needed to mitigate reputational risk.
NOTES
1. The latter effect should impose indirect market discipline on Islamic banks,
as is discussed in the next section.
2. For instance, any profits accrued to the bank as a result of investment in
non-Shariah-acceptable assets would be distributed for charitable purposes.
Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks
182
Three
Governance and Regulation
P A R T
For the most part, the corporate governance arrangements of Islamicbanks are modeled along the lines of a conventional shareholder
corporation (see figure 11.1).1 This configuration leads to a distribution of
rights and responsibilities that essentially leaves control with shareholders.
However, Islamic finance raises unique challenges for corporate governance.
In particular, two broad sets of issues require specific treatment. The first
revolves around the need to reassure stakeholders that the Islamic bank’s
financial activities comply fully with the precepts of Islamic jurisprudence.
Ultimately, the raison d’être of Islamic finance is to meet the desire of stake-
holders to conduct their financial business according to Shariah principles.
Mechanisms are needed to comfort and safeguard them to that effect. This
role is played by Shariah boards composed of scholars and Shariah review
units within Islamic banks that ensure compliance with Islamic law.
The second revolves around the stakeholders’ need to be comforted
in their belief that Islamic banks will promote their financial interests,
proving to be efficient, stable, and trustworthy providers of financial servi-
ces. In practice, depositors and borrowers need to be reassured that
Islamic banks deal with liabilities and assets that are competitive and offer
an acceptable risk-return tradeoff to their clients.
STAKEHOLDER-BASED GOVERNANCE MODEL
In theory, the Islamic economic system fully supports and endorses a
stakeholder view of governance based on Islam’s principles of the
Governance Issues in
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Key Messages
• The corporate governance of Islamic banks is modeled along the lines of a conventional share-
holder corporation, with distinct features such as the existence of Shariah boards and the role of
investors as depositors.
• Shariah endorses a stakeholder-oriented model of corporate governance in light of Islamic
tenets of property rights and contracts. Such a stakeholder-oriented model recognizes the
rights and responsibilities of different stakeholders and seeks to preserve the rights of all
stakeholders.
• The functioning of internal Shariah boards raises five issues for corporate governance: independ-
ence, confidentiality, competence, consistency, and disclosure.
• Since depositors of Islamic banks are investors, their role as quasi-shareholders has to be  rec-
ognized. The governance structure should include the protection of rights of different classes of
investment account holders.
• On the assets side, Islamic banks may enter into partnerships and take an equity stake. In such
cases, Islamic banks themselves become a stakeholder in other institutions and therefore may
exert some influence, which may complicate the governance structure.
preservation of property rights and the sanctity of contracts. Research
has shown that a Shariah-based stakeholder-centered model of gover-
nance offers a comprehensive framework of governance (for a more
detailed analysis, see Iqbal and Mirakhor 2004). As such, the corporate
governance model derives from an understanding of three principles
of Islam:
 Recognition of the property rights of individuals, legal entities (firms),
and the community;
 Significance of contractual obligations, explicit as well as implicit,
among economic agents;
 The design of incentive systems to enforce Shariah rules and preserve
the social order.
The principles of property rights and the treatment of contracts
differentiate the functions and obligations of an Islamic financial insti-
tution from those of a conventional bank. Islam is a rule-based system
geared to protecting the rights of all members of society, both individ-
ually and collectivity. The conventional economic system is based on a
“shareholder- or owner-centered” governance system. However, there is
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Source: Grais and Pilligrani (2006).
FIGURE 11.1 Corporate Governance Structures in Institutions Offering Islamic and Conventional Financial Services
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growing acceptance of the idea that stakeholders should be included in
the governance structure, but no solid theoretical foundation to date.
Questions such as why a stakeholder should be part of the governance
system and who should be qualified to be a stakeholder are the subject
of debate.
In contrast to the conventional system, the Islamic financial sys-
tem is based on the active participation of public policy institutions,
regulatory and supervisory authorities, and Shariah authorities. These
institutions collectively monitor the performance of the firm and its
faithfulness and commitment to explicit as well as implicit contracts.
This structure and process of governance incorporates the legitimate
rights and claims of stakeholders whenever a stakeholder’s rights are at
“risk” due to the activities of the firm. This does not in any way negate
or undermine the rights of shareholders to maximize profits, but it
does impose on Islamic banks the obligation to protect the rights of
stakeholders through explicit or implicit contracts.
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SHARIAH BOARDS
A distinctive feature of Islamic banks is the pledge to conduct activities in
accordance with the principles of Shariah. Islamic banks have created
corporate governance structures and processes to reassure stakeholders
that all transactions conform to Shariah principles and to ensure com-
pliance. Shariah supervisory boards, operating either within the Islamic
bank itself or through an external institution such as the central bank,
ensure conformity with religious principles. Each board has the author-
ity to design, develop, and issue Shariah-compliant financial products
and legal instruments. Shariah boards exist in all Islamic countries with
the exception of the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the central bank
guarantees and monitors compliance of the whole banking system with
Shariah (see table 11.1 for an overview).
The internal tasks of Shariah supervisory boards vary according to
the provisions stipulated in the particular Islamic bank’s articles of
association or by national regulators. However, a review of 13 Islamic
banks for which sufficient information was available revealed that all
Shariah supervisory boards are entrusted with ex ante monitoring.2
Next to internal regulations, international and national regulators often
implement guidelines for Shariah boards. These generally refer to the
duty to ensure Shariah compliance of transactions and less frequently
specify competencies, composition, and decision-making authority.
Table 11.2 provides an overview of practice in select countries that have
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Table 11.1 Presence of a Centralized Shariah Supervisory Board or Islamic 
Rating Agency in Select Countries 
Centralized Shariah board or high 
Country Shariah authority or fatwa board Islamic rating agency
Jordan No No
Malaysia 3 3
Sudan 3 No
Bahraina No No
Kuwait 3 No
Pakistan 3 No
United Arab Emirates 3 No
Indonesia 3 No
Source: Grais and Pilligrani (2006).
a. Bahrain is the seat of the International Islamic Financial Market and the International Islamic Rating
Agency, which, respectively, set standards for Islamic jurisprudence and rate Islamic instruments on an
international scale.
Table 11.2 Regulations Governing Shariah Supervisory Boards in Select Countriesa
Terms of Decision Appointment Fit and proper
Country reference Composition making and dismissal criteria
Bahrain 3 3 Unspecified 3 3
Dubai International
Financial Center 3 3 Unspecified 3 3
Indonesia 3 Unspecified Unspecified 3 3
Jordan 3 3 3 3 Unspecified
Kuwait 3 3 3 Unspecified Unspecified
Lebanon 3 3 Unspecified 3 Unspecified
Malaysia 3 Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified 3
Pakistan 3 3 Unspecified 3 3
Philippines 3 3 Unspecified Unspecified 3
Thailand 3 3 Unspecified 3 3
United Arab
Emirates 3 3 Unspecified 3 Unspecified
Source: Grais and Pilligrani (2006).
introduced guidelines or legislative edicts related to the functioning of
Shariah boards.3 Whereas all countries in the survey define the terms of
reference for Shariah boards, rulings on the decision-making process or
transparency are not uniform.
In principle, Shariah boards are responsible for five main areas:
certification of permissible financial instruments through fatwas
(ex ante Shariah audit), verification of transactions’ compliance with
issued fatwas (ex post Shariah audit), the calculation and payment of
zakat (alms giving), disposal of non-Shariah-compliant earnings, and
advice on the distribution of income or expenses among the bank’s
shareholders and investment account holders.4 Each Shariah board
issues a report to certify the Shariah compliance of all financial trans-
actions. This report usually forms an integral part of the institution’s
annual report.
ISSUES IN SHARIAH GOVERNANCE
The functioning of internal Shariah boards raises five issues for corporate
governance: independence, confidentiality, competence, consistency,
and disclosure.
The first issue concerns the independence of the Shariah supervisory
board from the management. Generally, members of Shariah boards are
appointed by the shareholders of the bank, represented by the board of
directors. As such, they are employed by the bank, and their remuneration
is proposed by the management and approved by the board. The board
members’ dual relationship with the Islamic bank as provider of remu-
nerated services and as assessor of the nature of operations can create a
conflict of interest. In principle, Shariah boards are required to submit an
unbiased opinion in all matters pertaining to their assignment. However,
their employment status generates an economic stake in the bank, which
may compromise their independence. In practice, the conflict-of-interest
risk may be mitigated by the ethical standards of the individual members
of the Shariah board and the high cost that a stained reputation would
inflict both on them and on the Islamic bank. Generally, members of
Shariah boards are highly regarded scholars and guardians of the princi-
ples of Shariah, making less than truthful assessment and disclosure of
Shariah compliance unlikely. Similarly, managerial interference in compli-
ance assessments may lead to a loss of confidence on the part of share-
holders and other stakeholders, in addition to the imposition of penalties
and even dismissal. Thus the cost of false assessments could be heavy.
This notwithstanding, a potential conflict of interest is embedded in
existing arrangements.
Confidentiality issues may be intertwined with issues of independence.
Many Shariah scholars sit on various boards. This multiple membership
may be a strength, as it may enhance independence vis-à-vis a particular
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Islamic bank. However, it entails access to proprietary information of
different, possibly competing, Islamic banks. Thus Shariah board members
may find themselves in the midst of a potential conflict of interest.
Malaysia has dealt with this issue by encouraging jurists to sit on the
board of only one Islamic bank. While this method would eliminate
concerns about confidentiality, the practice poses problems. First, it may
exacerbate the lack of competence in areas with a scarcity of Shariah
experts.5 Second, it may prevent the formation of an efficient labor
market by lessening the economic appeal of the auditing profession.
Finally, it may create a symbiotic relationship between the auditor and the
Islamic bank that undermines impartiality.
Shariah board members are required to combine a diverse set of
competencies. They should be knowledgeable in both Islamic law and
commercial, banking, and accounting practices.Very few scholars are well
versed in all these disciplines. The issue has been addressed by including
members from different backgrounds on most Shariah boards.6 The
combination of experts rather than expertise poses the challenge of
overcoming different perspectives as well as potential failures of commu-
nication. Over time, the gap between the supply of and the demand for
individuals with both Shariah and financial skills is likely to narrow
through public policy and formal cross-disciplinary training. Progress in
this direction is already noticeable in countries where the Islamic finan-
cial industry is well established. However, in countries where Islamic
finance is less developed, transitional incentives may be needed.
The fourth issue concerns consistency of judgment across Islamic
banks over time or across jurisdictions within the same Islamic bank. The
activities of Shariah boards create jurisprudence by their interpretation
of legal sources. As such, it would not be surprising to find conflicting
opinions on the admissibility of specific financial instruments or trans-
actions. However, the diversity of opinion is less widespread than
expected.7 Nevertheless, as the industry expands, the number of conflict-
ing rulings on the permissibility of an instrument is likely to grow if no
efforts are made to harmonize the standards. This may undermine cus-
tomer confidence in the industry and have repercussions on the
enforceability of contracts.
The last and overarching issue is the disclosure of all information relat-
ing to Shariah advisory. Stable corporate governance systems seek to
enhance the soundness of Shariah governance. The framework is enhanced
by arrangements put in place by regulators and external providers of finan-
cial information services. In addition, public rating agencies create a
positive climate for Shariah compliance. However, private mechanisms for
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the external governance of Shariah compliance are limited. Private rating
agencies have not yet developed the necessary skills or found enough incen-
tives to monitor Islamic bank compliance with the Shariah.
SHARIAH REVIEW UNITS AND OTHER STRUCTURES
In addition to Shariah boards, most Islamic banks, particularly those
complying with standards of the Accounting and Auditing Organization
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), have established another
internal Shariah review structure: the Shariah review unit.8 These units
are independent of other departments or are an integral part of the insti-
tution’s audit and control department. They perform an array of tasks
similar to that of the audit department: reviewers generally use all pow-
ers necessary to ascertain that all financial transactions implemented by
management comply with Shariah board rulings. In this respect, the role
of the internal review unit is limited to complementary ex post monitor-
ing. This makes its task secondary, if more focused and defined, to that of
the Shariah boards, which are the ultimate arbiters in matters of Shariah
compliance. In some instances, Shariah review units have been given
exclusive responsibility for ex post monitoring.9 These units face many of
the same challenges as Shariah boards, in particular, regarding inde-
pendence and competence.
Beyond internal arrangements, the broader Shariah governance frame-
work may include features put in place by regulators, such as the provision
of financial information to persons outside the institution. Among regula-
tory arrangements, centralized Shariah boards are the most noteworthy in
relation to Shariah governance. While there are significant differences
across countries, centralized Shariah boards are usually concerned with ex
ante monitoring, mostly understood as standardization of Shariah inter-
pretation,and with ex post monitoring of Shariah compliance.They also are
concerned with issues related to upholding Shariah compliance and offer
arbitration and recourse to settlement of Shariah disputes among members
of the same Shariah board. See table 11.3 for an overview of centralized
boards in select countries (Grais and Pilligrani 2006).
Private mechanisms for external monitoring of Shariah compliance
are limited. In particular, private rating agencies have not yet developed
the necessary skills or have enough incentives to monitor Islamic banks’
Shariah compliance.“Islamic rating”has so far been the exclusive domain
of government-sponsored organizations such as the International Islamic
Rating Agency and the Malaysian Rating Corporation. Likewise, other
external actors with an interest in Islamic finance, such as financial media
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and external auditors, are generally less concerned with assessments of
Shariah compliance.10
IMPROVEMENT IN SHARIAH GOVERNANCE
Shariah governance could be made more efficient and uniform. First, cre-
ation of an international standard-setting self-regulatory association
would help to harmonize standards and practices. Such an approach could
ensure consistency of interpretation and enhance the enforceability of
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Table 11.3 External Shariah Boards in Select Countries
Country Centralized Shariah board or high Shariah authority or fatwa board
Bahrain No. But the international Islamic financial market promotes the
harmonization and convergence of Shariah interpretations in
developing Islamic banking products and practices that are
universally acceptable.
Indonesia Yes. The National Shariah Board is authorized to issue fatwas
concerning products, services, and operations of Islamic banks. 
It also recommends Shariah advisers to Islamic banks.
Iran, Islamic Rep. of No. All are embedded in the by-laws of the central bank.
Jordan No.
Kuwait The Fatwa Board in the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs is
the final authority on Shariah disputes. Its advice is binding when
it arbitrates on disputes between members of the same Shariah
board.
Malaysia Yes. The Shariah Council advises the central bank on Shariah
matters and is the ultimate arbiter in Shariah interpretations of
disputes. The directives issued by Bank Negara Malaysia in
consultation with the Shariah Council have binding authority over
banks with Islamic windows.
Pakistan Yes. The Shariah Board of the State Bank advises the central bank
on matters of Shariah. It also produces templates of permissible
Islamic financial contracts to ensure compliance with minimum
Shariah standards.
Sudan Yes. The Shariah High Supervisory Board is responsible for fat-
was, contract templates, arbitrage, consultations relating to
Islamic legal aspects, training, research, lectures, and seminars.
Saudi Arabia No.
United Arab Emirates Yes. The Higher Shariah Authority, attached to the Ministry of
Justice and Islamic Affairs, is the final arbiter in Shariah matters.
It is also responsible for Shariah supervision.
Source: Grais and Pilligrani (2006).
contracts before the civil courts. Review of transactions would be
entrusted mainly to internal review units, which, in collaboration with
external auditors, would be responsible for issuing an annual opinion on
the Shariah compliance of transactions. This process would be sustained
by reputable agents, like rating agencies, stock markets, financial media,
and researchers, that would channel signals to market players. Such a
framework would also enhance public understanding of the requirements
of Shariah and lead stakeholders to play a more effective role in the
activities of the institution.
Second, creation of a systemwide board of knowledgeable religious
scholars who specialize in Islamic economic and financial principles
would be more efficient and lead to optimal governance structures.
Countries such as Malaysia and Sudan have adopted this structure, form-
ing a group of highly competent scholars and experts in finance, bank-
ing, economics, accounting, and finance to serve on a systemwide or
national Shariah board.
Such a systemwide Shariah board could work closely with regulators
and supervisors to devise effective monitoring and supervisory controls
that protect the rights of stakeholders according to Islamic principles. The
board is responsible for ensuring that compliance with the monitoring
system protects the rights of stakeholders with whom the financial insti-
tution has explicit or implicit contracts. This structure of governance is
more efficient and cost-effective than that of internal Shariah boards for
the following reasons:
 Each stakeholder is not required to duplicate monitoring;
 Each institution is not required to maintain its own fatwa-issuing
board;
 The fatwa-issuing board consists of knowledgeable experts in finance
as well as the Shariah;
 There is uniformity of expected behavior, which sets the standards to
be followed by individual institutions.
INVESTMENT ACCOUNT HOLDERS AS STAKEHOLDERS
Islamic banks generally have corporate governance structures and systems
similar to those of conventional systems for handling agency problems
between shareholders and management. In addition,a framework is needed
to protect the financial interests of stakeholders, in this case, investment
account holders. Generally, Islamic banks offer three broad categories of
deposit-investment accounts: current accounts, unrestricted investment
Governance Issues in Islamic Bank
193
accounts, and restricted investment accounts. Each category raises cor-
porate governance issues, but those of unrestricted investment accounts are
the most challenging.Current and restricted accounts are considered briefly
before turning to unrestricted investment accounts.
Current accounts take one of three general forms: (a) the amanah or
“trust deposits,” where the Islamic bank acts as a trustee and promises to
pay back the deposit in full, (b) the qard hassan, or goodwill loan, where
the bank receives a loan from depositors and owes the principal amount
only, and (c) the wadiah, or safe deposits and guaranteed banking, with
the amount of principal payable on demand. In all cases, the Islamic bank
obtains implicit or explicit authorization to use the deposited money for
any purpose permitted by the Shariah and pays no fixed interest or profit
shares to the depositor, with the exception of gifts (hiba) distributed at
the bank’s discretion.11 Current account holders need protection from the
exposure to risky investments or excessive use of their funds to enhance
the performance of overall investments or to benefit unrestricted invest-
ment accounts.
Investment account holders are like quasi-equity holders, but with-
out any participation in governance of the financial institution. Since
they do not participate in governance, they are at the mercy of public
policy makers, regulators, and Shariah boards. A transparent and efficient
governance arrangement is needed to include and protect their rights.
The Islamic Financial Services Board, in its Standard on Corporate Gov-
ernance, issued as an exposure draft, has proposed a governance commit-
tee that forms part of the institution and is responsible for safeguarding
the interests of investment account holders.
In the case of restricted investment accounts, the bank acts as fund
manager—agent or nonparticipating mudarib—and is not authorized to
mix its funds with those of investors without prior permission. The
Islamic bank operates these accounts under the principle of mudarabah,
engaging in tailor-made investments and distributing profits geared to the
risk appetite and needs of the client. Restricted account holders are nor-
mally savvy high-net-worth investors, whose holdings are large enough to
induce them to monitor the agent’s behavior directly. They have an inter-
est in full disclosure of all relevant information about returns and risks. In
addition, management is responsible for ensuring that their investments
are ring-fenced from the rest and that full transparency is present in the
identification and distribution of profits and losses.
Unrestricted investment accounts are the third and the most important
category of Islamic bank accounts. They constitute the majority of deposits
and are a characteristic feature of Islamic finance, posing distinctive
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challenges for corporate governance. Unrestricted account holders
usually enter into a mudarabah contract with the Islamic bank,12 in which
the Islamic bank manages their funds and pays a share of returns accord-
ing to a predetermined profit- and loss-sharing ratio. Unrestricted
account holders bear the risk of the performance of the investment pool,
except in the case of Islamic bank misconduct, a feature that makes them
akin to shareholders. A significant difference is that the agent is appointed
by another principal, the shareholder. In short, unrestricted account
holders constitute a sui generis category of depositors with neither the
capital value nor the returns on their deposits ex ante guaranteed. In prin-
ciple, this does not constitute a problem, since the allocation of returns is
governed by the ratio of the mudarabah contract. However, it is common
practice to commingle shareholder and investment funds in a common
pool, without a mechanism separating the two. Consequently, concern
remains over shareholder-controlled management and boards that may
favor and protect shareholders’ investments at the expense of the holders
of unrestricted investment accounts.
With selective application of international norms of corporate gover-
nance, regulators should deal with those issues that exclusively jeopardize
the interests of Islamic bank stakeholders. The first priority for all depos-
itors is to discontinue the practice of commingling funds because it casts
a shadow on Islamic bank compliance with clients’ investment mandates.
Accordingly, regulatory authorities should stipulate rules and firewalls and
establish sanctions for breaches. This is of paramount importance for
unrestricted investment accounts. Shortcomings in current practices may
require a combination of solutions.
On the one end, rights that normally belong to equity holders may be
extended to the holders of unrestricted accounts. Doing so would satisfy
the demand of depositors for greater involvement in the strategic manage-
ment of banks.13 Otherwise, a step may be taken in the opposite direction
by granting unrestricted account holders full debt-holding status and the
protection it carries. In most financial systems, regulators act on behalf of
debt holders by requiring insurance on all deposits and taking control away
from equity holders in case of distress. A Shariah-compliant version of
deposit insurance could be put in place that would cover current accounts
under all circumstances of bank insolvency and unrestricted accounts only
in cases of insolvency deriving from fraudulent mismanagement. Alterna-
tively, the sui generis status of unrestricted accounts may be maintained
provided that governance structures are created to protect their interests.
The key rationale would be to create a permanent institutional channel to
facilitate the flow of information from and to unrestricted account holders.
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However, the creation of a new agent would bring with it additional agency
problems and the risk of multiplying rather than diffusing the asymmetries
of information to which unrestricted investment accounts are subject. The
creation of a complex body, made up of representatives from several parts
of the firm, would certainly reduce the tendency to collusion, as the differ-
ent members would cross-check each other’s behavior. Yet it would not
guarantee proper behavior.
Another issue pertains to the reserves that Islamic banks maintain to
smooth profits over time. The objective of a profit equalization reserve
(PER) is to hedge against future low-income distributions by keeping a
portion of current profits to pay out to investment account holders in the
future.14 Whereas this practice is in alignment with prudent risk man-
agement, it raises a governance issue that needs attention. First, limited
disclosure of such reserves and their use make investment account holders
uneasy. Second, investment account holders lack the rights to influence
the use of such reserves and to verify the exposure of overall investments.
Third, an investment account holder with long-term investment objec-
tives might be comfortable with the practice of retaining profits earned
in reserves, but other investors might prefer to have profits paid out as
they are earned, even if the payout will vary from period to period and
may sometimes be zero. Finally, the latter attitude is all the more likely
since Islamic banks require investment account holders to waive their
rights to these reserves. For example, the terms and conditions of Islamic
Bank of Britain state,“You [the investment account holders] authorize us
to deduct from net income your profit stabilization reserve contribution
for payment into the profit stabilization reserve account. Upon such
deduction you agree that you relinquish any right you may have to the
monies in the profit stabilization reserve account.”
Islamic financial institutions should standardize their practice in
respect of such reserves, and the rights of investment account holders to
these reserves should be stated clearly and explained to the depositors.
One suggestion is that profits only be deducted from long-term deposi-
tors who are more likely to be exposed to displaced commercial risk and
not from short-term depositors who are not exposed it.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS STAKEHOLDERS 
Internal corporate governance arrangements are generally reinforced by
external ones that set the framework governing business activity and
provide the information necessary for their official and private monitoring.
These external arrangements relate to the legal and regulatory prudential
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framework governing Islamic bank activities and to the infrastructure
that permits their monitoring.
Islamic financial institutions carry assets based on partnership con-
tracts, which converts them into stakeholders in the businesses to which
they provide financing. This is similar to the “insider”system of governance
in the German model of banking, where bankers may also be represented
on the board of directors. Little attention is being paid to this aspect, but it
does pose challenges for corporate governance.
First, Islamic bank assets are composed of profit- and loss-sharing
instruments, akin to those of mudarabah and musharakah. Due to the
high degree of asymmetry of information in equity and profit- and loss-
sharing contracts, there is greater need for close monitoring by the
Islamic bank. To minimize the costs, institutional arrangements that
facilitate monitoring and governance are essential. The absence of such
mechanisms is a cause for concern.
Second, as the Islamic financial system places more emphasis on
partnership-based instruments, Islamic bank participation in governance
matters is critical, enhancing the responsibility and accountability of the
management and the decision makers.
Poor corporate governance may impose a heavy cost. The mere exten-
sion of international standards and practices to Islamic banks may not be
sufficient. Sound corporate governance requires the formulation of prin-
ciples and enforcement (for more, see Berglöf and Claessens 2004). Many
countries where Islamic finance is developing have weak contractual envi-
ronments.15 Regulators often lack powers to enforce the rules, private actors
are nonexistent, and courts are “underfinanced, unmotivated, unclear as to
how the law applies, unfamiliar with economic issues, or even corrupt”
(Fremond and Capaul 2002). Furthermore, a “law habit” culture—that is,
a propensity to abide by the law—must be rooted in society. While the
ability to enforce regulations is inextricably coupled with the overall
process of development, legislation enabling transparency, private moni-
toring initiatives, and investments in the rule of law can pave the way to
effective regulatory frameworks.
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has recently issued a
standard concerning corporate governance of financial institutions offer-
ing Islamic products and services. This standard addresses some of the
above-mentioned issues and provides a framework for Islamic banks to
formulate and implement corporate governance (see box 11.1). The
Standard on Corporate Governance defines principles dealing with issues
such as general governance principles, rights of investment account
holders, Shariah governance, and transparency in reporting. For further
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BOX 11.1 IFSB Principles of Corporate Governance for Islamic Banks
Principle 1.1. Islamic banks shall establish a comprehensive governance policy framework
which sets out the strategic roles and functions of each organ of governance and mechanisms
for balancing the Islamic bank’s accountabilities to various stakeholders.
Principle 1.2. Islamic banks shall ensure that the reporting of their financial and non-
financial information meets the requirements of internationally recognized accounting
standards which are in compliance with Shariah rules and principles and are applicable to the
Islamic financial services industry as recognized by the supervisory authorities of the country.
Principle 2.1. Islamic banks shall acknowledge the right of investment account holders
to monitor the performance of their investments and the associated risks and put in place ade-
quate means to ensure that these rights are observed and exercised.
Principle 2.2. Islamic banks shall adopt a sound investment strategy that is appropriately
aligned to the risk and return expectations of investment account holders (bearing in mind the
distinction between restricted and unrestricted investment accounts), and be transparent in
smoothing any returns.
Principle 3.1. Islamic banks shall have in place an appropriate mechanism for obtaining
rulings from Shariah scholars, applying fatawa, and monitoring Shariah compliance in all
aspects of their products, operations, and activities.
Principle 3.2. Islamic banks shall comply with the Shariah rules and principles as
expressed in the rulings of the Islamic bank’s Shariah scholars. The Islamic bank shall make
these rulings available to the public.
Principle 4. Islamic banks shall make adequate and timely disclosure to investment
account holders and the public of material and relevant information on the investment
accounts that they manage.
details, consult IFSB’s Standard on Corporate Governance, which was
issued in 2007.
NOTES
1. See El-Hawary, Grais, and Iqbal (2005); Grais and Pilligrani (2006); Grais and
Iqbal (2006).
2. Annual reports, articles of association, and all information posted on the
Web sites of the following Islamic banks were used for this analysis: Bahrain
Islamic Bank, Al Rajhi Banking Corporation, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad,
Jordan Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance House, Bank Muamalat Malaysia,
Shamil Bank, Bahrain, Islamic Bank of Britain, Emirates Islamic Bank, Dubai
Islamic Bank, Islamic Bank Bangladesh Limited, First Islamic Investment
Bank, and Bank Rakyat Malaysia (Grais and Pilligrani 2006).
3. We mention only those countries where authorities have implemented
laws or acts or issued circulars and regulations on internal Shariah super-
visory boards.
4. A fatwa is a religious edict or proclamation. It is a legal opinion issued by a
qualified Muslim scholar on matters of religious belief and practice. For
more, see Briston and El-Ashker (1986) and Abdel Karim (1990).
5. Especially in the area of fiqh al-muamalat (Islamic commercial jurisprudence).
6. The practice of AAOIFI (Governance Standard 1) is to include jurists of fiq
al-muamalat. However, one member may be an expert in Islamic financial
institutions and also have knowledge of Islamic commercial jurisprudence.
7. See http://ifptest.law.harvard.edu/ifphtml/index.php?module=Forum
Report01&session_id=3886ede153bf015d2c1045ade9f71db5 [April, 4, 2006].
The General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions sampled
about 6,000 fatwas and found that 90 percent were consistent across
Islamic banks.
8. In AAOIFI member countries and banks, internal Shariah review is prescribed
by Governance Standard 3. In Pakistan, it is regulated by Annexure-III to IBD
Circular no. 02 of 2004.
9. This is the case of large Islamic banks where the Shariah boards may not be
able to assess large volumes of transactions. Therefore, separate Shariah con-
trol departments have been established. This seems to be the case in Al Rajhi
Banking and Investment Corporation and Dubai Islamic Bank.
10. A notable exception is the multiplication of stock market Islamic indexes,
whose major contribution is the identification of halal investments. Halal
conveys goodness and, by extension, has taken the meaning of “permissible.”
11. In the case of amanah deposits, the authorization must be obtained from the
depositor, while in qard hassan, this is not needed. For more, see Ahmad
(1997).
12. Wakalah-based unrestricted investment accounts, where the Islamic bank
earns a flat fee, rather than a share of profits, are not considered here.
13. Chapra and Ahmed (2002) find that depositors want to be involved in the
strategic management of the bank.
14. Islamic banks also typically maintain an investment risk reserve (IRR) con-
stituted entirely out of appropriations from the investment account holder’s
share of the profits. This reserve, unlike the PER, may be used to offset losses.
Reservations about the use of the PER are also relevant to the IRR.
15. The 2005 Doing Business report continues to reveal weak enforcement in Mid-
dle Eastern countries. Islamic banks operate mostly in jurisdictions where
legal protection could be strengthened. The prohibition of riba (interest)
and gharar (gambling) translates into risk-sharing arrangements that may
leave stakeholders uncertain about the security of their assets. Furthermore,
undivided control with shareholders can create biased decision making, see
Tirole (1999).
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In forming a safe environment for stakeholders, corporate governancerules for Islamic banks should focus on creating a culture of trans-
parency. Transparency refers to the principle of creating an environment
where information on existing conditions, decisions, and actions is made
accessible, visible, and understandable to all market participants. Disclo-
sure refers more specifically to the process and methodology of providing
the information and of making policy decisions known through timely
dissemination and openness. Accountability refers to the need for market
participants, including the relevant authorities, to justify their actions and
policies and to accept responsibility for both decisions and results.
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Transparency is a prerequisite for accountability, especially to borrowers and
lenders, issuers and investors, national authorities, and international finan-
cial institutions. In part, the case for greater transparency and accountabil-
ity rests on the need for private sector agents to understand and accept policy
decisions that affect their behavior. Greater transparency improves eco-
nomic decisions taken by other agents in the economy. Transparency also
fosters accountability, internal discipline, and better governance, while both
transparency and accountability improve the quality of decision making in
policy-oriented institutions. Such institutions—as well as other institutions
that rely on them to make decisions—should be required to maintain trans-
parency. If actions and decisions are visible and understandable, the costs of
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Key Messages
• Accounting information has to be useful.
• Relevance, faithful representation, comparability, and understandability are attributes of useful
information.
• Financial statements should strive to achieve transparency through the fair presentation of useful
information.
• Islamic and international financial reporting standards contain sufficient disclosure requirements
to ensure fair presentation.
• Perceived deficiencies in financial reporting standards often relate to inadequate enforcement of
and failure to adhere to existing standards.
monitoring can be lowered. In addition, the general public is better able to
monitor public sector institutions, shareholders and employees have a better
view of corporate management, creditors monitor borrowers more
adequately, and depositors are able to keep an eye on banks. Poor decisions
do not go unnoticed or unquestioned.
Transparency and accountability are mutually reinforcing. Trans-
parency enhances accountability by facilitating monitoring, while account-
ability enhances transparency by providing an incentive for agents to
ensure that their actions are disseminated properly and understood.
Greater transparency reduces the tendency of markets to place undue
emphasis on positive or negative news and thus reduces volatility in
financial markets. Taken together, transparency and accountability also
impose discipline that improves the quality of decision making in the
public sector. This can result in more efficient policies by improving the
private sector’s understanding of how policy makers may react to events
in the future. Transparency forces institutions to face up to the reality
of a situation and makes officials more responsible, especially if they
know they will have to justify their views, decisions, and actions. For
these reasons, timely policy adjustment is encouraged.
The provision of transparent and useful information on market
participants and their transactions is an essential part of an orderly and
efficient market; it also is a key prerequisite for imposing market disci-
pline. In order for a risk-based approach to bank management and super-
vision to be effective, useful information must be provided to each key
player. These players include supervisors, current and prospective share-
holders and bondholders, depositors and other creditors, correspondent
and other banks, counterparties, and the general public. Left alone,
markets may not generate sufficient levels of disclosure. While market
forces normally balance the marginal benefits and costs of disclosing
additional information, the end result may not be what players really need.
Banking legislation traditionally has been used to force disclosure
of information. Disclosure has involved the provision of prudential infor-
mation required by bank supervisors and the compilation of statistics for
monetary policy purposes, rather than the provision of information
that enables a comprehensive evaluation of financial risks. Neverthe-
less, even such imperfect information has improved the functioning
of markets.
The public disclosure of information is predicated on the existence
of quality accounting standards and adequate disclosure methodology.
The process normally involves publication of relevant qualitative and
quantitative information in annual financial reports, which are often
supplemented by biannual or quarterly financial statements and other
important information. Because the provision of information can be
expensive, disclosure requirements should weigh the usefulness of
information for the public against the costs of provision.
It is also important to time the introduction of information well.
Disclosure of negative information to a public that is not sufficiently
sophisticated to interpret it could damage a bank and possibly the entire
banking system. In situations where low-quality information is put forth
or users are not deemed capable of properly interpreting what is
disclosed, public requirements should be phased in carefully and tight-
ened progressively. In the long run, a full disclosure regime is beneficial,
even if some immediate problems are experienced, because the cost to the
financial system of not being transparent is ultimately higher than the
cost of revealing information.
The financial and capital market liberalization of the 1980s brought
increasing volatility to financial markets and, consequently, increased the
information needed to ensure financial stability. With the advance of
financial and capital market liberalization, pressure has increased to
improve the usefulness of available financial sector information through
the formulation of minimum disclosure requirements. These require-
ments address the quality and quantity of information that must be
provided to market participants and the general public. Since the provi-
sion of information is essential to promote the stability of the banking
system, regulatory authorities have placed high priority on improving the
quality of information disclosed. Banks are also encouraged to improve
their internal information systems in order to develop a reputation for
providing quality information.
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In the 1990s, the changing structure of financial intermediation
further strengthened the case for enhanced disclosure. The substitution of
tradable debt securities for bank lending and the increased use of financial
instruments to transfer risk reduced the importance of banker-client
relationships, while expanding the role of markets and market prices in the
allocation of capital and risks in the financial system. This shift also affected
disclosure requirements: in order to make informed choices, investors need
sound information about the profile and nature of risks involved.
Over the past decade, the issues of transparency and accountability
have been increasingly and strongly debated as part of economic policy
discussions. Policy makers have long been accustomed to secrecy, which
has been viewed as a necessary ingredient for the exercise of power; it has
the added benefit of hiding the incompetence of policy makers. How-
ever, secrecy also hinders the desired effects of policies. Changes in the
changed world economy and financial flows have entailed increasing
internationalization and interdependence, placing the issue of openness
at the forefront of economic policy making. There is growing recogni-
tion on the part of national governments, including central banks, that
transparency improves the predictability and therefore the efficiency of
policy decisions.
LIMITATIONS OF TRANSPARENCY
Transparency and accountability are not ends in and of themselves; nor
are they panaceas to solve all problems. They are designed to improve
economic performance and the working of international financial markets
by enhancing the quality of decision making and risk management among
market participants. In particular, transparency does not change the nature
of banking or the risks inherent in financial systems. While it cannot pre-
vent financial crises, it may moderate the responses of market participants
to bad news by helping them to anticipate and assess negative information.
In this way, transparency helps to mitigate panic and contagion.
A dichotomy exists between transparency and confidentiality. The
release of proprietary information may enable competitors to take
advantage of a particular situation, a fact that often deters market
participants from full disclosure. Similarly, monitoring bodies frequently
obtain confidential information from financial institutions, which can
have significant market implications. Under such circumstances, finan-
cial institutions may be reluctant to provide sensitive information with-
out the guarantee of client confidentiality. However, both unilateral
transparency and full disclosure contribute to a regime of transparency.
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If such a regime were to become the norm, it would ultimately benefit
all market participants, even if in the short term it would create
discomfort for individual entities.
TRANSPARENCY IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The objective of financial statements is generally to provide information
about an entity’s financial position (balance sheet), performance (income
statement), changes in financial position (cash flow statement), significant
risk exposures, and risk management practices (in the notes) to the entity’s
stakeholders. The transparency of financial statements is secured by pro-
viding full disclosure and fair presentation of the information necessary for
a wide range of users to make economic decisions. In the context of public
disclosure, financial statements should be easy to interpret. Widely avail-
able and affordable financial information supports official and private
monitoring of a business’s financial performance. It promotes transparency
and supports market discipline, two important ingredients of sound
corporate governance. Besides being a goal in itself, in that it empowers
stakeholders, disclosure could be a means to achieve better governance.
As can be expected, specific disclosure requirements vary among
regulators. Nonetheless, there are certain key principles whereby standards
should be evaluated (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2000).
These key principles are summarized in box 12.1.
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
has facilitated transparency and the proper interpretation of financial
statements. In 1989 the Framework for the Preparation and Presentation
of Financial Statements was included in the IFRS in order to accomplish
the following:
 Explain concepts underlying the preparation and presentation of
financial statements to external users;
 Guide those responsible for developing accounting standards;
 Assist preparers, auditors, and users in interpreting the IFRS and in
dealing with issues not yet covered by the standards.
According to international standards,financial statements are normally
prepared under the assumption that an entity will continue to operate as a
going concern and that events will be recorded on an accrual basis. In
other words, the effects of transactions and other events should be recog-
nized when they occur and be reported in the financial statements for the
periods to which they relate.
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Qualitative characteristics are those attributes that make the infor-
mation provided in financial statements useful. If comprehensive, useful
information does not exist, managers may not be aware of the true finan-
cial condition of the bank. Key governance players may be misled, which
would prevent the proper operation of market discipline. In contrast, the
application of key qualitative characteristics and appropriate accounting
standards normally results in financial statements that present a true and
fair picture.
Key qualitative characteristics are as follows:
 Relevance. Information must be relevant because it influences the
economic decisions of users by helping them to evaluate past, present,
and future events or to confirm or correct past assessments. The rele-
vance of information is determined by its nature and material quality.
Information overload can force players to sift through a plethora of
information for relevant details, making interpretation difficult.
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BOX 12.1 Criteria for Evaluating Accounting Standards
Effective accounting standards should satisfy three general criteria (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision 2000): Accounting standards should contribute to—or at least be con-
sistent with (and not hamper)—sound risk management and control practices in banks. They
should also provide a prudent and reliable framework for generating high-quality accounting
information in banks. Accounting standards should facilitate market discipline by promoting
transparent reporting of banks’ financial position and performance, risk exposures, and risk
management activities. Accounting standards should facilitate and not constrain the effective
supervision of banks.
In addition to the general criteria, disclosure should be sufficiently comprehensive to
allow assessment of a bank’s financial position and performance, risk exposures, and risk man-
agement activities. International accounting standards should be suitable for implementation
not only in the most advanced financial markets but also in emerging markets. 
Certain specific criteria underpin high-quality accounting. Accounting principles should
generate relevant and meaningful accounting information. They should generate prudent, real-
istic, and reliable measurements of financial position and performance and consistent meas-
urements of similar or related items.
In addition, there are certain internationally accepted criteria for accounting stan-
dards. Accounting standards should not only have a sound theoretical foundation, but also
be workable in practice. Accounting standards should not be overly complex in relation to
the issue addressed. They should be sufficiently precise to ensure consistent application,
and they should not allow alternative treatments. When alternative treatments are per-
mitted, or judgments are necessary in applying accounting principles, balanced disclosures
should be required.
 Faithful representation: Information should be free from material errors
and bias. The key aspects of faithful representation are reliability, pri-
ority of substance over form, neutrality, prudence, and completeness.
 Comparability. Information should be presented consistently over
time and be congruous with related information and with other entities
in order to enable users to make comparisons.
 Understandability. Information should be easily comprehensible by
users with reasonable knowledge of business, economics, and account-
ing as well as the willingness to study the information diligently.
The process of producing useful information comprises a number
of critical points to ensure the comprehensiveness of the information
provided:
 Timeliness. A delay in reporting may improve reliability, but compro-
mise relevance.
 Benefit versus cost. Benefits derived from information should normally
exceed the cost of providing it. Banks in developing countries often lack
adequate accounting systems and therefore have difficulty providing
relevant information. The level of sophistication of the target audience
is also important. Both of these aspects affect the costs and benefits of
improved disclosure. However, the mere fact that a bank does not have
an accounting system capable of producing useful information is not
an acceptable excuse for failing to provide markets with it.
 Balancing qualitative characteristics. Providers of information must
achieve an appropriate balance of qualitative characteristics to ensure
that financial statements are adequate for their particular environment.
In the context of fair presentation, it is better to disclose no infor-
mation than to disclose information that is misleading. It is therefore not
surprising that, when an entity does not comply with specific disclosure
requirements, the IFRS framework requires full disclosure of the fact and
the reasons for noncompliance. Figure 12.1 summarizes how trans-
parency is secured through the proper application of the concepts
contained in the IFRS framework.
DISCLOSURE AND DATA QUALITY
Disclosure requirements related to financial statements have tradition-
ally been a pillar of sound regulation. Disclosure is an effective mecha-
nism for exposing banks to market discipline and presenting quality
data, enabling reasonable financial risk analysis. Although a bank is
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normally subject to supervision and provides regulatory authorities
with information, this information is often confidential or market
sensitive and not always available to all categories of users. Disclosure
in financial statements should therefore be sufficiently comprehensive
to meet the needs of other users within the constraints of what can
reasonably be required. Improved transparency through better disclo-
sure may (but not necessarily) reduce the chances of a systemic bank-
ing crisis or the effects of contagion, since creditors and other market
participants will be better able to distinguish between the financial
circumstances facing different institutions or countries.
Users of financial statements need information to assist them in
evaluating a bank’s financial position and performance and in making
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FIGURE 12.1 Transparency in Financial Statements Achieved through Compliance
with the IFRS Framework
Objective of financial statements 
To provide a fair presentation of 
• Financial position 
• Financial performance 
• Cash flows 
Transparency and fair presentation 
• Fair presentation achieved through providing useful information (full disclosure),
which secures transparency 
• Fair presentation equals transparency 
Secondary objective of financial statements 
To secure transparency through a fair presentation of useful information
(full disclosure) for decision-making purposes
Attributes of useful information 
Existing framework
• Relevance 
• Faithful representation
• Comparability 
• Understandability 
Constraints
• Timeliness 
• Benefit versus cost 
• Balancing the qualitative characteristics 
Underlying assumptions 
Accrual basis Going concern 
economic decisions. Of key importance are a realistic valuation of assets,
including sensitivities to future events and adverse developments, and the
proper recognition of income and expenses. Equally important is the
evaluation of a bank’s entire risk profile, including on- and off-balance-
sheet items, capital adequacy, the capacity to withstand short-term pro-
blems, and the ability to generate additional capital. Users may also need
information to better understand the special characteristics of a bank’s
operations, in particular solvency and liquidity and the relative degree of
risk involved in various dimensions of the banking business.
The issuance of IFRS has followed developments in international
financial markets. Over time, the coverage of IFRS has been broadened
both to include new topics (for example, disclosure and presentation
related to the use of new financial instruments) and to enhance the existing
international standards.
Historically, Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) did
not place heavy burdens on banks to disclose their financial risk manage-
ment practices. This situation changed in the 1990s with the introduc-
tion of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 30 (scrapped with
introduction of IFRS 7) and IAS 32 (whose disclosure requirements
were transferred to IFRS 7). These standards, which are now largely
superseded by IFRS 7, resulted in the requirement on the part of many
financial regulators to adopt a “full disclosure” approach.
IAS 30 encouraged management to comment on financial statements
describing the way liquidity, solvency, and other risks associated with the
operations of a bank were managed and controlled. Although some bank-
ing risks may be reflected in financial statements, a commentary can help
users to understand their management. IFRS is applicable to all banks,
meaning all financial institutions that take deposits and borrow from the
general public with the objective of lending and investing and that fall within
the scope of banking-related or similar legislation. IAS 32 and IFRS 7
supplement other international accounting standards that also apply to
banks. The disclosure requirements, as well as other accounting standards
specific to banks, are derived from the IFRS framework. The standard
entitled Presentation of Financial Statements gives general guidance on
the basic principles, structure, and content of financial statements.
IFRS 7 aims to rectify some of the remaining gaps in financial 
risk disclosure by adding the following requirements to the existing
accounting standards:
 New disclosure requirements in respect of loans and receivables
designated as fair value through profit or loss;
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 The amount of change in the financial liability’s fair value that is not
attributable to changes in market conditions;
 The method used to determine the effects of the changes from a
benchmark interest rate;
 Where an impairment of a financial asset is recorded through an
allowance account (for example, a provision for doubtful debts as
opposed to a direct reduction to the carrying amount of the receiv-
able), a requirement to reconcile changes in carrying amounts in that
account during the period for each class of financial asset;
 The amount of ineffectiveness recognized in profit or loss on cash flow
hedges and hedges of net investments.
 Gains or losses in fair value hedges arising from remeasuring the hedging
instrument and on the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk;
 The net gain or loss on held-to-maturity investments, loans and
receivables, and financial liabilities measured at amortized cost.
In addition to the disclosures of IFRS 7, users need information that
enhances their understanding of the significance of on- and off-balance-
sheet financial instruments to a bank’s financial position, performance,
and cash flows. This information is necessary to assess the amount, timing,
and certainty of future cash flows associated with such instruments.
This is addressed under IAS 32, Financial Instruments: Disclosure,
which supplements other disclosure requirements and specifically
requires that disclosure be made in terms of the risks related to the
financial instrument. The specific objectives of the IFRS are to prescribe
requirements for the presentation of on-balance-sheet financial instru-
ments and to identify information that should be disclosed about both
on-balance-sheet (recognized) and off-balance-sheet (unrecognized)
financial instruments.
Although separate IFRS standards were issued (IAS 32, IAS 39, and
IFRS 7), they are applied in practice as a unit because they deal with
exactly the same accounting phenomenon. IAS 39, which deals with the
recognition and measurement of financial instruments, also contains
supplementary disclosures to those required by IAS 32. However, it is
constantly under review and should be regarded as a work in progress.
IAS 39 establishes principles for recognizing,measuring,and disclosing
information about financial instruments in the financial statements. The
standard significantly increases the use of fair value accounting for financial
instruments, particularly on the assets side of the balance sheet. Despite
the introduction of IAS 39, leading accounting standard setters are still
deliberating the advantages and disadvantages of introducing fair market
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value accounting for financial assets and liabilities as well as for the
corresponding risks. This process should foster a consistent, market-
based approach to measuring the risk related to various financial instru-
ments. However, without prudent and balanced standards for estimating
fair value, the use of a fair value model could reduce the reliability of
financial statements and increase the volatility of earnings and equity
measurements. This is particularly true when active markets do not exist,
as is often the case for loans, which frequently account for the lion’s share
of a bank’s assets.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision believes that the fair
value approach is appropriate in situations where it is workable—for
example, when financial instruments are being held for trading purposes.
It has expressed concern that some banks may be led to change how they
manage their risks as a consequence of applying IAS 39 to their hedging
strategies; in doing so, they would be deviating from the Basel-supported
principles for best-practice global risk management. Accounting stan-
dards should contribute to sound risk management practices and take
into account the ways in which trading and banking books are actually
managed—not the reverse. However, financial statements should also
reflect the reality of transactions in a conceptually consistent manner, and
this objective will always produce a certain amount of tension between
accountants and practitioners.
Current international accounting standards provide a solid and
transparent basis for the development of national disclosure require-
ments. These standards already require banks to disclose extensive
information on all of the categories of risk that have been addressed
here, adding transparency to the presentation of financial statements.
DEFICIENCIES IN ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
For several years, but especially in the wake of the East Asian financial
crises of the late 1990s, criticism has been voiced regarding deficiencies
in bank accounting that have resulted in the incomplete and inadequate
presentation of financial information in annual financial reports. Market
participants perceive the opacity of financial information not only as
official oversight but also as the Achilles’ heel of effective corporate
governance and market discipline. Market participants need a wide range
of economic and financial information for decision-making purposes
and therefore react negatively to poor disclosure.
There seems to be a perception among market participants and
the general public that the lack of adequate information about a bank’s
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financial position, results, and cash flow are the result of insufficient
accounting standards. This misperception seems to stem from general
ignorance of the sound accounting standards that already exist.
Contrary to popular belief among non-accountants, the predomi-
nant problem is not always a lack of sound and adequate accounting stan-
dards, but rather the fact that regulatory and accounting authorities do
not enforce the principles underlying existing standards. In fact, the
establishment of disclosure requirements is not sufficient in and of itself.
Disclosure requirements have to be accompanied by active regulatory
enforcement—and perhaps even fraud laws—to ensure that the infor-
mation disclosed is complete, timely, and not deliberately misleading.
Regulatory institutions need to have adequate enforcement capacities.
Both banks and their external auditors may lack proper incentives to
disclose more than the regulatory authorities and market discipline
demand of them. Market participants, as well as rating agencies, could
therefore make a valuable contribution to improving the level of trans-
parency in financial reporting by demanding comprehensive, full disclo-
sure. They could also demonstrate a direct link between investor confidence
and transparent disclosure. In addition, disclosure could be improved by
peer pressure. A bank’s competitors could demonstrate that disclosure is
advantageous to an institution because investors and depositors are more
likely to provide capital and deposits at lower prices to transparent entities
than to nontransparent ones.
A frequent problem with disclosure, especially that which involves a
new system, is the hesitancy of a bank’s management and supervisors, as
well as market participants, to disclose highly negative information. Such
information, which has the strongest potential to trigger a market reaction,
typically is disclosed at the last possible moment and is often incomplete.
Even professional members of the public, such as rating agencies, may be
slow to react to and disclose potential problems (see box 12.2 for a survey
on public disclosure of banks).
APPLICABILITY OF IFRS TO ISLAMIC BANKS
Islamic banks, however, face a specific problem regarding the applicability
of the accounting standards designed for conventional types of business. A
number of International Financial Reporting Standards are not applicable
to Islamic banks, and issues arise in Islamic finance for which no IFRS exist.
In 1990 the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Finan-
cial Institutions (AAOIFI) was created to address this issue and create an
adequate level of transparency in the financial reporting of Islamic banks.
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BOX 12.2 Survey on Public Disclosure of Banks
The following is based on a survey of banks conducted by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2002).
Most banks disclosed basic information relating to capital structure and ratios, account-
ing and presentation policies, credit risk, and market risk. Fewer than half of the banks dis-
closed information about credit risk modeling, credit derivatives, and securitization. The most
notable increases in disclosure involved questions about complex capital instruments, policies
and procedures for setting credit risk allowances, securitization, and operational and legal
risks, although disclosure regarding securitization was rare.  
Most banks released fundamental quantitative data pertinent to their capital structure.
While they were less forthcoming about their holdings of innovative and complex capital
instruments, the rate of disclosure in this area has generally been improving. 
The risk-based capital ratio was almost always disclosed, but fewer than half of the
banks provided information on the credit and market risks against which the capital serves
as a buffer. Most banks made fairly extensive disclosures about their use of internal models
for market risk. The main opportunity for future improvement involves the results of stress
testing. 
Just over half of the banks described fully their process for assessing credit exposures,
and only a few more provided summary information on the use of internal ratings. Fewer
than half provided basic information about their credit risk models. These areas of disclo-
sure will become more important under the proposed revision of the Basel Capital Accord,
as banks will have to disclose key information regarding the use of internal ratings to qual-
ify for the proposed internal ratings-based approach. In this regard, the large improvement
in the disclosure of the internal risk-rating process since the 1999 survey is encouraging. In
the area of asset securitization, fewer than half of the banks provided even the most basic
information regarding the amount and types of assets securitized and the associated
accounting treatment. 
Most banks disclosed key quantitative information concerning credit risk, another
area with required disclosures. Disclosures of provisioning policies and procedures are
improving. About half of the banks discussed the techniques they use to manage impaired
assets. However, only a small number of banks disclosed the effect of their use of credit
risk mitigants. 
Approximately three-fourths of banks discussed their objectives for derivatives and their
strategies for hedging risk. The proportion of banks making quantitative disclosures was lower,
and trends here are mixed. Approximately two-fifths of banks that use credit derivatives dis-
closed their strategy and objectives for the use of these instruments, as well as the amount
outstanding. However, few provided more detailed information. 
While approximately four-fifths of banks provided breakdowns of their trading activities
by type of instrument, somewhat fewer provided information about the diversification of their
credit risks. Fewer than half supplied a categorical breakdown of problem credits. 
There was a dramatic increase in the rate of disclosures of operational and legal risks
since the first survey, although the level was still lower than that for more basic market and
credit risk information. Basic accounting policies and practices were generally well
disclosed. 
AAOIFI has made a number of important contributions, including the
issuance of accounting and auditing standards (see box 12.3).
Between 1998 and 2002, Bahrain, Sudan, and Jordan adopted
accounting standards issued by AAOIFI, and Qatar issued accounting
standards based on AAOIFI pronouncements. Saudi Arabia requires
banks to report according to IFRS and local Saudi standards based on
IFRS, but in 2001 banks were asked to review AAOIFI’s standards for
guidance when accounting for Islamic banking products. While these
banks still report using IFRS and Saudi local standards, they now have the
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BOX 12.3 AAOIFI Standards
The following standards are available on the AAOIFI Web site (www.AAOIFI.com): 
Financial Accounting Statements
• Objective of Financial Accounting of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions 
• Concepts of Financial Accounting for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions 
Financial Accounting Standards
• General Presentation and Disclosure in the Financial Statements of Islamic Banks and
Financial Institutions 
• Murabahah and Murabahah to the Purchase Orderer 
• Mudarabah Financing 
• Musharakah Financing 
• Disclosure of Bases for Profit Allocation between Owners’ Equity and Investment Account
Holders and Their Equivalent 
• Salam and Parallel Salam
• Ijarah and Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek
• Istisnah and Parallel Istisnah
• Zakah 
• Provisions and Reserves 
• General Presentation and Disclosure in Financial Statements of Islamic Insurance Com-
panies
• Disclosure of Bases for Determining and Allocating Surplus or Deficit in Islamic Insurance
Companies 
• Investment Funds 
• Provisions and Reserves in Islamic Insurance Companies 
• Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Operations 
• Investments 
• Islamic Financial Services offered by Conventional Financial Institutions 
• Contributions in Islamic Insurance Companies 
• Deferred Payment Sale 
• Disclosure on Transfer of Assets
• Segment Reporting 
additional benefit of AAOIFI’s standards for their Shariah-based trans-
actions. Indonesia has formed a national body within the Indonesian
Accounting Association to prepare and issue Islamic Accounting Stan-
dards based on those of AAOIFI, and individual banks in countries such
as Kuwait and United Arab Emirates have begun to train staff in the use
of AAOIFI’s accounting standards.
TRANSPARENCY AND ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The issues of transparency are especially relevant for Islamic financial
institutions due to the private equity nature of certain Islamic instru-
ments and the assumption that these investment account holders have
greater incentives than conventional depositors to monitor Islamic bank
performance directly. However, an institutional infrastructure is needed
to facilitate the production of accurate financial information, the devel-
opment of agents that can interpret and disseminate it, as well as arrange-
ments to protect its integrity. Islamic banks have made considerable
efforts to improve the level of transparency and the quality of informa-
tion disclosed in the market in recent years. However, several areas still
require attention.
In May 2007 the Islamic Financial Services Board issued Exposure
Draft no. 4, which deals with “disclosures to promote transparency and
market discipline for institutions offering Islamic financial services.” The
exposure draft clearly states that the need for transparency is, above all,
an important Shariah consideration as any form of concealment, fraud,
or attempt at misrepresentation violates the principles of justice and fair-
ness as mentioned in the Qur’an.
The IFSB makes it clear that the intended standard builds on both the
guidelines and principles issued by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision as well as the disclosure standards contained in Pillar 3 of the
new Basel Capital Accord (see chapter 13). In addition, it is intended that
the requirements of relevant international accounting (financial report-
ing) standards will be complemented when the exposure draft becomes
a standard itself.
Weaknesses in the Current System of Disclosure
Analysts often have difficulty collecting useful information regarding
Islamic financial institutions. Contributing to this problem is the lack of
uniform reporting standards by the institutions themselves (see table 12.1
for the disclosure practices of Islamic banks). For example, in a survey
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conducted by the authors of nine Islamic banks for which balance sheet
data were easily available, one bank did not provide sufficient details as
to the division of equity and deposits, while the remaining eight did.
However, when it came to deposits, only five provided a detailed division
of the type of deposits they offer, while the remaining three lumped
together different types of deposits. For these three types of deposits, two
made no specific reference to special investment accounts, while the other
one made no distinction between demand and savings deposits.
Several early studies on the regulation and supervision of Islamic
banks note that an appropriate regulatory framework needs to place
greater emphasis on accounting standards and information disclosure.
Errico and Farabakash (1998) suggest a supervisory framework based on
the standards and best practices established by the Basel Committee and
an Islamic finance–tailored prudential framework based on the CAMEL
(capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity)
system. Errico and Sundarajan (2002) reinforce this view by recom-
mending the creation of a regulatory framework created along the same
lines as a CAMEL framework and the adoption of a Securities and
Exchange Commission type of disclosure system. The AAOIFI has
promulgated a Statement on the Purpose and Calculations of Capital
Adequacy Ratio (CAR) for Islamic Banks, which takes into account
differences between deposit accounts in conventional banking and
investment accounts in Islamic banking.1 This statement builds on the
capital adequacy principles laid down by the Basel Committee (see also
Chapra and Khan 2000; Mulajawan, Dar, and Hall 2002). Archer and
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TABLE 12.1 Disclosure Practices of Islamic Banks
Disclosure item Practice
Deposit composition: Share of Generally disclosed, ranging from 0 to 95 percent, with some
investment deposits to banks (36 percent) reporting no investment deposits
total deposits
Return on restricted investment Very few disclose this (only one bank in the sample)
deposits
Risk management framework Disclosures are presented at a very general level; some mention
and practices the existence of specific committees, such as an asset-liability
management committee
Value-at-risk (VAR) None discloses this (one bank reports using VAR)
Large exposures Very few banks disclose this (6 percent)
Source: Sundararajan (2004).
Ahmed (2003) point out features of Islamic finance that require specific
accounting, corporate governance, and prudential regulations. They
note issues regarding the applicability of the IAS to Islamic banks and
further describe efforts undertaken, notably by AAOIFI, to create
accounting and auditing regulations, standardize Shariah interpreta-
tions, and establish capital adequacy ratios for Islamic banks.
Demarcation of Equity and Depositors’ Funds
Islamic banks are hybrids of both commercial and investment banks,
making them more akin to universal banks. Unlike conventional universal
banks, Islamic banks do not erect firewalls to separate legally, financially,
and managerially their investment and commercial banking services. As a
result, investment account funds are not “ring-fenced” from the funds of
others, including equity holders. This commingling of funds is of concern
to all stakeholders since it becomes difficult to identify the source of funds
invested when the time comes to distribute the profits and losses.
Transparency in Shariah Rulings
A transparent financial institution ideally would reveal the duties, decision
making, competence, and composition of the Shariah board as well as
publish all fatwas (religious proclamations) issued by the board. This
would strengthen stakeholders’ confidence in the credibility of Shariah
board assessments. In addition, public disclosure would provide a venue
for educating the public, paving the way for market discipline to play a
larger role with respect to Shariah compliance. Again, this aspect of trans-
parency is missing from the market. Often the annual reports of a Shariah
board are not readily available to the public, and other relevant informa-
tion regarding fatwas issued by a Shariah board are not available at all.
The use of quantitative methods could enhance the level of financial
disclosure by producing enhanced measures of risk exposures, especially
in the area of credit and equity risk.
NOTE
1. See also Mulajawan, Dar, and Hall (2002) for a discussion of the issue and a
suggestion for a modified capital adequacy ratio.
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Almost every aspect of banking is influenced either directly or indi-rectly by the availability of capital. This is one of the key factors to be
considered when assessing the safety and soundness of a particular bank.
An adequate base of capital serves as a safety net for a variety of risks to
which an institution is exposed in the course of its business. Capital
absorbs possible losses and thus provides a basis for maintaining the con-
fidence of depositors. Capital also is the ultimate determinant of a bank’s
lending capacity. A bank’s balance sheet cannot be expanded beyond the
level determined by its capital adequacy ratio (CAR); the availability of
capital consequently determines the maximum level of assets.
The cost and amount of capital affect a bank’s competitive position.
Because shareholders expect a return on their equity, the obligation to earn
it affects the pricing of bank products. There is another market perspective
as well. In order to create assets, a bank needs to attract deposits (investment
accounts and special investment accounts) from the public. Doing so
requires public confidence in the bank,which in turn can best be established
and maintained by a capital buffer. If a bank faces a shortage of capital, or if
the cost of capital is high, the bank stands to lose business to its competitors.
The key purposes of capital are to provide stability and to absorb
losses, thereby providing a measure of protection to depositors and other
creditors in the event of liquidation. As such, the capital of a bank should
have three important characteristics:
 Be permanent;
 Not impose mandatory fixed charges against earnings;
 Allow for legal subordination to the rights of depositors and other
creditors.
The total amount of capital is of fundamental importance. Also
important is the nature of bank ownership, specifically the identity of
owners who can directly influence the bank’s strategic direction and risk
management policies. A bank’s ownership structure must ensure the
integrity of the bank’s capital and be able to supply more capital if and
when needed. It must not negatively influence the bank’s capital position
or expose it to additional risk. In addition to owners who are less than fit
and proper or who do not discharge their fiduciary responsibilities effec-
tively, the structure of a financial conglomerate may also have a negative
impact on the capital of banks in the group.
SIGNIFICANCE OF CAPITAL IN BANKING
Conventional bank capital consists of equity capital, retained reserves,
and certain non-deposit liabilities. It is both a means of funding
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Key Messages
• Capital is required as a buffer against unexpected losses. 
• Capital cannot be a substitute for good management. 
• A strong base of permanent shareholders’ equity and disclosed reserves, supplemented by other
forms of qualifying capital (for example, undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provi-
sions for loan losses, hybrid instruments, and subordinated debt) is needed. 
• Capital requirements are different for Islamic banks as recognized by AAOIFI and the IFSB. The
IFSB standard on capital requirement provides a framework to determine adequacy of capital for
Islamic banks.
• Capital adequacy percentage requirements must be seen as a minimum. In transitional or volatile
environments, a risk-weighted capital adequacy requirement of substantially more than 10 per-
cent would be more appropriate. 
• Supervisory authority must be willing to set different capital levels for individual banks depend-
ing on the specific risk profiles and a bank’s capacity to identify, measure, monitor, and control
its risks. 
• The amount of capital held by a bank must be commensurate with its level of risk. It is manage-
ment and the board’s responsibility to, first, evaluate the bank’s risk profile and, second, to equate
capital to risk. The board of directors also has a responsibility to project capital requirements to
determine whether or not current growth and capital retention are sustainable.
earnings-generating assets and a stability cushion. From the perspective
of efficiency and returns, capital is part of a bank’s sources of funding
that can be applied directly to the purchase of revenue-earning assets as
well as be used to raise other funds, with the net benefit accruing to
shareholders. From the perspective of stability, bank capital is a cushion
for absorbing shocks of business losses and maintaining solvency, with
benefits accruing to depositors and other stakeholders. Both financial
intermediaries and regulators are sensitive to the dual role of capital.
Financial intermediaries tend to be more focused on the earnings-
generating role, while regulators tend to be more focused on the stability-
cushion role.
A bank’s capital structure relates to the ratio of capital to deposits and
the ratio of debt capital to equity capital. Its performance, in terms of
return on equity capital, is influenced by its ability to calibrate the level
of capital required. Efficient risk management can enable the bank to
choose a capital structure that allows it to (a) achieve profitability while
maintaining stability; (b) reassure markets as to the quality of its business
conduct; and (c) have a constructive dialogue with regulators.
Banks have a relatively low ratio of capital to externally provided
funding. To encourage prudent management of the risks associated with
this unique balance sheet structure, regulatory authorities in most countries
have introduced certain capital adequacy requirements. In the late 1980s,
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision took the lead in developing
a risk-based capital adequacy standard that would lead to international
convergence of supervisory regulations governing the capital adequacy of
internationally active banks. The dual objectives for the Basel framework
were to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking
system and, by ensuring a high degree of consistency in the framework’s
application, to diminish the sources of competitive inequality among
international banks.
Thinking along the lines of Basel and recognizing the differences
in the nature of intermediation by Islamic banks, the Accounting and
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)
drafted a basic standard on capital adequacy of Islamic financial institu-
tions. This standard was further enhanced by the Islamic Financial Services
Board (IFSB). In December 2006, a working group of the IFSB issued the
first capital adequacy standard for institutions (other than insurance
institutions) offering only Islamic financial services. The minimum capital
adequacy requirements for both credit and market risks are set out for
each of the Shariah-compliant financing and investment instruments.
Like for conventional financial institutions, in the IFSB standard the
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minimum capital adequacy requirement for Islamic banks is not lower
than 8 percent for total capital.
BASEL I AND BASEL II
The 1980s’ initiative resulted in the Basel Capital Accord of 1988 (Basel
I). The Basel Accord comprises a definition of regulatory capital, meas-
ures of risk exposure, and rules specifying the level of capital to be main-
tained in relation to these risks. It introduced a de facto capital adequacy
standard, based on the risk-weighted composition of a bank’s assets and
off-balance-sheet exposures that ensures that an adequate amount of
capital and reserves is maintained to safeguard solvency. While the orig-
inal targets were international banks, many national authorities
promptly applied the Basel Accord and introduced formal regulatory
capital requirements. Since the introduction of the risk-based capital
adequacy standard, risk-based capital ratios have increased significantly
in all countries that have adopted the standard: the industry average for
the G-10 countries increased from 9.3 percent in 1988 to 11.2 percent in
1996. (However, the differences in fiscal treatment and accounting pre-
sentations of certain classes of provisions for loan losses and of capital
reserves derived from retained earnings may still distort the compara-
bility of the real capital positions of banks from different countries.)
The standard also has played a major role in improving the safety of
banking systems in less developed countries and in transitional economies.
The capital adequacy standard has been adopted and implemented in
more than 100 countries and now forms an integral part of any risk-based
bank supervisory approach. Aware that the banking environment in these
countries entails higher economic and market risks, many regulators have
introduced even higher standards, with 12 to 15 percent often regarded
as appropriate for transitional and developing environments.
The world financial system has seen considerable changes since
introduction of the Basel I Accord. Financial markets have become more
volatile, and a significant degree of financial innovation has taken place.
There also have been incidents of economic turbulence leading to wide-
spread financial crisis—for example, in Asia in 1997 and in Eastern
Europe in 1998. The risks that internationally active banks must deal with
have become more complex. There was an increasing concern that the
Basel I Accord did not provide an effective means to ensure that capital
requirements match a bank’s true risk profile; in other words, it was not
sufficiently risk sensitive. The risk measurement and control aspects of the
Basel I Accord also needed to be improved. In 1999 the Basel Committee
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started consultations leading to issuance of a new Capital Accord (Basel
II) that is better attuned to the complexities of the modern financial
world. While the new framework aims to provide a more comprehensive
approach to measuring banking risks, its fundamental objectives remain
the same: to promote safety and soundness of the banking system and to
enhance the competitive equality of banks.
By 2005, the development of the Basel II Accord had been com-
pleted. A significant aspect of the Basel II Accord is the greater use of
the banks’ internal systems as an input to capital assessment and
adequacy calculations and the allowance of more national discretion in
determining how specific rules may be applied. This was intended to
adapt the standards to different conditions in national financial mar-
kets. In addition to minimum capital requirements, Basel II Accord
includes two additional pillars: an enhanced supervisory review process
and effective use of market discipline. All three pillars are mutually rein-
forcing and no one pillar should be viewed as more important than
another. The countries with well-developed financial systems, which
actively participated in its development, are expected to begin adopting
Basel II in the course of 2009. Supervisory authorities worldwide are
being encouraged to start the procedure, although this may take some
time. The Basel II Accord is expected to become a de facto capital
adequacy standard in the next year or so. The following discussion is
based on and related to Basel II Accord.
PILLAR 1: CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENT
The capital adequacy requirement constitutes Pillar 1 under the Basel II
Accord. The capital adequacy standard is based on the principle that the
level of a bank’s capital should be related to the bank’s specific risk profile.
Measurement of the capital adequacy requirement is determined by three
components of risk—credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. For
each of these components, a number of models can be used. In principle,
these include some form of standardized approach and an approach
based on internal systems.
The risk management arrangements of Islamic banks thus bear on
their ability to calibrate capital to their business objectives and risk toler-
ance, to deal with market discipline, and to maintain a dialogue with
regulators. Their characteristic of mobilizing funds in the form of risk-
sharing investment accounts in place of conventional deposits, together
with the materiality of financing transactions, may alter the overall risk of
the balance sheet and, consequently, the assessment of their capital
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requirements. Indeed, risk-sharing “deposits” would, in principle, reduce
the need for a safety cushion with which to weather adverse investment
outcomes. Similarly, the materiality of investments is likely to modify the
extent of their risk and have a bearing on the assessment of the overall
need for capital; asset-based modes of finance may be less risky, and profit-
sharing modes more risky, than conventional interest-bearing modes.
Nevertheless, Islamic banks operate within a regulatory framework that is
likely to impose on them capital requirements with a view to promoting
stability and limiting contagion risks (Grais and Anoma 2007).
Defining what constitutes capital is a long-debated issue. However,
there is wide acceptance of the capital structure that has been stipulated
by the Basel Committee, which segregates capital into three categories, as
set out in table 13.1.
To be considered adequately capitalized, international banks in the
G-10 countries are required to hold a minimum total capital (Tier 1 and
Tier 2) equal to 8 percent of risk-adjusted assets. Tier 1 capital is the
same in Islamic banks as in conventional financial institutions. However,
in Islamic banks the reserves include the shareholders’ portion of the
profit equalization reserve (PER), which is included in disclosed
reserves.1 In Tier 2 capital, there are no hybrid capital instruments or
subordinated debts, as these would bear interest and contravene Shariah
principles. However, an issue is the treatment of unrestricted risk-sharing
investment accounts, which may be viewed as equity investments on a
limited-term basis.
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TABLE 13.1 Classification of Capital in the Basel Accords
Classification Contents
Tier 1 (core capital) Ordinary paid-up share of capital or common stock, disclosed
reserves from post-tax retained earnings, noncumulative
perpetual preferred stock (goodwill to be deducted)
Tier 2 (supplementary capital) Undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, general
provisions or general loan-loss provisions, hybrid (debt-equity)
capital instruments, and subordinated term debtsa
Tier 3 Unsecured debt: subordinated and fully paid up, to have an
original maturity of at least two years and not be repayable
before the agreed repayment date unless the supervisory
authority agreesb
a. Eligible Tier 2 capital may not exceed total Tier 1 capital, and long-term subordinated debt may not exceed 
50 percent of Tier 1 capital.
b. This will be limited to 250 percent of a bank’s Tier 1 capital, which is required to support market risks.
CAPITAL ADEQUACY METHODOLOGY FOR ISLAMIC BANKS
Unlike depositors of conventional banks, the contractual agreement
between Islamic banks and investment account holders is based on the
concept of sharing profit and loss, which makes investment account hold-
ers a unique class of quasi-liability holders: they are neither depositors
nor equity holders. Although they are not part of the bank’s capital, they
are expected to absorb all losses on the investments made through their
funds, unless there is evidence of negligence or misconduct on the part of
the bank. The nature of intermediation and liabilities has serious impli-
cations for the determination of adequate capital for Islamic banks (Grais
and Kulathunga 2007):
 Deposits taken on the basis of profit- and loss-sharing agreements
should not be subject to any capital requirements other than to cover
liability for negligence and misconduct and winding-down expenses.
 Investments funded by current accounts carry commercial banking risks
and should be subject to adequate risk weights and capital allocation.
 Restricted investment accounts on the liabilities side form a collection
of heterogeneous investment funds resembling a fund of funds; there-
fore, financial institutions holding such funds should be subject to the
same capital requirements as are applicable to fund managers.
 The presence of displaced commercial risk and the practice of income
smoothing have indirect implications for the Islamic bank’s capital
adequacy, which a regulator may take into account when determining
the CAR.
 Islamic banks acting as intermediary can face a moral hazard issue.
Since, as agent, the bank is not liable for losses but shares the profits
with the investment account holder, it may have an incentive to max-
imize the investments funded by the account holder and to attract
more account holders than it has the capacity to handle. This can lead
to investment decisions that are riskier than the investment account
holder is willing to accept. Such “incentive misalignment” may lead to
higher displaced commercial risk, which necessitates higher capital
requirements.
Capital requirement standards have been developed for Islamic banks
adapting conventional Basel approaches. In December 2006, the Islamic
Financial Services Board issued a capital adequacy standard based on
the Basel II standardized approach, with a similar approach to risk
weights. While the modes of intermediation, financial instruments, and
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risks may differ between Islamic and conventional financial institutions,
the general approach is applicable to both types of financial intermedi-
aries. A better-circumscribed economic capital can allow Islamic banks
to manage their resources more efficiently, while providing comfort to
their stakeholders. A major difference between Islamic banks and con-
ventional banks relates to investment account deposits. For Islamic banks,
the expected losses would be borne by the income, and so the risk cap-
ital needed to meet unexpected losses may be less for Islamic banks than
for conventional banks.
Theoretically, Islamic banks accept investment deposits that are risk-
sharing contracts.The Islamic financial intermediary,as an agent (mudarib),
would share profits with the depositor, but the depositor would bear
losses that are the outcome of market conditions, but not of a mudarib’s
misconduct. Hence the risk-sharing feature of investment account
deposits would reduce the overall risks for Islamic banks in principle.
Under the circumstances, and going back to the murabahah contract, an
Islamic bank would be expected to conduct business in such a way as to deal
with expected losses, pricing its products and accumulating provisions
accordingly. The Islamic bank would identify economic capital to deal
with unexpected losses that are due primarily to misconduct.Unanticipated
adverse events that are beyond the reasonable anticipation of the bank
would not be cushioned, as profit-sharing investment account “depositors”
would share the losses attributable to the assets (or the proportion of
assets) financed by their funds.
Determination of Risk Weights
Assigning risk weights to different asset classes reflects the contractual
relationship between the bank and the borrower. For conventional banks,
most assets are based on debt, whereas for Islamic banks, the assets range
from trade financing to equity partnerships; this fact changes the nature
of risks. Some instruments carry additional risks that are not present in
conventional lending instruments. Therefore, the calculation of risk
weights is different for Islamic banks than for conventional banks:
(a) assets based on trade are not truly financial assets and carry risks
other than credit and market risks; (b) nonfinancial assets such as real
estate, commodities, and ijarah and istisnah contracts have special risk
characteristics; (c) Islamic banks carry partnership and profit- and loss-
sharing assets that have a higher risk profile; (d) Islamic banks do not
have well-defined instruments for mitigating and hedging risk, such as
derivatives, which raises the overall riskiness of assets.
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In the case of partnership-based contracts such as mudarabah and
musharakah, the bank is exposed to both credit and market risks that need
to be analyzed in a similar manner to the methodology of the Basel accords.
When such partnership-based assets are acquired in the form of tangible
assets—that is, commodities—and are held for trading, the only exposure
is to market risk because credit risk is minimized by direct ownership of the
assets. However, there is significant risk of capital impairment when direct
investment takes place in partnership-based contracts and the investments
will be held to maturity. Treatment of this risk within the Basel framework
is not straightforward and therefore requires special attention.
This standard comprehensively discusses the nature of risks and the
appropriate risk weights to be used for different assets (see box 13.1).
The standard deals with the minimum capital adequacy requirements
for both credit and market risks for seven Shariah-compliant financing
and investment instruments: (a) murabahah, (b) salaam, (c) istisnah,
(d) ijarah, (e) musharakah and diminishing musharakah, (f) mudarabah,
and (g) sukuk. The discussion of each contract includes risk weights for
credit and market risks.
The IFSB standard is defined in two forms: standard and discre-
tionary. In the standard formula, capital is divided by risk-weighted assets
excluding the assets financed by investment account holders (see box
13.2). The size of the risk-weighted assets is determined for the credit risk
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The minimum capital adequacy requirements for Islamic banks shall be a CAR of not
lower than 8 percent of total capital. Tier 2 capital is limited to 100 percent of Tier 1 capital. 
In calculating the CAR, the regulatory capital as the numerator shall be calculated in rela-
tion to the total risk-weighted assets as the denominator. The total of risk-weighted assets is
determined by multiplying the capital requirements for market risk and operational risk by 12.5
(which is the reciprocal of the minimum CAR of 8 percent) and adding the resulting figures to the
sum of risk-weighted assets computed for credit risk.
The Shariah rules and principles whereby investment account holders provide funds to the
Islamic bank on the basis of profit-sharing and loss-bearing mudarabah contracts instead of
debt-based deposits mean that investment account holders would share in the profits of a
successful operation but could lose all or part of their investment. The liability of investment
account holders is limited to the capital provided, and the potential loss of the Islamic bank is
restricted to the value or opportunity cost of its work.
However, if negligence, mismanagement, or fraud can be proven, the Islamic bank is finan-
cially liable for the capital of the account holders. Therefore, account holders normally bear the
credit and market risks of the investment, while the Islamic bank bears the operational risk.
BOX 13.1 IFSB Principles for Minimum Capital Adequacy Requirements (CAR)
first and then adjusted to accommodate for the market and operational
risks. To determine the adjustment, the capital requirements for market
risk and operational risk are multiplied by 12.5, which is the reciprocal
ratio (1 / 0.08) of the minimum CAR of 8 percent.
The second formula, referred to as the supervisory discretion formula,
is modified to accommodate the existence of reserves maintained by
Islamic banks to minimize displaced commercial, withdrawal, and sys-
temic risks (see box 13.3). In markets where Islamic banks maintain PER
and investment risk reserves (IRR), the supervisory authorities are given
discretion to adjust the denominator of the CAR formula for them.
Supervisors may adjust the formula according to their judgment of the
systemic risk and prevalent practices.
In the discretionary formula, the supervisory authority has the dis-
cretion to include a specified percentage (represented by α in the formula)
of assets financed by investment account holders in the denominator of
the CAR. The percentage set by the supervisory authority is applied to
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BOX 13.2 IFSB Standard Formula for CAR
Eligible capital
Total risk-weighted assets Total risk-weighted assets 
PLUS MINUS funded by profit-sharing 
Operational risk investment accounts
Notes: Risk weighting includes weights for market and credit risk. Profit-sharing investment 
account balances include PER and IRR.
Eligible capital
Total risk-weighted assets 1. (1 – a )* Total risk-weighted assets 
PLUS funded by profit-sharing investment 
Operational risk MINUS accounts
2. a* Risk-weighted assets funded by
PER and IRR
Notes: Risk weighting includes weights for market and credit risk. Profit-sharing investment account bal-
ances include PER and IRR. a refers to the proportion of assets funded by PSIAs, which is to be deter-
mined by the supervisory authorities. The value of a normally does not exceed 30 percent.
BOX 13.3 IFSB Supervisory Discretion Formula for CAR
assets financed by holders of both unrestricted and restricted investment
accounts. Further adjustment is made for PER and IRR in such a man-
ner that a certain fraction of the risk-weighted assets funded by the
reserves is deducted from the denominator. The rationale given for this
adjustment is that these reserves reduce the displaced commercial risk.
As Basel II takes into account the capital requirements for opera-
tional risk, IFSB’s draft on exposure also deals with the issue in detail.
Due to difficulties in quantifying the exposures from operational risk,
determination of how much capital should be allocated for such risks
also becomes complex. The IFSB draft recommends basing the pro-
posed measurement of capital to be allocated to operational risk on
either the basic indicator approach or the standardized approach.2 It is
further recommended that, due to the structure of the line of business
for Islamic banks, at the present stage, Islamic banks may use the basic
indicator approach.
Risk Weights and CAR for Credit Risk
Although the general framework for determining capital requirements in the
Basel and IFSB methodology is similar, there are differences in application
and determination of weights due to differences in intermediation and
instruments.Table 13.2 provides an overview of differences in the approaches
taken by Basel II and IFSB.
Figure 13.1 provides a fairly good picture of the mechanics of deter-
mining risk weights required to assess the adequate level of capital for an
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TABLE 13.2 Capital Adequacy Standards for Credit Risk: Basel II versus IFSB
Criteria Basel II IFSB
Risk weight Calibrated on the basis of external Calibrated on the basis of external
ratings by the Basel committee ratings by the Basel Committee; varies
according to contract stage and 
financing mode
Treatment of equity in > 150 percent for venture capital Simple risk weight method (risk weight 
the banking book and private equity investments 300 or 400 percent) or supervisory slotting
method (risk weight 90–270 percent)
Credit risk mitigation Includes financial collateral, credit Includes profit-sharing investment 
techniques derivatives, guarantees, netting accounts (PSIA), or cash on deposits 
(on and off balance sheet) with Islamic banks, guarantees, financial
collateral, and pledged assets
Source: Jabbari (2006).
Islamic bank. A standardized approach can be taken where an external
assessment of credit ratings is available. For investments based on profit
sharing or loss bearing, the institution can use either a simple risk-weight
method or a slotting method. Risk weights determined through these
different approaches are multiplied with the next exposure, excluding any
collateral against an asset.
Risk Weights and CAR for Market Risk
Table 13.3 compares the treatment of market risk in the Basel II and IFSB
standards. The main differences are that IFSB’s standard includes market
risk of inventories for the measurement of weights; it allows certain
standardized methods of measurement.
IFSB standard lays down an elaborated mechanism for determining
market risks weights assignments (see figure 13.2).
Risk Weights and CAR for Operational Risk
The IFSB standard for determining risk weights for operational risk
recommends excluding the share of profit-sharing investment account
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FIGURE 13.1 Framework for Measuring Credit Risk Weights 
Risk weights based on external credit assessments (RW)
Individual claims based
on external assessment
Standardized
approach
Investments in profit-/loss-sharing
modes
Simple risk
weight method
Slotting
method
RW * Net exposure
(adjusted for collateral)
Credit risk weight assignment =
Source: Jabbari (2006).
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Table 13.3 Capital Adequacy Standards for Market Risk: Basel II versus IFSB
Criteria Basel II IFSB 
Category Equity, foreign exchange, Equity, foreign exchange, interest rate risk in 
interest rate risk in the trading the trading book, commodities, inventories
book, commodities
Measurement 1996 market risk amendments 1996 market risk amendments (standardized 
(standardized and internal model) measurement method)
Source: Jabbari (2006).
FIGURE 13.2 Framework for Measuring Market Risk Weights 
Market risk capital requirement (MRCR) 
Market rate weight assignment = 12.5 * MRCR
Equity position,
sukuk 
Foreign
exchange
Commodity/
inventory
Standardized approach
Maturity
ladder
Simplified
Directional
Forward gap
Basis
Single currency 
Portfolio General market
Specific
Source: Jabbari (2006).
holders from gross income. This adjustment is necessary because Islamic
banks share profits with their depositors-investors (see table 13.4).
CAR Based on IFSB Methodology: An Example
Box 13.4 illustrates a very simple approach to determining the capital
adequacy requirement for a hypothetical Islamic bank.
PILLAR 2: SUPERVISORY REVIEW
Supervisory review is the second pillar of Basel II and a critical part of
the capital adequacy framework. The supervisory review has two objec-
tives: to assess whether the banks maintain adequate capital necessary
for the risks inherent in their business profile and business environ-
ment and to encourage banks to have policies and internal processes for
Capital Adequacy and Basel II
231
Liabilities:
Demand deposits $200M
Unrestricted investment account deposits $500M
Restricted investment account deposits $250M
PER and IRR $ 50M
Shareholders’ capital $ 20M
Assets:
Trade financing (murabahah) $550M
Salaam / ijarah / istisnah $250M
Mudarabah and musharakah investments $220M
Total risk-weighted assets $250M
Risk-adjusted assets financed by investment account holders $100M
Risk-adjusted assets financed by PER and IRR $10M
Supervisory authority’s discretion (α) 30%
Adjustment for market and operational risk (12.5 × $5M) $62.5M
CAR according to the standard formula:
$20 = 9.88%
($250M + 62.5M) − ($100M + $10M)
CAR according to the supervisory discretion formula:
$20 = 8.35%
($250M + 62.5M) − (0.7 × $100M – 0.3 × $10M)
BOX 13.4 Computation of CAR for an Islamic Bank
TABLE 13.4 Capital Adequacy Standard for Operational Risk: Basel II versus IFSB
Criteria Basel II IFSB 
Gross income Annual average gross income Annual average gross income (previous
(previous three years) three years), excluding profit-sharing invest-
ment account (PSIA) holders’ share of income
Source: Jabbari (2006).
Source: Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007).
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assessing and managing capital adequacy that are commensurate with
their risk profile, operations, and business strategy. Banks’ management
is accountable for ensuring that their bank has adequate capital.
The role of supervisors is to review the bank’s internal capital ade-
quacy assessments and management processes, to ensure that the bank’s
capital targets and capital position are consistent with its overall risk
profile and strategy, and to enable supervisory intervention if the bank’s
capital does not provide a sufficient buffer against risk. An important
aspect of supervisory reviews is to assess compliance with the minimum
standards and disclosure requirements. Supervisors also are expected to
have an approach for identifying and intervening in situations where
falling capital levels raise questions about the ability of a bank to with-
stand business shocks.
Supervisors are expected to take appropriate actions if they are not
satisfied with the quality of a bank’s internal processes and the results of
a bank’s own risk assessment and capital allocations. They are expected
to have at their disposal the necessary enforcement powers and tools. For
example, they should be able to require banks to hold capital in excess of
the minimum, if so mandated by the risk characteristics of a particular
bank or its business environment, and to require prompt remedial action
if capital is not maintained or restored.
Four key principles of supervisory review are issued to complement
the supervisory guidelines already established (Grais and Kulathunga
2007): (a) Banks must have a process for assessing their overall capital
adequacy in relation to their risk profiles and a strategy for maintaining
their capital levels. (b) Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’
internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies as well as their
ability to monitor and ensure compliance with regulatory capital ratios.
Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they are not
satisfied with the result of this process. (c) Supervisors should expect
banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and
should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the
minimum. (d) Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to
prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required to sup-
port the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should require rapid
remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored.
The Basel II framework sets special requirements for cooperation
between supervisors, especially for the cross-border supervision of complex
banking or financial groups. More detailed discussion of the supervisory
review process and techniques is provided in chapter 14.
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PILLAR 3: MARKET DISCIPLINE
The requirement for market discipline, the third pillar of Basel II, com-
plements the minimum capital requirements and the supervisory review
process. Market discipline is based on disclosure requirements. Banks are
asked to disclose reliable and timely information that market participants
need in order to make well-founded risk assessments, including assess-
ment of the adequacy of capital held as a cushion against losses and of the
risk exposures that may give rise to such losses.
The disclosure requirements are based on the concept of materiality—
that is, banks must include all information where omission or misstatement
could change or influence the decisions of the information users. The only
exception is proprietary or confidential information, the sharing of which
could undermine a bank’s competitive position. Except for large interna-
tionally active banks, disclosures are to be made on a semi-annual basis.
Banks are expected to have a formal disclosure policy approved by the board
of directors, including decisions on what will be disclosed, the frequency of
validation reporting, and internal controls over the disclosure process.
The areas that are subject to disclosure are capital structure, capital
adequacy, and risk exposure and assessment. The disclosures include
qualitative and quantitative aspects. For each area of risk (for example,
credit, market, operational, equity), qualitative aspects cover strategies,
policies, and processes; the structure and organization of the risk
management function; the scope and nature of the risk measurement and
reporting systems; the strategies and policies for hedging or mitigating
risks; and the processes and systems for monitoring their effectiveness.
Quantitative aspects involve disclosures of specific values.
Market discipline contributes to responsible corporate behavior.
Market perceptions of—and thus reactions to—a financial intermediary’s
business conduct and capital strength may be unforgiving. It is thus in the
interest of financial intermediaries to define capital resource requirements
that take into account the institutional environment in which they oper-
ate. The market’s perception of market imperfections is likely to influence
views on the appropriate level of capital and the capital adequacy of a
financial intermediary. For example, the availability of a safety net may
lead market participants to require banks to hold less capital in relation to
assets. Conversely, anticipation of the high costs of financial distress may
induce market participants to require banks to hold more capital in pro-
portion to assets. Similarly, wherever the institutional environment is weak
and contract enforcement is uncertain and costly, markets may expect
financial intermediaries to adjust the amount of capital they hold.
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MANAGING CAPITAL  ADEQUACY
A capital adequacy assessment starts with analysis of the components of
a bank’s capital, as illustrated in figure 13.3. (The figures presented in this
section illustrate the analysis of a bank’s capital, but do not refer to the
same bank.) The core capital components, including common stock and
retained earnings, should account for more than half of total capital, as
mandated by the 1988 Basel Accord. The identity of shareholders is also
important. In extreme circumstances the shareholders may be called on
to increase a bank’s capital, either by adding new capital or by forgoing
dividend payments. However, no amount of capital would be adequate
for a bank with malevolent shareholders, incompetent management, or
an incompetent board.
The changes in the volume and structure of capital over time are also
significant. The bank shown in figure 13.3 experienced some changes in
the structure of capital. Any changes in capital structure, especially
reductions involving core capital, should be credibly explained. A care-
ful analysis is also needed to explain exactly why and what provoked the
loss of capital and to ensure that the bank has learned from the experi-
ence and taken adequate measures to prevent a similar situation in the
future. The analyst could also compare changes in the volume of capital
to the bank’s risk profile, which is illustrated in figures 13.3 and 13.4. In
general, changes in the volume of capital should be in concert with
FIGURE 13.3 Components of Bank Capital 
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FIGURE 13.4 Risk Profile of Assets 
Illustration: Risk-Weights of assets
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expected changes in the risk profile, to provide an adequate cushion for
the bank’s risk exposures.
In addition to analyzing the structure of a bank’s base of capital, the
analyst should consider the level and demand for dividends being placed
on the bank by shareholders. In periods of economic downturn or situations
where the bank’s condition is deteriorating, the bank should reduce or
eliminate dividend payments to its shareholders.
The next step in the analysis is to assess the bank’s risk exposures, on
and off the balance sheet. The bank’s balance sheet categories are classi-
fied according to the risk categories specified in the Basel Accord (and
IFSB standards) and are assigned the corresponding risk weight. The ana-
lyst should notice the structure of risk-weighted assets and if and how this
has changed over time. For example, whether the average risk weights
associated with the bank’s assets have increased or decreased. The issues
to be addressed are whether or not this is a result of the bank’s business
strategy, whether or not the risk weights reflect actual risk, whether or not
the bank is able to understand and adequately manage the higher level of
risk, and what appears to be the trend for the future.
Figure 13.4 summarizes the risk profile of a bank, illustrating changes
over time in average risk weighting, including on- and off-balance-sheet
items; it also projects future trends. It appears that the weighted average
of the bank’s total risk profile has been reduced in the observation
period. The analyst should understand why and what is the trend. For
Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks
236
example, the total average could have been reduced because the bank
increased its off-balance-sheet business. The weighted average of on-
balance-sheet items could have been reduced because the bank started
to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or because of changes in its
demand structure.
The final step is to verify the denominator for the capital adequacy
calculation by multiplying the amounts of various asset categories by
their corresponding risk weights. Once the denominator is determined,
the capital adequacy ratio calculation is straightforward. The analyst
should, however, also scrutinize a bank’s asset quality, to make sure that
the capital ratio is realistic. This would normally include checking the
bank’s policies and practices regarding asset classification and provisions
to make sure that it has adequately provided for the impaired value of any
of its assets (see chapter 7). It may also include checking the applicable
rules concerning general loss reserves.
Table 13.5 illustrates select capital ratios of a bank and their trends
over time. A decline in the percentage of core capital in relation to total
qualifying capital would indicate that Tier 2 capital or debt instruments
are being used to a greater degree in order to meet minimum capital
requirements. This situation would, in turn, indicate a relative shift to less
permanent forms of capital. The capital ratio indicates whether or not the
bank is meeting the minimum capital requirements.
When a bank’s capital ratio shows deterioration, this is a cause for
concern. The reason could be that the bank has increased the size of its
balance sheet, while still meeting minimum capital requirements. Should
the growth trend continue, the bank would have to increase capital to be
able to maintain the minimum capital ratio. Another reason for a deteri-
orating capital ratio could be that the bank has changed its risk profile. In
such a case, the analyst should investigate whether the bank has adequate
policies, procedures, and controls in place to handle the higher risk pro-
file of its operations.
Figure 13.5 illustrates the trend in the capital of a conventional bank
over time. The capital is split into Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 categories, and
these are compared to the capital necessary to meet the 8 percent and
15 percent risk-weighted minimum capital requirement. The bank under
review has significantly increased its capital as well as its risk-weighted
capital ratios. This situation likely indicates that this bank is positioning
itself for future growth. While capital adequacy is clearly not an issue, this
calls for a review of the bank’s internal processes and controls, to ensure
that it is adequately prepared to handle the increasing volume of business
and, most likely, the increasing degree of risk.
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TABLE 13.5 Trend Analysis of Capital Adequacy Ratios 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Actual and projected assets – at past average growth % 15,333,978 19,597,790 22,778,319 30,613,361 42,998,279 64,433,936 
Share capital 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 1,500,000 2,800,000 
Retained income & reserves portion of equity 136,560 473,986 548,180 1,195,645 1,627,431 4,561,150 
Majority shareholders’ equity 1,136,560 1,473,986 1,548,180 2,695,645 3,127,431 7,361,150 
Assumed capital requirement @ 15 % 2,300,097 2,939,669 3,416,748 4,592,004 6,449,742 9,665,090 
Assumed capital requirement @ 10 % 1,533,398 1,959,779 2,277,832 3,061,336 4,299,828 6,443,394 
Shortfall – actual capital to assumed 15 % requirement (1,163,537) (1,465,683) (1,868,568) (1,896,359) (3,322,311) (2,303,940)
Asset growth: 2001–2006 0% 28% 49% 100% 180% 320%
Retained income & reserves portion of equity: growth 0% 247% 301% 776% 1092% 3240%
Equity: Total Asset Ratio 7% 8% 7% 9% 7% 11%
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FIGURE 13.5 Capital Tiers and Compliance 
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FIGURE 13.6
Potential Capital Shortfall Assuming Continued Average Growth in
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The next question is whether or not a bank can continue to meet its
minimum capital requirements in the future. Analysis of this question
should include stress tests for situations that might arise in which risk or
the bank’s capacity to control risk could get out of hand. Figure 13.6
illustrates capital adequacy projections under normal circumstances,
made as part of the process of risk management and capital planning.
The graph shows the end result of possible situations that a bank may
encounter in the future and highlights any projected excess or deficiencies
in capital adequacy.
The projection in figure 13.6 is based on a simplistic assumption
that both risk-weighted assets and net qualifying capital will grow at
the average asset growth percentage of the past five years and that the
bank’s risk profile will remain the same. This expected business growth
clearly would result in a capital shortfall. A bank may take a number of
actions to address an expected shortfall in capital adequacy, including
the following:
 Increase Tier 1 capital by asking shareholders to add capital, by retain-
ing earnings, or by issuing new shares in the market;
 Increase Tier 2 capital—if there is space for this in the bank’s capital
structure—by issuing the appropriate instruments;
 Change the business policy to focus on a business with lower capital
requirements;
 Reduce the size of its balance sheet or of its growth.
NOTES
1. The account holder’s share of the PER and the whole of the IRR (none of
which is attributable to shareholders) are excluded from capital. They are
taken into account in measuring the amount of risk-weighted assets attrib-
utable to investment account holders. For a discussion of some issues raised
by the use of the PER and IRR, see Archer and Karim (2006).
2. Under the basic indicator approach, a fixed percentage, namely 15 percent, of
the annual average gross income, averaged over the previous three years, is set
aside. Under the standardized approach, this percentage varies according to
the line of business, from 12 to 18 percent. It is 18 percent for corporate
finance, trading and sales, and payment and settlement; 15 percent for com-
mercial banking and agency services; and 12 percent for retail banking, asset
management, and retail brokerage.
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Banking supervision, based on the ongoing analytical review of banks,serves the public good as one of the key factors in maintaining stability
and confidence in the financial system. This chapter discusses the rela-
tionship between banking risk analysis and the supervisory process. The
methodology for a supervisory review of banks should be similar to that
used by private sector analysts, external auditors, or a bank’s own risk
managers, except that the focus of the analysis differs somewhat.
Bank supervision is an integral part of a much broader and continuous
process. It normally includes off-site surveillance and on-site exami-
nations, as summarized in figure 14.1. This process includes the estab-
lishment of a legal framework for the banking sector, the designation of
regulatory and supervisory authorities, the definition of licensing con-
ditions and criteria, and the enactment of regulations limiting the level
of risk that banks are allowed to take. Other necessary steps include
establishment of a framework for prudential reporting and off-site sur-
veillance and execution of these activities, followed by on-site supervision.
The results of on-site examinations provide inputs for the institutional
development of banks and for the improvement of the regulatory and
supervisory environment.
In addition to effective supervision, other factors necessary for the
stability of banking systems, financial systems, and markets include sound
and sustainable macroeconomic policies, a well-developed financial sector
infrastructure, effective market discipline, and an adequate banking sector
safety net.
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Key Messages
• Bank supervisors and financial analysts should view the risk management process in a similar
manner. 
• The analyst or supervisor should determine what happened, why it happened, the impact of
events, and a credible action plan or future strategy to rectify unacceptable trends.
• The supervisory process of off- and on-site supervision is similar to the financial analysis of infor-
mation, which has to be tested through verification of preliminary conclusions. On-site examination
is essential, but could be performed by supervisors, analysts, or external auditors. 
• Regulators and supervisors should ensure that all financial institutions are supervised using a
consistent philosophy, to ensure a level playing field for financial intermediaries. 
• Properly used, banking analysis can enhance the institutional development of the banks concerned.
THE RISK ANALYSIS PROCESS
As discussed in chapter 3, the analytical review of banks follows a number
of stages whereby the results of one stage serve as inputs to the next. The
ultimate objective of this process is to produce a set of recommendations
that, if properly implemented, result in a safe, sound, and properly func-
tioning financial intermediary. Table 14.1 summarizes the stages of the
analytical review process.
An analytical review normally comprises a review of financial condi-
tions and specific issues related to risk exposure and risk management. In
addition to verifying the conclusions reached during off-site reviews,on-site
reviews cover a much larger number of topics and are more concerned with
qualitative aspects, including the availability and quality of management
information. The questions asked during all phases of the analytic review
should focus on what happened, why it happened, the impact of the event
or trend, the response and strategy of the bank’s management, the recom-
mendations of the analyst, and the vulnerabilities identified. Appendix D
summarizes the typical outline for off-site and on-site analytical reviews or
diagnostic reports of a bank.
Analytical tools include ratio tables and graphs based on processed
input data. These ratios relate to balance sheet structure, profitability,
capital adequacy, credit and market risk, liquidity, and currency risk.
Taken together, they constitute a complete set of ratios that are normally
subject to off-site surveillance. The tables enable analysts to judge the effec-
tiveness of the risk management process and to measure performance.
Combined with qualitative information obtained from the questionnaire,
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these statistical tables make up the raw material on which the analysis
contained in off-site reports is based. Graphs provide a visual repre-
sentation of results and a snapshot of the current situation in a bank.
They may also be used during off-site surveillance as a starting point
for on-site examination.
During the course of their operations, banks are subject to a wide array
of risks. In general, banking risks fall into the following four categories:
 Financial risks, as discussed in chapters 5 to 9;
 Operational risks related to a bank’s overall business strategy and the
functioning of its internal systems, including computer systems and
technology, compliance with policies and procedures, and the possi-
bility of mismanagement and fraud;
 Business risks—often referred to as country risks—associated with a
bank’s business environment, including macroeconomic, policy, legal,
and regulatory factors; financial sector infrastructure and the payment
system; and overall systemic risk related to operations;
The Relationship between Risk Analysis and Bank Supervision
243
TABLE 14.1 Stages of the Analytical Review Process 
Analytical phase Source and tools available Output
Structuring and collection of Questionnaire, financial Completed input data, question-
input data statements, other financial data naires, and financial data tables 
Processing of data Completed input data Processed output data 
(questionnaires and financial 
data tables)
Analysis and interpretation of Input data and processed Analytical results 
processed or structured output output data 
data
Development of an off-site Analytical results and previous Off-site examination report or 
analysis report of the bank’s risks on-site examination reports terms of reference for on-site
examination 
Follow-up through on-site Off-site examination report and On-site examination report and
examination, audit, or terms of reference for on-site institutional development plan or 
analytical review examination a memorandum of understanding 
Institutional strengthening On-site examination report and Well-functioning financial 
memorandum of understanding intermediary 
for institutional development 
Repeat the process, building on Repeat the process Repeat the process 
the previous reports and 
regulatory deficiencies identified 
 Event risks, including all types of exogenous risks that, if they were to
materialize, could jeopardize a bank’s operations or undermine its
financial condition and capital adequacy. Such risks include political
events (for example, the fall of a government), contagion due to the
failure of a major bank or a market crash, banking crises, natural dis-
asters, and civil wars. Event risks are, in most cases, unexpected until
immediately before the event occurs. Banks therefore may not be able
to prepare adequately for them other than by maintaining a cushion
of capital. The dividing line between the end of an event risk and the
beginning of systemic risk is often blurred.
Risk that is inherent in banking should be recognized, monitored,
and controlled. Some financial risks are controlled when regulators
establish prudential guidelines for a particular type of exposure. The
effectiveness of a bank’s management of financial risk, monitoring of risk
exposure, and compliance with prudential guidelines of bank supervision
forms the backbone of the supervisory process, both off- and on-site.
Regulations, however, can be costly for a bank. The manner in which
regulators apply their functions determines the impact that regulations
have on the market as well as their cost. Costs include the provision of
information to regulators, maintenance of an institution’s internal systems
that measure risk and ensure compliance with regulations,and certain busi-
ness decisions that reduce a bank’s profitability. In addition to the direct cost
of regulation, hidden costs also exist, such as a bank’s compromised
ability to innovate or adjust quickly to changing market conditions,
which might prevent it from capitalizing on its comparative advantages
or competitive position.
With regard to operational risks (with the exception of business
strategy risk), regulators typically establish guidelines that banks are
expected to follow. Adherence to the guidelines is subject to supervision,
typically as part of an on-site examination. A bank’s business strategy is
also given attention. Initially, as part of the licensing process, the author-
ities review and implicitly endorse a bank’s business strategy. The strategy
and its risk implications are always discussed during the process of an
on-site examination and possibly also in the context of off-site
surveillance. In many countries, senior management is obliged to meet
quarterly with supervisory authorities to discuss the bank’s business
strategy; this is often the case for large banks that have the potential to
disrupt market stability.
The category of risks related to a business environment may or may
not fall within the scope of supervisory authorities. Regulatory authorities
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(including the central bank) are closely related to many key aspects of a
bank’s business environment, however. Entry and licensing regulations
effectively determine a banking system’s structure and the level and nature
of competition. The criteria for issuing licenses must therefore be consistent
with those applied in ongoing supervision. If the supervisory authority is
different from the licensing authority, the former should have a legal right
to have its views considered by the latter.
Monetary authorities also play a critical role in determining the
business environment. The choice, design, and use of monetary policy
measures and instruments are inextricably related to banking system
conditions, the nature of bank competition, and the capacity of the
banking system to innovate. In the choice and use of policy instruments,
pragmatic considerations (which imply a connection to supervisory
authorities) are of prime importance. It is essential to look not only at
specific policies or measures, but also at the context in which they are
applied. Similar policies may be transmitted, but work in different ways,
depending on the structure, financial conditions, and dynamics of the
banking system and markets. Supervisory authorities are not involved
with other aspects of the business environment that have implications
for risk, such as macroeconomic policies, which often determine supply
and demand in markets and are a major component of country risk. In
addition, authorities usually are not concerned with the tax environment
(which directly affects a bank’s bottom line), the legal framework, or the
financial sector infrastructure (including the payment system and reg-
istries), but they may be very influential in proposing changes and
improvements in these areas.
Supervisory authorities are also critical with respect to event risks.
While these risks may not be foreseen and often cannot be prevented, the
authorities play an important role in evaluating their impact on the status
and condition of the banking system and of the markets. They also ensure
that proper arrangements are put in place to minimize the impact and
extent of disruption, to mobilize other authorities to deal effectively with
the consequences of certain events, and, ultimately, to oversee the orderly
exit of failed institutions.
THE SUPERVISORY PROCESS
All banking systems have at least one regulatory and supervisory author-
ity. However, the locus, structure, regulatory and enforcement powers,
and specific responsibilities of each authority are different. This variation
is usually a consequence of traditions and of the legal and economic
environment of a particular country. Decisions regarding the regulatory
and supervisory authorities are sometimes politically motivated. In most
countries, the regulatory and supervisory authority for the banking sector
is assigned to the central bank, but the current trend is to consolidate all
financial supervision in a separate entity, outside the central bank. The
responsibilities of bank supervision usually include the following:
 Issuance and withdrawal of banking licenses on an exclusive basis;
 Issuance and enforcement of prudential regulations and standards;
 The authority to prescribe and obtain periodic reports (that is, establish
prudential reporting as a precondition for off-site surveillance) and to
perform on-site inspections;
 Assessment of fines and penalties and the initiation of emergency
actions, including cease and desist orders, management removal and
suspension orders, and the imposition of conservatorships;
 Closure and liquidation of banks.
In order to be effective, supervisory authorities must have appropriate
enforcement power and an adequate degree of autonomy. These abilities
are necessary to resist undue pressures from the government, banks and
their shareholders, depositors and creditors, borrowers, and other people
who use financial services. Supervisory authorities should command the
respect of the banks they oversee.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has identified certain
preconditions and set certain standards for effective banking supervision.
These standards require the supervisory authority to have a clear, achiev-
able, and consistent framework of responsibilities and objectives as well
as the ability to achieve them. If more than one supervisory authority
exists, all must operate within a consistent and coordinated framework
in order to avoid regulatory or supervisory arbitrage. Where distinctions
between banking business and other deposit-taking entities are not clear,
the latter could be allowed to operate as quasi-banks, with less regulation.
Supervisory authorities should have adequate resources, including the
staffing, funding, and technology needed to meet established objectives,
provided on terms that do not undermine the autonomy, integrity, and
independence of the supervisory agencies. Supervisors must be protected
from personal and institutional liability for actions taken in good faith
while performing their duties. Supervisory agencies should be obliged to
cooperate and share relevant information, both domestically and abroad.
This cooperation should be supported by arrangements for protecting
the confidentiality of information.
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Supervisory authorities, however, cannot guarantee that banks will
not fail. The potential for bank failure is an integral part of risk taking.
Supervisors have a role to play, but there is a difference between their role
in the day-to-day supervision of solvent institutions and their handling
of problem institutions in order to prevent contagion and systemic crisis.
When approaching systemic issues, the key concern of supervisory
authorities is to address threats to confidence in the financial system and
contagion to otherwise sound banks. The supervisor’s responsibility is to
make adequate arrangements that could facilitate the exit of problem
banks with minimum disruption to the system; at the same time, the
methods applied should minimize distortions to market signals and dis-
cipline. Individual bank failure, in contrast, is an issue for shareholders
and management. In some cases, a bank failure may become a political
issue, especially in the case of a large bank, and involve decisions regarding
whether, to what extent, and in what form public funds should be com-
mitted to turning the situation around.
An effective supervisory system encompasses some form of off-site
surveillance and on-site examination. Off-site surveillance is, in essence,
an early-warning device that is based on the analysis of financial data sup-
plied by banks. On-site examination builds on and supplements off-site
surveillance and enables supervisory authorities to examine details and
to judge a bank’s future viability. The extent of on-site work and the
method by which it is carried out depend on a variety of factors. In addi-
tion to differences in supervisory approaches or techniques, the key deter-
minant of the objectives and scope of supervision is whether they aim
only to safeguard the stability of the banking system or if they are also
expected to protect the interests of depositors. Some countries have a
mixed system of on-site examination based on collaboration between
supervisors and external auditors.
Off-Site Surveillance
The central objective of off-site surveillance is to monitor the condition of
individual banks, peer groups, and the banking system. Based on this
assessment, the performance of a bank is then compared with that of its
peer group and the banking sector overall, in order to detect significant
deviations from the peer group or from sectoral norms and benchmarks.
This process provides an early indication of an individual bank’s prob-
lems, as well as systemic problems, and assists in prioritizing the use of
scarce supervisory resources in areas or activities at greatest risk. Off-site
monitoring systems rely on financial reporting in a prescribed format
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that is supplied by banks according to previously determined reporting
schedules. Reporting formats and details vary among countries, although
most supervisory authorities systematically collect and analyze data
concerning liquidity, capital adequacy, credit risk, asset quality, concen-
tration of exposures, large exposures, market rates, currency, market
risks, earnings and profitability, and balance sheet structure. Supporting
schedules may also be requested in order to provide greater detail of a
bank’s exposure to different types of risk and its capacity to bear that risk.
Schedules depend on the type and subject of related reports. For example,
supervisory authorities may require liquidity to be reported on a weekly
or even a daily basis, large exposures on a monthly basis, financial state-
ments quarterly, and asset classification and provisions semiannually.
The sophistication and exact purpose of analytical reviews also vary
from country to country. Most supervisory authorities use some form of
ratio analysis. The current financial ratios of each bank are analyzed and
compared to historical trends and to the performance of its peers in
order to assess its financial condition and compliance with prudential
regulations. This process may also identify existing or forthcoming prob-
lems. Individual bank reports are aggregated to attain group (or peer)
statistics for banks of a particular size, business profile, or geographic area
and can then be used as a diagnostic tool or in research and monetary
policy analysis.
Off-site surveillance is less costly in terms of supervisory resources.
Banks provide the information needed for supervisors to form a view of
a bank’s exposure to the various categories of financial risk. Supervisory
authorities then manipulate and interpret the data. Although off-site
surveillance allows supervisors to monitor developments concerning a
bank’s financial condition and risk exposures, it also has limitations:
 The usefulness of reports depends on the quality of a bank’s internal
information systems and on the accuracy of reporting.
 Reports have a standard format that may not adequately capture new
types of risks or the particular activities of individual banks.
 Reports cannot convey all factors affecting risk management, such as
the quality of a bank’s management personnel, policies, procedures,
and internal systems.
On-Site Examinations
On-site examinations enable supervisors to validate the information pro-
vided by a bank during the prudential reporting process, to establish the
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diagnosis and exact cause of a bank’s problems with an adequate level of
detail, and to assess a bank’s future viability or possible problem areas. More
specifically, on-site examinations should help supervisors to assess the
accuracy of a bank’s reports, overall operations and condition, the quality
and competence of management, and the adequacy of risk management
systems and internal control procedures. Other aspects that should be eval-
uated include the quality of the loan portfolio, adequacy of loan provisions
and reserves, accounting and management information systems, the issues
identified in off-site or previous on-site supervisory processes, adherence
to laws and regulations, and the terms stipulated in the banking license.
On-site examination is very demanding in terms of supervisory resources
and usually can address only some of a bank’s activities.
On-site examinations can take different forms depending on a bank’s
size and structure, available resources, and the sophistication, knowledge,
and experience of supervisors. Supervisory authorities should establish
clear internal guidelines on the objectives, frequency, and scope of on-site
examinations. Policies and procedures should ensure that examinations
are systematic and conducted in a thorough and consistent manner. In
less developed supervisory systems, the examination process often pro-
vides only a snapshot of a bank’s condition, without assessing potential
risks and the availability and quality of systems used by management to
identify and manage them. On-site supervision begins with business
transactions and proceeds from the bottom up. Results from the succes-
sive stages of supervision are compiled and eventually consolidated to
arrive at final conclusions regarding a bank’s overall financial condition
and performance. This approach is characteristic of countries in which
management information is unreliable and bank policies and procedures
are poorly articulated.
In well-developed banking systems, supervisors typically use a top-
down approach that focuses on assessing how banks identify, measure,
manage, and control risk. Supervisors are expected to diagnose the causes
of a bank’s problems and to ensure that they are addressed by preventive
actions that can reduce the likelihood of recurrence. The starting point of
an on-site examination is an assessment of objectives and policies related
to risk management, the directions provided by the board and senior
managers, and the coverage, quality, and effectiveness of systems used
to monitor, quantify, and control risks. The completeness and effective-
ness of a bank’s written policies and procedures are then considered, as
well as planning and budgeting, internal controls and audit procedures,
and management information systems. Examination at the level of busi-
ness transactions is required only if weaknesses exist in the systems for
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identifying, measuring, and controlling risks. In many countries, external
auditors examine systems and processes at this level.
Early-Warning Systems
In the 1990s supervisory authorities started to refine their early-warning
systems—aimed at assessing supervisory risk and identifying potential
problems in the financial system and individual banks. The systems gen-
erally combine qualitative and quantitative elements. Just as approaches
to banking regulation and supervision differ from country to country,
the design of early-warning systems also varies. However, there are four
generic types: supervisory bank rating systems, financial ratio and peer
group analysis systems, comprehensive bank risk assessment systems, and
statistical models.
In supervisory bank rating systems (of which the most well known is
CAMEL—capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and
liquidity), a composite rate is assigned to a bank typically as a result of
an on-site examination. Financial ratio and peer group analysis systems
(normatives) are based on a set of financial variables (typically including
capital adequacy, asset quality, profitability, and liquidity) that generate
a warning if certain ratios exceed a predetermined critical level, lie within
a predetermined interval, or are outliers with regard to past performance
of the bank. Comprehensive bank risk assessment systems include a com-
prehensive assessment of the risk profile of a bank, disaggregating a bank
(or a banking group) into significant business units and assessing each
separate business unit for all business risks. Scores are assigned for spec-
ified criteria, and assessment results are aggregated to arrive at the final
score for the whole bank or banking group.
Finally, statistical models attempt to detect those risks most likely to
lead to adverse future conditions in a bank. In contrast with the other three
systems, the ultimate focus of statistical models is to predict the proba-
bility of future developments rather than produce a summary rating of
the current condition of a bank. Statistical models are based on various
indicators of future performance. For example, some models estimate a
probability of a rating downgrade for an individual bank (for example,
probability that the most recent CAMEL rating will be downgraded based
on financial data supplied in prudential reporting). Failure-of-survival
prediction models are constructed on a sample of failed or distressed
banks and aim to identify banks whose ratios, indicators, or change in
ratios or indicators are correlated with those of failed or distressed banks.
Expected loss models are used in countries where the statistical basis of
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failed or distressed banks is not large enough to be able to link changes in
specific financial variables to probabilities of failure. These models are
based on failure probabilities derived from banks’ exposure to credit risk
and other data, such as the capacity of existing shareholders to supply addi-
tional capital. Some regulators have constructed statistical models based
on other variables. For example, high growth in assets that is not matched
adequately with strengthening of a bank’s management and institutional
capacity has, in many cases, been the culprit for bank failure. Therefore,
a model tracing a high rate of asset growth combined with measures of
institutional capacity could be used as an early-warning system.
In many cases, supervisory authorities use more then one early-warning
system. The major issues with early-warning systems are the proper choice
of variables on which the prediction is based, the availability of reliable input
data, and limitations related to quantification of qualitative factors that are
critically related to banks’ performance (for example, management quality,
institutional culture, integrity of internal controls).
CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION 
The institutional classification under which a financial intermediary oper-
ates has traditionally been assigned based on predominant financial
instruments or services offered by the intermediary. The institutional clas-
sification designates regulatory and supervisory authorities for particular
institutions and the corresponding regulatory treatment, for example,
regarding minimum capital levels, capital adequacy, and other prudential
requirements (for example, for liquidity and cash reserves). Increasing
financial market integration blurs the difference between various types
of financial institutions and creates opportunities for regulatory or super-
visory arbitrage, which ultimately increases systemic risk. While perfect
neutrality may not be possible or even necessary, authorities should strive
to level the playing field with respect to specific markets and to reduce the
scope for regulatory arbitrage. In other words, when different financial
institutions compete in the same market for identical purposes, their respec-
tive regulations must ensure competitive equality.
Regulatory environments that potentially allow for regulatory (or
supervisory) arbitrage display at least one of the following features:
 Inconsistent or conflicting regulatory philosophies for different types of
financial institutions;
 Deficiencies or inconsistencies in defining risks and prudential require-
ments for different types of financial institutions;
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 Differences in the cost of regulating different financial institutions;
 Lack of coordination between regulatory and supervisory authorities
in the financial sector.
Cross-Border Operations
The international expansion of banks increases the efficiency of both
global and national markets, but it may create difficulties during the
supervisory process. For example, cross-border transactions may con-
ceal a bank’s problems from its home-country supervisors. Certain prac-
tices by subsidiaries in less regulated environments may be hidden from
home-country supervisors but ultimately create losses that can impair
the bank’s capital. Internationalization may be used as a vehicle to escape
regulation and supervision—for example, by transferring problem assets
to less stringent regulatory environments or to areas with less effective
supervision. Internationally active banks therefore present a challenge to
supervisory authorities.
Cooperative efforts are needed to ensure that all aspects of interna-
tional banking are subject to effective supervision and that remedial actions
are well coordinated. Responding to the failure of a number of large, inter-
nationally active banks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has
issued minimum standards for their supervision. The Basel Concordat is
based on the following principles:
 A capable home-country authority should supervise internationally
active banks and banking groups on a consolidated basis.
 The creation of a cross-border banking establishment should receive the
prior consent of both home- and host-country supervisory authorities.
Such bilateral supervisory arrangements should be specified in a mem-
orandum of understanding signed by both authorities.
 Home-country supervisory authorities should possess the right to col-
lect information concerning the cross-border establishment of the
banks and banking groups that they supervise. The collection by and
exchange of information between authorities should be guided by
principles of reciprocity and confidentiality. Confidential information
should be safeguarded against disclosure to unauthorized parties.
 If host-country supervisors determine that the home-country super-
visory arrangements do not meet minimum standards, they should
prohibit cross-border operations or impose restrictive measures that
satisfy their standards.
Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks
252
 Home-country supervisory authorities should inform host-country
authorities of changes in supervisory measures that have a significant
bearing on the relevant bank’s foreign operations.
One of the primary reasons why consolidated supervision is critical is
the risk of a damaging loss of confidence and of contagion that extends
beyond legal liability. Since supervisory arrangements and techniques
differ due to legal, institutional, historical, and other factors, no single set
of criteria establishes conclusively whether consolidated supervision is
effective or not. In principle, consolidated supervision should assess all
risks run by a banking group wherever they occur, including branches
and subsidiaries, non-bank financial companies, and financial affiliates.
More specifically, consolidated supervision should support the principle
that no banking operation, wherever located, should escape supervision.
It also should prevent the double leveraging of capital and ensure that all
risks incurred by a banking group (no matter where it is booked) are eval-
uated and controlled on a global basis.
Consolidated supervision should extend beyond the mere consoli-
dation of accounts. Supervisory authorities should consider the exact
nature of the risks involved and design an appropriate approach to them.
Consolidated accounting may even be inappropriate when the nature of
risk varies—for example, when market risk differs from market to market.
The offsetting of market risks during the process of accounting consoli-
dation may result in an inaccurate risk exposure position. Liquidity risk
should be considered primarily on a market-by-market or a currency-by-
currency basis.
Supervision of Conglomerates
Supervisory arrangements involving conglomerates are even more
complex. An international financial group active in banking, securities,
fund management, and insurance may be subject to a number of regulatory
regimes and supervised by authorities in a number of countries.
Problems related to a conglomerate’s information, coordination, and
compliance with prudential regulations—which are complex enough in
a single-country environment—are compounded at the international
level, particularly when operations involve emerging-market economies.
Financial conglomerates may have different shapes and structural
features, reflecting various laws and traditions. Key aspects to be consid-
ered in the supervision of conglomerates are the overall approach to
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supervision, the transparency of group structures, the assessment of capital
adequacy, and the prevention of double gearing. In addition, contagion and
the effect of intragroup exposures and the consolidated treatment of large
exposures play a role because of differences in exposure rules in banking,
securities, and insurance.
The problem of consolidated supervision has been addressed inter-
nationally by a tripartite group consisting of representatives of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision and interest groups involved in both
the securities and insurance sectors. Their joint statement on the super-
vision of conglomerates specifies the following:
 All banks, securities firms, and other financial institutions should be
subject to effective supervision, including that related to capital.
 Geographically or functionally diversified financial groups require
consolidated supervision and special supervisory arrangements. Coop-
eration and information flow among supervisory authorities should be
adequate and free from both national and international impediments.
 The transparency and integrity of markets and supervision rely on
adequate reporting and disclosure of information.
The joint statement also recommends accounting-based consolidation
as an appropriate technique for assessing capital adequacy in homogeneous
conglomerates. This process allows for the straight-forward comparison,
using a single set of valuation principles, of total consolidated assets and
liabilities as well as the application, at the parent level, of capital adequacy
rules to consolidated figures.With regard to heterogeneous conglomerates,
the group recommended a combination of three techniques: the building-
block prudential approach (whereby consolidation is performed following
solo supervision by the supervisory authority), risk-based aggregation, and
risk-based deduction.
The best approach to supervision and the assessment of capital ade-
quacy is still broadly debated in international circles, while the supervisory
community continuously learns from its experiences.
SUPERVISORY COOPERATION WITH INTERNAL 
AND EXTERNAL AUDITORS
The Institute of Internal Auditors has defined internal auditing as “an inde-
pendent, objective activity that  . . . helps an organization to accomplish its
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and
improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance
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processes.”The internal audit function of a bank should cover all of a bank’s
activities in all its associated entities. It should be permanent, impartial, and
technically competent, operating independently and reporting to a bank’s
board or to the chief executive officer.
Supervisory authorities normally issue regulatory requirements for
banks’ internal control systems, aiming to establish some basic principles
for the system and the quality of controls applied by banks. Although the
extent of regulations varies, internal audit-control regulations normally
cover policies and procedures for management of credit risk and other
core banking risks, such as liquidity management, foreign exchange and
interest rate risks, and risk management of derivatives and computer and
telecommunication systems. On-site supervision normally includes an
evaluation of the bank’s internal controls and the quality of the internal
audit function. If satisfied with the quality of internal audit, supervisors
can use the reports of internal auditors to identify problems pertaining
to control or management in the bank.
External auditors and bank supervisors cover similar ground but
focus on different aspects in their work. Auditors are concerned primarily
with fair presentation in the annual financial statements and other reports
supplied to shareholders and the general public. They are expected to
express an opinion on whether financial statements and other prudential
returns (when applicable) fairly present the condition and results of a
bank’s operations. In order to express such an opinion, auditors must also
be satisfied with a bank’s accounting policies and principles and the con-
sistency of their application, and they must be sure that the bank’s key
functional systems are coherent, timely, and complete.
Because supervisory resources are scarce and in order to avoid dupli-
cation of examination efforts, supervisory authorities have come to rely
increasingly on external auditors to assist in on-site supervision. Relying
on the assessments and judgment of external auditors implies that super-
visors have an interest in ensuring high bank auditing standards and that
auditors meet certain quality criteria. In many countries, banking regula-
tions require that the banks’ external audits be carried out by auditors who
have adequate professional expertise available in their firms and meet
certain quality standards.
Auditors are often expected to report to the supervisory authorities
any failures by banks to fulfill the requirements related to their banking
license and other material breaches of laws and regulations, especially
where the interests of depositors are jeopardized. In some countries the
external auditors are asked to perform additional tasks of interest to the
supervisors, such as to assess the adequacy of organizational and internal
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TABLE 14.2 Adapting the External Audit to Specific Circumstances and Needs 
International 
Standard of 
Type of analysis or audit Output Auditing Comments
Limited assurance review On-site examination ISA 910 Suggested when the objective
engagement review report is a “validated” understanding
of the corporate governance 
and risk management process 
Report of factual findings in Audit opinion of the ISA 920 Recommended procedure 
connection with an extended loan portfolio or other for any major balance sheet 
(loan) portfolio review major asset category category such as the loan or 
trading portfolio 
Audit of the remainder of the An opinion on the ISA 700 Optional, to be determined on 
financial data details of financial a case-by-case basis; 
statements required  recommended for change of 
in an audit; can be ownership or restructuring 
expanded using that involves public funds 
ISA 920 
control systems as well as the consistency of methods and databases used to
prepare prudential reports, financial statements, and internal reports.
A supervisor’s request to an external auditor to assist in specific
supervision-related tasks should be made in the context of a well-defined
framework. This process demands adherence to, at a minimum, interna-
tional accounting and auditing standards. Table 14.2 illustrates the options
available in this area.
An important prerequisite for cooperation between the supervisory
authorities and external auditors is a continuing dialogue between the
supervisory authorities and the national professional accounting and
auditing bodies. Such discussions should routinely cover all areas of
mutual concern, including generally accepted accounting practices and
auditing standards applicable to banks, as well as specific accounting
problems, such as appropriate accounting techniques to be introduced in
the context of specific financial innovations.
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Four
Future Challenges
P A R T
Islamic banking has survived well despite the obstacles and skepticism ofthe critics, although it continues to face many challenges.1 Its future
growth and development will depend largely on the nature of innovations
introduced in the market. The immediate need is to develop instruments
that enhance liquidity; to develop secondary, money, and interbank mar-
kets; and to perform asset-liability and risk management.
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Although Islamic banks have grown in numbers, the average size of their
assets is still small compared to that of conventional banks. As of 2001,
no Islamic bank was among the top 100 banks in the world. More than
60 percent of Islamic banks were below the $500 million in assets con-
sidered to be the minimum for an efficient conventional bank, and
aggregate assets of all Islamic banks were less than those of any single
bank among the top 60 banks in the world. Finally, the size of assets of the
largest Islamic bank amounted to a meager 1 percent of the assets of the
largest bank in the world.
Large institutions have significant potential for efficiency gains due
to economies of scale and scope, organizational efficiency, and lower
cost of funding. Due to their small size, Islamic banks are unable to reap
these benefits.
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Key Messages
• Several areas pose challenges for sustaining the growth of Islamic banks.
• The introduction of new products and financial engineering represents a critical challenge requir-
ing immediate attention. New products can be defined either through “reverse engineering” or by
“innovation.”
• Liquidity-enhancing financial instruments and the development of capital markets are essential
for further growth.
• Islamic banks can benefit from economies of scale as well as enhancement of scope. Both
approaches offer diversification benefits.
• The measurement and management of risk need to be supplemented with analytical models.
• The risk management framework can be enhanced by improving the transparency in current
financial disclosure.
Illiquidity 
Islamic banks are operating with a limited set of short-term traditional
instruments, and there is a shortage of products for medium- to long-term
maturities. One reason for these shortcomings is the lack of markets in
which to sell, trade, and negotiate financial assets of the bank. There are
no venues for securitizing dormant assets and taking them off the balance
sheet. In other words, the secondary markets lack depth and breadth. An
effective portfolio management strategy cannot be implemented in the
absence of liquid markets, as opportunities for diversification become lim-
ited. Since the needs of the market regarding liquidity, risk, and portfolio
management are not being met, the system is not functioning at its full
potential. There is growing realization that the long-term, sustainable
growth of Islamic financial markets will depend largely on the develop-
ment of well-functioning secondary markets and the introduction of
liquidity-enhancing and risk-sharing products.
Limited Scope
In the absence of debt markets, underdevelopment of equities markets, and
lack of derivatives markets, financial intermediaries play a critical role in
the provision of Islamic financial services. Financial intermediaries not
only are the main source of capital and risk mitigation but also are expected
to undertake activities with wider scope. The changing global financial
landscape will require Islamic banks to go beyond their traditional role as
commercial banks and develop areas such as securities, risk management,
and insurance that are either lacking or functioning on a limited scale.
The distinction between traditional commercial banking and invest-
ment banking is getting blurred, and there is a global trend to mix finan-
cial services with non-banking services. Although this trend is prevalent
in major industrial economies, it has not been embraced by many of the
emerging markets where Islamic finance is practiced. For example, a
recent study that ranks several countries in the Middle East according to
their level of financial development finds that countries throughout the
region have a weak institutional environment and a poorly developed
non-bank financial sector (Creane and others 2003).
Concentrated Banking 
Islamic banks tend to have a concentrated base of deposits or assets.
They often concentrate on a few select sectors and avoid direct compe-
tition. For example, one Islamic bank may specialize in financing the
agricultural sector, while another might do the same in the construction
sector, and neither attempts to diversify to other sectors. This practice
makes Islamic banks vulnerable to cyclical shocks in a particular sector.
Dependence on a small number of sectors—lack of diversification—
increases their exposure to new entrants, especially foreign conventional
banks that are better equipped to meet these challenges.
This concentration in the base of deposits or assets reflects a lack of
diversification, which increases their exposure to risk. Islamic banks’
assets are concentrated in a handful of products. In terms of sector allo-
cation, average financing activities of Islamic banks have been oriented
primarily to trade (32 percent), followed by industry (17 percent), real
estate (16 percent), services (12 percent), agriculture (6 percent), and
others (17 percent; see Kahf 1999). Islamic banks are not fully exploiting
the benefits that come from both geographic and product diversification.
At present, they rely heavily on maintaining good relationships with
depositors. However, these relationships can be tested during times of
distress or changing market conditions, when depositors tend to change
loyalties and shift to large financial institutions they perceive to be safer.
This risk of losing depositors raises a more serious exposure known
as “displacement risk.” Displacement risk refers to a situation where, in
order to remain competitive, an Islamic bank pays its investment deposi-
tors a rate of return higher than what should be payable under the
“actual” terms of the investment contract; it does this by forgoing part or
all of its equity holders’ profits, which may adversely affect its own capital.
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Islamic banks engage in such practices to induce investment account
holders not to withdraw their funds. By diversifying their base of deposi-
tors, Islamic banks could reduce their exposure to displacement or with-
drawal risks. With the changing face of banking and the introduction of
Internet-based banking, achieving a high degree of geographic diversity
on the liabilities side is conceivable and should be encouraged.
Weak Risk Management and Governance Framework 
Several studies have identified weaknesses and vulnerabilities among
Islamic banks in the areas of risk management and governance. Opera-
tional risk, which arises due to the failure of systems, processes, and
procedures, is one area of concern. Weak internal control processes may
present operational risks and expose an Islamic bank to potential losses.
Governance issues are equally important for Islamic banks, investors, reg-
ulators, and other stakeholders. The role of Shariah boards brings unique
challenges to the governance of Islamic financial institutions. Similarly,
human resource issues, such as the quality of management, technical
expertise, and professionalism, are also subject to debate.
STEPS FORWARD: SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
Improvement can be made in several areas to promote and enhance the
functioning of Islamic banks and other institutions providing Islamic
financial services. However, certain areas deserve immediate attention,
and these are discussed further in this section.
Financial Engineering 
Financial engineering and financial innovations are driving the global
financial system toward greater economic efficiency by expanding the
opportunities for sharing risk, lowering transaction costs, and reducing
asymmetric information and agency costs. Financial engineering involves
the design, development, and implementation of innovative financial
instruments and processes as well as the formulation of creative solutions.
Financial engineering may lead to a new consumer-type financial instru-
ment, or a new security, or a new process or creative solution to corporate
finance problems, such as the need to lower funding costs, manage risk
better, or increase the return on investments.
For Islamic financial institutions, a financial engineering challenge is
to introduce new Shariah-compatible products that enhance liquidity,
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risk management, and portfolio diversification. Generally, attempts to
apply financial engineering techniques to Islamic banking will require
committing a great deal of resources to understanding the risk-return
characteristics of each building block of the system and offering new
products with different risk-return profiles that meet the demand of
investors, financial intermediaries, and entrepreneurs for liquidity and
safety. Securitization is a prime candidate for financial engineering. New
financial innovations are also needed to satisfy the demand for instruments
at both ends of the maturity structure: extremely short-term deposits and
long-term investments. Money markets that are Shariah-compatible do
not exist at present, and there is no equivalent of an Islamic interbank
market where banks could place, say, overnight funds or could borrow to
satisfy a need for temporary liquidity. Although securitization of a pool of
lease portfolios could help to develop the interbank market, the volume of
transactions offered by securitization may not be sufficient to meet the
demand (Iqbal 1999).
With increased globalization, integration and linkages have become
critical to the success of any capital market. Such integration becomes
seamless and transparent when financial markets offer a wide array of
instruments with varying structures of maturity and opportunities for
portfolio diversification and risk management. Financial engineering in
Islamic finance will have to focus on the development of products that
foster market integration and attract investors and entrepreneurs to the
risk-return characteristics of the product rather than to the fact of the
product being Islamic or non-Islamic.
As impressive as the record of growth of individual Islamic banks
may be, so far they have served mostly as intermediaries between Muslim
financial resources and major commercial banks in the West. It has been
a one-way relationship. No major Islamic bank has been able to develop
ways and means of intermediating between the supply of Western finan-
cial resources and the demand for them in Muslim countries. There is
an urgent need to develop marketable Shariah-based instruments by
which asset portfolios generated in Muslim countries can be marketed
in the West.
Related to the challenge of financial engineering is another opera-
tional challenge for Islamic banks: the need to standardize the process for
introducing new products in the market. Currently, each Islamic bank has
its own religious board that examines and evaluates each new product
without coordinating the effort with other banks. Each religious board
adheres to a particular school of thought. This process should be stream-
lined and standardized to minimize time, effort, and confusion.2
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Development of new products and financial engineering are resource-
intensive activities. All major conventional banks have dedicated depart-
ments that conduct background market research,product development,and
analytical modeling.These activities demand financial and human resources,
which are costly. Conventional financial institutions can justify these costs,
because they are able to recover them, in most cases, from the volume of
business generated as a result of the innovative product. Costs associated
with the development of new products are rising due to the increasing com-
plexity of the business environment as a result of regulatory or accounting
and reporting standards.
Islamic financial institutions are, in general, of small size and cannot
afford to invest substantial funds in research and development. They are
unable to reap the benefits of economies of scale. Considering the impor-
tance of financial engineering, Islamic financial institutions should seri-
ously consider making joint efforts to develop the basic infrastructure for
introducing new products. Conducting basic research and development
collectively may save some of the costs required to build this infrastruc-
ture individually. A good example of such collective effort would be to
sponsor research in the development of analytical models, computer sys-
tems, and tools to analyze the risk and return on different instruments.
Financial engineering is an area where Islamic financial institutions
could benefit from more experienced Western institutions, which are
more sophisticated in engineering and marketing the right product to
the right client. Conventional investment banks, which have invested
heavily in the infrastructure for developing new products, can work for
or with Islamic financial institutions to develop Shariah-compliant prod-
ucts. Once a financial engineering shop is set up, it can develop different
products with different risk and return profiles. In this respect, Islamic
financial institutions would do well to develop synergies and collabo-
rate with conventional institutions. Islamic financial institutions could
outsource the development part to conventional institutions and keep
the marketing part to themselves, a division of labor that could benefit
both institutions.
Risk Management and Diversiﬁcation
Financial markets are becoming more integrated and interdependent,
thus increasing the probability of expeditious contagion effects and leaving
little room for swift measures against unexpected risk. Insufficient under-
standing of the new environment can create a sense of greater risk even if
the objective level of risk in the system remains unchanged or is even
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lower. The current wave of capital market liberalization and globalization
is prompting the need for enhanced risk management measures, espe-
cially for the developing economies and emerging markets. Whereas risk
management is practiced widely in conventional financial markets, it is
underdeveloped in Islamic financial markets.
Due to limited resources, Islamic banks are often unable to afford
high-cost management information systems or the technology to assess
and monitor risk in a timely fashion. With weak management and lack
of proper risk-monitoring systems, the risk exposure of Islamic banks
is high.
Providing a more diverse mix of financial services or spreading risks
over a larger geographic area imply at least the potential for improved
diversification, so the same protection against financial distress can be
attained with fewer resources.3 For Islamic financial institutions,geographic
expansion of the depositor base could achieve diversification on the lia-
bilities side. Diversification on the assets side could reduce the variance
of the returns that accrue to claimholders of the financial intermediary.
Also, geographic and sectoral diversification on the assets side could
break up the financial institution’s concentration in a region or a sector
and thus reduce its exposure by creating less perfectly correlated risks.
Geographic spread of products can further help the financial intermedi-
ary to improve its credit risk by selecting borrowers with the best credit
and avoiding those with the weakest. With diversification, Islamic banks
would be able to extend the maturity frontier.
Islamic financial intermediaries need to adopt appropriate risk
management not only for their own portfolio but also for that of their
clients. Diversification and risk management are closely associated with
the degree of market incompleteness. In highly incomplete markets,
financial intermediaries are in a better position to provide diversification
and risk management for the client because the responsibility for risk
diversification shifts from the investors to the financial intermediary,
which is considered to be better at providing intertemporal risk man-
agement. Islamic financial institutions need to take immediate steps to
devise an infrastructure for implementing proper measures, controls, and
management of risk and to create innovative instruments to share, transfer,
and mitigate financial risk so that entrepreneurs can concentrate on what
they do best: managing exposure to business risk in which they have a
comparative advantage.
Exposure can also be reduced by working closely with clients to reduce
their exposure, which will ultimately reduce the intermediary’s exposure.
In other words, if the debtor of the bank has lower financial risk, this
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will result in better quality credit for the bank. Furthermore, monitoring
becomes vital in cases where Islamic banks invest in equity-based instru-
ments because an institution with limited resources may not be equipped
to conduct thorough monitoring. An institution with adequate resources
may develop processes, systems, and training to undertake effective mon-
itoring. There is clearly a need for Islamic financial institutions that can
offer guarantees, enhance liquidity, underwrite insurance against risks,
and develop hedging tools for a fee.
Finally, Islamic financial institutions need to realize the importance
not only of financial risk and its management but also of operational risk,
which is risk due to the failure of controls and processes. Currently, there
is a serious lack of a risk culture and of enterprise-level sponsorship of
active risk management. Formulating a strategy for risk management in
Islamic financial markets will require (a) holding comprehensive and
detailed discussion of the scope and role of derivatives within the frame-
work of the Shariah; (b) expanding the role of financial intermediaries
with special emphasis on facilitating risk sharing; (c) applying takaful
(Shariah-compliant mutual insurance) to insure financial risk; and, finally,
(d) applying financial engineering to develop synthetic derivatives and
off-balance-sheet instruments.
Challenges for Risk Management 
Implementation of a risk management framework requires close collabo-
ration among the management of Islamic financial institutions, regulators,
and supervisors. Implementation of risk management at the institutional
level is the responsibility of management, which should identify clear
objectives and strategies for the institution and establish internal systems
for identifying, measuring, monitoring, and managing various risk expo-
sures.Although the general principles of risk management are the same for
conventional and Islamic financial institutions, there are specific challenges
in the management of risk in Islamic financial institutions:
 The need to establish supporting institutions. Such institutions include
a lender of last resort, a deposit insurance system, a liquidity manage-
ment system, secondary markets, a legal infrastructure favorable to
Islamic instruments, and an efficient system for resolving disputes.
 The need to achieve uniformity in and harmonization of Shariah stan-
dards across markets and borders. The current practice of maintaining
separate Shariah boards for each institution is inefficient and should
be replaced by a centralized Shariah board for a jurisdiction.
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 The cost of developing risk management systems. Many Islamic financial
institutions are too small to afford the costs. Efforts should be made to
collaborate with other institutions to develop systems that are customized
to the needs of Islamic financial institutions and that address the need
for instrument-specific modeling.
 The challenges of integrating Islamic financial institutions with global
financial markets. Efforts should be made to enhance transparency in
financial reporting and develop accounting and reporting standards
across markets.
 The scarcity of highly skilled human resources. Efforts should be made
to develop customized research and training programs on risk man-
agement. Such training programs should certify participants after
successful completion of the program.
Non-Bank Financial Services 
For further growth, the role of intermediation should be extended
beyond its traditional setup. In particular, there is a need to broaden the
scope and range of financial services offered, similar to the concept of a
“financial products supermarket.” Such a supermarket would act like an
“all-in-one-bank” covering all sorts of financial services. In this role, the
Islamic bank would serve as a one-stop shop catering to different types of
customers, ranging from private individuals, institutions, high-net-worth
individuals, and corporations and offering products that serve their
investment, borrowing, risk management, and wealth management
needs. For example, such an institution would serve retail customers,
manage investment portfolios, and provide various services for corporate
customers. At the same time, like a broker, the financial products super-
market would be a retail firm that manages assets and offers payment and
settlement services.
As financial systems become more sophisticated, institutional
investors have grown significantly in size and importance. For instance,
contractual savings with defined benefits, like insurance and pension
funds, are managing a large volume of assets. In a financial system where
securities markets are underdeveloped, which is the case of Islamic finan-
cial markets, financial intermediaries will have to provide a broader set of
services, including non-bank financial services. Most Islamic banks are
not adequately equipped to provide typical investment banking services,
such as underwriting, guarantees, market research, and fee-based advi-
sory services. The refinement and development of fee-based services
would enhance the functionality of Islamic financial services. Fee-based
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contracts like joalah, wakalah, and kifalah require further development if
they are to be recognized and operationalized to exploit the full capabili-
ties of Islamic banks.
Performance Benchmarks
The practice of measuring performance of an asset by comparing its
return and risk relative to a well-defined benchmark is well established in
a market-centered financial system. Markets are good at offering an effi-
cient, measurable, and consistent benchmark for different asset classes
and securities. The absence of benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate
the performance of Islamic financial institutions. The dearth of trans-
parent benchmarks that can be used to compare risk-adjusted returns
complicates the task of evaluating the efficiency of financial institutions.
Such benchmarks are valuable tools for measuring the relative perform-
ance of different asset classes and, ultimately, the performance of the
financial intermediary. The current practice of using interest-based
benchmarks such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) has
been accepted on an ad hoc basis in the absence of better benchmarks,
but several researchers have raised the need to develop benchmarks based
on the rate of return, reflecting Islamic modes of financing.
Payment System 
The absence of risk-free or high-grade investment securities and the
dominance of trade-financed asset-backed securities are of concern to
regulators, as they threaten the payment system and increase its vulnera-
bility to risk and illiquidity. In this context, it has been suggested that the
concept of narrow banking be applied to Islamic banks. Fischer  originally
presented the concept of narrow banking, which is banking that specializes
in deposit-taking and payment activities but does not provide lending
services. Stability and safety are achieved if deposits are invested only in
short-term treasuries or their close equivalents. In the context of the
Islamic financial system, Islamic banks do not have access to relatively
risk-free securities like treasuries. One alternative, suggested by El-Hawary,
Grais, and Iqbal (2004), is to segment the balance sheet of Islamic banks
so that demand and short-term deposits are invested only in high-grade,
liquid asset-backed securities, reducing the risk to the payment system.
This concept needs to be refined further by developing a secondary market
to enhance the liquidity and standardizing contracts to reduce the riskiness
of asset-backed securities.
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Institutionalization of Instruments 
If the Islamic financial services industry is to grow, various institutions
are desperately needed. Institutions to support equity-style financing and
investment are the most critical. Due to the nature of trade- and asset-
related financing instruments, Islamic banks tend to act as more than
mere financiers. Institutions are needed to support such instruments. For
example, specialized institutions are needed to administer, maintain, and
facilitate lease-related operations and to work closely with the banks to
provide funding. Standardizing the operations and instruments will pave
the way for pooling heterogeneous assets for securitization purposes—a
much-needed functionality for enhancing liquidity in the market.
Universal Banking 
The nature of financial intermediation and the style of financial products
and services offered make Islamic banks a hybrid between commercial
and investment banking, similar to a universal bank. Universal banking
benefits from economies of scope due to its close relationship, established
client base, and access to private information gained through the relation-
ship. Combining different product lines (such as banking and insurance
products) or commercial and investment banking lines may increase the
relationship value of banking at a much lower average cost of marketing.
Islamic financial institutions could realize the benefits of universal bank-
ing by strengthening this aspect.
For example, by expanding the scope of services, Islamic banks could
spread the fixed cost, in terms of both physical and human capital, of
managing a client relationship over a wider set of products, leading to
more efficient use of resources. Through expansion, Islamic banks could
use their branch networks and other channels to distribute additional
products at low marginal cost. As universal banks, Islamic banks would
be able to capitalize on their good reputation established in one product
or service to market other products and services with relatively little
effort. Finally, expanding the scope of Islamic banks would benefit con-
sumers, who would save on searching and monitoring costs by purchasing
a bundle of financial services from a single provider instead of acquiring
them separately from different providers.
Despite its advantages, universal banking has inefficiencies as well,
and these should be avoided. For example, universal banks can stymie
innovation by extracting informational rents and protecting established
firms with close ties to the bank from competition.
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Regulation, Governance, and Transparency
Corporate governance in Islamic finance entails implementation of a rule-
based incentive system that preserves social justice and order among all
members of society (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2001). Islamic banks emphasize
service to multiple stakeholders. Governance processes and structures
inside and outside the firm are needed to protect the ethical and pecuniary
interests of shareholders and stakeholders.
Having a Shariah board for every institution is not efficient; only one
set of Shariah-compliant rules is needed for appropriate corporate gov-
ernance. A Shariah board for the system as a whole, consisting of schol-
ars from different disciplines including Shariah, economics, finance, and
commercial law, is needed to ensure that rules are defined and enforced
so that economic agents comply fully with their contractual obligations
to all stakeholders (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2003). Complementing existing
arrangements, a harmonized systemwide Shariah board could be guided
by standardized contracts and practices, set by an international standard-
setting self-regulatory association. Such an approach would ensure consis-
tency of interpretation and enhance the enforceability of contracts before
civil courts.
To enhance Shariah compliance further, relying on a body external
to the institution is likely to improve the consistency of interpretation and
application of Shariah. Chapra and Habib (2002) propose having char-
tered audit firms acquire the necessary knowledge to undertake a Shariah
audit. The idea of a market for Shariah audit firms presents some advan-
tages if externalization is reconceptualized as a complement—rather than
an alternative—to the internal Shariah audit. External Shariah companies
would perform a role that reflects their chartered counterparts in con-
ventional finance, thus introducing an additional layer in the Shariah
verification process. This option would entail a clear separation of ex ante
and ex post audit. However, it is unclear whether switching to a market
for Shariah auditing firms would guarantee Shariah compliance.
Implementation of financial disclosure is another priority. Ideally,
jurisdictions where Islamic banks are present should implement account-
ing and reporting practices in line with standards of the Accounting and
Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). This
could be accomplished by adopting the official AAOIFI standards, creat-
ing AAOIFI-inspired national standards, or integrating select AAOIFI
standards with existing accounting and auditing standards. AAOIFI stan-
dards present multiple advantages. First, the process of conducting peri-
odic reviews ensures that only the best accounting and auditing practices
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are used. Second, they allow comparability across Islamic banks in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, although they may limit comparability between
Islamic and conventional banks. Third, stakeholders involved in Islamic
finance will find it easier to gain familiarity with a single accounting
framework instead of multiple national ones. In spite of increased com-
parability across sectors, the simple extension of International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) or national conventional standards is not
likely to bring the same clarity, because it may not allow the disclosure of
relevant information.
Poor corporate governance imposes heavy costs,but the mere extension
of international standards to Islamic banks may not be sufficient. The
principles and practices of Islamic financial services require a thorough
review from the corporate governance perspective. Sound corporate gov-
ernance requires the formulation of principles and enforcement (for
more, see Berglöf and Claessens 2004). Many countries where Islamic
finance is developing have weak contracting environments: regulators
often lack the power to enforce rules, private actors are nonexistent, and
courts are “underfinanced, unmotivated, unclear as to how the law applies,
unfamiliar with economic issues, or even corrupt” (Fremond and Capaul
2002). Furthermore, a “law habit” culture—that is, a propensity to abide
by the law—must be rooted in society. While the ability to enforce regu-
lations is inextricably coupled with the overall process of development,
legislation enabling transparency, private monitoring initiatives, and
investments in the rule of law by willing authorities can pave the way to
the emergence of regulatory frameworks.
Development of Capital Markets 
Responding to the current wave of oil revenues and growing demand for
Shariah-compliant products, Islamic capital markets are expanding at a
quickening pace, and stakeholders are starting to realize their potential.
Development of institutional infrastructure, such as accounting stan-
dards and regulatory bodies, is a step in the right direction.4 However, the
market needs host governments to undertake strong leadership and con-
structive policy actions.
Well-developed Islamic capital markets will not only benefit bor-
rowers and institutional investors, they also can enhance the stability of
Islamic banks, providing them with improved portfolio, liquidity, and
risk management tools. Ultimately, these developments will help to inte-
grate Islamic financial markets, as well as the institutions that form them,
into the broader conventional international financial system.
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On the supply side, the volume of Islamic investments, with a pref-
erence for Shariah-compliant instruments, has grown to form a critical
mass that can support a well-functioning and efficient capital market. It
is evolving into a truly international market. Not only highly rated bor-
rowers, such as the multilateral development banks (for example, the
World Bank), but also developing-country borrowers with lower credit
ratings, such as Pakistan, have successfully raised a considerable volume
of funds in this market.
On the demand side, countries in the developing world, especially the
middle-income countries, will require a significant volume of invest-
ments in infrastructure over the next decade. For Indonesia alone, addi-
tional infrastructure investments of $5 billion (2 percent of GDP) are
required annually, to reach a 6 percent medium-term growth target
(World Bank 2004). Because the domestic capital markets of these bor-
rowers are often too shallow to satisfy their large investment needs, they
will have to access external sources of financing.
Furthermore, Muslim stakeholders in middle-income countries are
increasingly expressing their preference for Shariah-compliant financing.
In turn, financial intermediaries, including private sector commercial and
investment banks, as well as development finance institutions, will have
to start paying more attention to the “nonfinancial”needs of their clients.
For the multilateral development banks, the development of Islamic
capital markets is a highly relevant topic. First, multilateral development
banks are deeply involved in infrastructure finance and are naturally
interested in the Islamic capital market as a new and alternative source of
financing. Second, by channeling the funds available in Islamic financial
markets, which are mostly based in the countries with high savings such
as the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Malaysia, to finance
investments in developing countries, multilateral development banks can
create a new model for international cooperation while responding to the
stakeholders’ voices on both sides. Third, multilateral development banks
can promote financial stability by encouraging the development of Islamic
capital markets and providing the momentum to integrate the Islamic
financial markets into the international financial system.
In the near future, structures such as ijarah (a lease) and murabahah
(a cost-plus sales contract used to purchase commodities) that provide
investors with a predetermined return as well as full recourse to the
obligor probably will have more market potential than other structures.
This will be driven primarily by investor preferences, but a large propor-
tion of potential borrowers will prefer to lock in their borrowing costs
rather than engage in pure profit-sharing schemes.
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While the future appears promising, certain obstacles lie ahead, and
market participants and regulators need to take concrete steps to support
market takeoff. First and most important, market development requires
strong sponsorship and leadership on the part of the host-country govern-
ment, especially regarding legal and regulatory issues. For example, for an
ijarah transaction, the owner of operating assets enters into a leasing trans-
action. While the owner of operating assets is often the government itself
or related public sector bodies, the relevant laws and regulations in the host
country may not allow these bodies to pledge or lease assets needed to
structure an ijarah transaction. This is a fundamental point; the host coun-
try’s policy actions are a key prerequisite for further market development.
In addition, borrowers, investors, and intermediaries need to nurture
the market patiently. Islamic transactions are often less cost-efficient than
conventional bond issues. Each new issue incurs higher legal and docu-
mentary expenses as well as distribution costs because it involves exam-
ining structural robustness in addition to evaluating the credit quality of
the obligor. Since the terms available in Islamic capital markets are
derived mostly from pricing levels in the more liquid conventional bond
markets, there is no inherent cost advantage for borrowers tapping
Islamic markets. Borrowers, therefore, need to formulate a comprehen-
sive, long-term, and strategic view on how to reduce the overall cost of
tapping Islamic markets, rather than focus on a single transaction.
Investors can support market development by expressing their preference
for Shariah-compliant instruments, namely, in their bid prices. Interme-
diaries can lead the process, perhaps through further standardization of
transaction schemes and instruments.5
Globalization 
Globalization is a multifaceted process that is connecting the nations and
peoples of the world. Its main dimensions are cultural, sociopolitical, and
economic. Its economic dimensions include growing trade flows, unhin-
dered movements of finance, investment, and production, and standardi-
zation of processes, regulations, and institutions, all facilitated by the free
flow of information and ideas. Globalization is the result of lower costs
of information and transportation and liberalization of trade, finance,
investment, capital flows, and factor movements.
As globalization gathers momentum and as more economies liber-
alize and integrate into the global economy, the new finance will grow and
so will risk sharing and asset-based securitization: both are the core of
Islamic finance. So far, globalization is considered unfair because the risks
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and rewards of the process are not shared equitably. But as equity-based
and asset-backed financing grows, the fruits of globalization could be
distributed more widely and more equitably among participants, at least
in terms of the financial linkages. Issues such as protectionism in indus-
trial countries, segmented labor markets, impediments to the transfer of
technology, and the like remain and will require full international coop-
eration if they are to be addressed and mitigated.
As globalization proceeds, its main engines—the new finance and
advances in information technology—will shift the methods and instru-
ments of financing trade, investment, and production in favor of spreading
and sharing risk rather than shifting risk via fixed-price debt contracts. This
will be the result of financial innovations that are dissecting, analyzing, and
pricing risk better, so that—combined with efficient availability of infor-
mation and the adoption of best international standards of transparency,
accountability, and good governance in public and private sectors—the
raison d’être of fixed-price debt contracts will erode. This will pave the
way for risk-sharing financial contracts, such as those promoted by
Islamic finance. As risk-sharing financial instruments gain wider accept-
ance and earn the confidence of investors, a financial system founded on
the risk-sharing principles promoted by Islamic finance will become
more and more feasible.
Mircoﬁnance 
Microfinance institutions have experienced impressive growth in the last
two decades, and the award of the Nobel Prize to Dr. Mohammed Yunis
of Bangladesh in October 2006 for his pioneering work with Grameen
Bank has enhanced the prominence of this sector. The conventional
microfinance industry has been growing at 13 percent a year since 1999,
and today there are more than 320 sustainable institutions operating
under this banner. Microfinance mainly targets the poor or the “non-
banked” segment of the society. Whereas microfinance institutions have
been successful in conventional markets, there are only a few cases of such
institutions operating on Islamic finance principles. In an Islamic system,
instruments like qard hassan can play a vital role in serving the poor, and
the role each instrument can play needs to be reviewed.
This phenomenal success in conventional finance has forced even
private investors to regard microfinance as a potential and viable asset class.
Unlike conventional microfinance institutions, only very limited infor-
mation is available on microfinance institutions operating under Islamic
finance. A relatively small number of interest-free loans are operating in
Pakistan, and there are some small-scale, micro-rural banks in Indonesia.6
However, no organized institutions are known to be operating on the
basis of qard hassan except in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where it has
been used effectively to provide finance for the needy and where these
institutions are widespread throughout the country (for further details,
see Sadr 2007).
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007b) argue that an Islamic form of microfinance
based on qard hassan has its own benefits, which are worth investigating:
 It is flexible with respect to collateral. No physical collateral is normally
required, but a co-signature for the loan by capital contributors is,
more often than not, a substitute for physical collateral.
 Documentary procedures are usually very simple.
 Loans are usually small in size, approval procedures are rapid, and dis-
bursement is quick.
 No interest charges are involved, although some funds charge as much
as 1 percent to cover administrative costs.
 The fund has easy access to capital contributors, borrowers, and co-
signers because of its local base.
 The fund managers, who are drawn from the capital contributors, are
fully accountable.
Microfinance and qard hassan microfinance have both similarities and
differences. Both target the same groups and have devised effective ways of
avoiding informational problems by relying on peer monitoring, in the case
of traditional microfinance, and familiarity with the borrower and his or
her reputation in the case of qard hassan microfinance. Moreover, neither
requires collateral as a prerequisite for a loan. There are two crucial differ-
ences, however. The first is that traditional microfinance charges interest,
an abomination from an Islamic perspective. The second is that quard
hassan has no collective punishment for the group if one of its members
defaults on a loan: a capital contributor has to introduce the borrower and,
at times, co-sign for the loan, but if there is a default, the co-signer does not
have to withdraw from the fund (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007b).
Islamic finance that claims to promote social justice and advocates
equal opportunity for less fortunate segments of society needs to develop
a microfinance industry. A well-developed microfinance industry will
promote economic development in underdeveloped Islamic countries. As
poor segments of society are economically empowered, they will move
from being “non-bankable” to being “bankable,” expanding the base of
depositors and investors.
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NOTES
1. For further discussion of issues see Iqbal and Mirakhor (1999); Iqbal (2005);
and Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007).
2. Informal discussions with practitioners revealed that religious boards
sometimes are extremely rigid on minor technical matters and make the
process of introducing a new product difficult and lengthy, resulting in
missed business opportunities.
3. Hughes and others (1999) examine the tradeoffs among expected profit, vari-
ability and efficiency of profit, and insolvency risk for large U.S. banking
organizations in the early 1990s. They find that when organizations are larger
in a way that produces geographic diversification, especially via interstate
banking that diversifies macroeconomic risk, efficiency tends to be higher
and insolvency risk tends to be lower.
4. These institutions include the IFSB, AAOIFI, Liquidity Management Center,
International Islamic Financial Markets, and International Islamic Rating
Agency.
5. For example, in the Malaysian market, market participants have developed a
few well-standardized structures, such as bai’ bithaman ajil. The costs of
structuring and distributing these standardized Islamic deals in Malaysia are
now reduced to a competitive level, making them a viable alternative to con-
ventional debt instruments.
6. See www.akhuwat.org.pk.
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A P P E N D I X  A : G LO S S A RY
Amanah. Safe keeping.
Bai’ bithaman ajil. Sale contract where payment is made in installments
after delivery of goods. Sale could be for long-term and there is no obli-
gation to disclose profit margins.
Bay’ al-dayn. Sale of debt.
Bay’ al-muajjil. Sale with deferred payment.
Bay’ al-salaam. Purchase with deferred delivery.
Fatwa. A legal opinion issued by a qualified Muslim scholar on matters of
religious beliefs and practice.
Fiqh. An Islamic scholar.
Fiqh al-muamalat. Islamic commercial jurisprudence.
Gharar. Any uncertainty created by the lack of information or control
in a contract; ignorance in regard to an essential element in a trans-
action.
Halal. Goodness; permissible.
Hiba. Gifts.
Ijarah. A leasing contract, technically a contract of sale.
Istisnah. A manufacturing contract that facilitates the manufacture or
construction of an asset at the request of the buyer.
Joalah. Agreement with an expert in a given field to undertake a task for
a pre-determined fee or commission(as in a consultancy agreement
or contract).
Kifalah. Stewardship Guarantee or Surety.
Maysur. Games of chance involving deception. Same as Myisur.
Mudarabah. A contract in which the owner of capital forms a partnership
with an entrepreneur or manager who has certain entrepreneurial
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skills and both agree to share the profits and losses of the venture
undertaken. There are two types of funds: multipurpose—having
more than one investment purpose or objective (multipurpose)—and
specific purpose.
Mudarabat. Plural of Mudarabah
Mudarib. A fund manager or agent.
Murabahah. A cost-plus sales contract, which is used to purchase com-
modities.
Murabahat. Plural of Murabahah Short-term commodity finance based
on Murabahah contracts.
Musharakah. A profit- and loss-sharing contract. An equity partnership.
Musharakat. Plural of Musharakah.
Musharik. The partner in a musharakah contract.
Myisur. Same as Saysur (duplicate)
Qard hassan. Goodwill loan, in which the bank receives a loan from
depositors and owes the principal amount only.
Qard-ul-Hasan.
Qimar. Gambling.
Qur’an. The basic source of law for Muslims, which includes all of the
constitutive rules of law.
Rab al-mal. Supplier of funds, the principal.
Riba. Interest. Literally, it means excess, addition, and surplus, while the
associated verb implies “to increase, to multiply, to exceed, to exact
more than was due, or to practice usury.”
Sadaqah. Voluntary charitable contribution.
Salaam. Agriculture-based sales contract.
Sarraf. Financier in the early days of Islam.
Shariah. The constitutive and regulative rules based on the Qur’an.
Shiraka. Partnership.
Sukuk. Islamic asset-backed certificates.
Sunnah. Explanations rendered by the Prophet Muhammad.
Takaful. Shariah-compliant mutual insurance; literally, a mutual or joint
guarantee.
Ummah. Muslim Community.
Waqf. Charitable Trust or endowment.
Wadiah. Safe deposits and guaranteed banking, with the principal
amount payable on demand.
Wakalah. Representation. Entrusting a person or legal entity (Wakil) to
act on one's behalf or as one's representative.
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Wakalah Accounts. Unrestricted investment account in which the bank
earns a flat fee rather than a share of profits.
Wakalat. Plural of Wakalah.
Zakah. An obligatory charitable contribution. One of the five basic pillars
of Islam.
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A P P E N D I X  B : I F S B  S TA N DA R D
O N  R I S K  M A N AG E M E N T
The following premises relate to the sound processes of credit risk
management in Islamic financial services.
Islamic financial institutions can embrace the role of financiers, suppli-
ers, mudarib, and musharakah partners. They concern themselves with the
risk of a counterparty’s failure to meet their obligations by receiving deferred
payment and making or taking delivery of an asset. A failure could relate to
a delay or default in payment or in delivery of the subject matter of salaam
or parallel istisnah, entailing a potential loss of income and even capital.
Due to the unique characteristics of each type of financing instrument,
such as the nonbinding nature of some contracts, the commencement stage
involving credit risk varies. Therefore, credit risk shall be assessed separately
for each financing instrument to facilitate appropriate internal controls and
risk management systems.
Islamic banks shall consider other types of risks that give rise to credit
risk. For example, during the life of a contract, the risk inherent in a
murabahah contract is transformed from market risk to credit risk. In
another example, the invested capital in a mudarabah or musharakah con-
tract is transformed into debt in case of proven negligence or misconduct
of the mudarib or the musharakah’s managing partner.
In case of default, Islamic banks are prohibited from imposing any
penalty except in the case of deliberate procrastination. In the latter case,
they are prohibited from using the amount of the penalty for their own
benefit; they must donate the amount levied to charity.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Islamic banks shall have in place a framework for managing credit risk
that includes identification, measurement, monitoring, reporting, and
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control of credit risks. Adequate capital should be held against the credit
risks assumed. Islamic banks shall also comply with relevant rules, regu-
lations, and prudential conditions applicable to their financing activities.
Islamic banks shall assess credit risk in a holistic manner and ensure
that its management forms part of an integrated approach to the man-
agement of all financial risks. Given the nature of Islamic financing
instruments, the source of credit risk may be the same as that of market
or operational risks. For example, in a salaam contract, changes in market
risk factors (for example, commodity prices) as well as in the external
environment (for example, bad weather) affect the likelihood of default.
Islamic banks shall have in place the following:
 An appropriate credit strategy, including pricing and tolerance for
undertaking various credit risks;
 A risk management structure with effective oversight of credit risk
management;
 Credit policies and operational procedures including credit criteria
and credit review processes, acceptable forms of risk mitigation, and
limit setting;
 An appropriate measurement and careful analysis of exposures,
including market- and liquidity-sensitive exposures;
 A system (a) to monitor the condition of ongoing individual credits to
ensure the financings are made in accordance with the Islamic bank’s
policies and procedures; (b) to manage problem credit situations
according to an established remedial process; and (c) to determine
adequate provisions to be made for such losses.
PRINCIPLE 2.1
Islamic banks shall have in place a strategy for financing, using the vari-
ous Islamic instruments in compliance with Shariah, whereby they rec-
ognize the potential credit exposures that may arise at different stages of
the various financing agreements.
The board of directors shall define and set the institution’s overall level
of risk appetite, risk diversification, and asset allocation strategies applica-
ble to each Islamic financing instrument, economic activity, geographic
spread, season, currency, and tenor. Islamic banks shall be mindful of and
take into account the permissible types of financing instruments available
in different locations wherever they undertake cross-border transactions.
They will take into account seasonal aspects resulting from a shift in or
termination of the use of certain financing instruments, thus affecting the
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overall concentration exposures of their financing portfolio. For example,
the Islamic bank may offer salaam contracts during a certain season where
a product can most likely be delivered and sold at maturity.
Islamic financing strategies shall include a list of all types of applicable
and approved transactions and financings. The approved list must include
formal exclusions from any engagement by the Islamic bank in prohibited
industries, such as pork meat, alcohol, gambling, and tobacco. The
approved list will be kept up to date and communicated to the relevant per-
sonnel within the institution, and an internal compliance function will be
organized and empowered to ensure that such rules are applied.
Islamic banks shall be aware of the commencement of exposure to
credit risk inherent in different financing instruments and in various
jurisdictions when developing the strategy. The nonbinding promise and
legal enforcement vary among Islamic banks or from one jurisdiction to
another, which may give rise to operational risks and other risk manage-
ment problems relating to Shariah compliance.
When setting the level of risk appetite relating to counterparties,
Islamic banks shall ensure that (a) the expected rate of return on a trans-
action is commensurate with the risks incurred and that (b) excessive
credit risks (at both the individual and portfolio levels) are avoided.
PRINCIPLE 2.2
Islamic banks shall carry out a due diligence review in respect of counter-
parties prior to choosing an appropriate Islamic financing instrument.
Islamic banks shall establish policies and procedures defining eligi-
ble counterparties (retail or consumer; corporate or sovereign), the
nature of approved financings and types of appropriate financing
instruments. Islamic banks shall obtain sufficient information to permit
a comprehensive assessment of the risk profile of the counterparty prior
to granting the financing.
Islamic banks shall have a policy for carrying out due diligence 
in evaluating counterparties, in particular, for transactions involving
the following:
 New ventures with multiple financing modes. The bank shall carry out
due diligence on customers or sovereigns using multiple financing
modes to meet specific financial objectives designed to address the
Shariah, legal, or tax issues of customers.
 Creditworthiness that may be influenced by external factors. Where
significant investment risks are present in participatory instruments,
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especially in the case of mudarabah financings, additional counter-
party reviews and evaluations will focus on the business purpose,
operational capability, enforcement, and economic substance of the
proposed project, including the assessment of realistic forecasts of esti-
mated future cash flows.1 Risk-mitigating structures should be put in
place as far as possible.
Islamic banks in their policy for approval shall engage appropriate
experts, including a Shariah adviser or Shariah board, to review and
ensure that new, ad hoc financing proposals or amendments to existing
contracts are Shariah compliant at all times. They may also engage an
appropriate technical expert (for example, an engineer) to evaluate the
feasibility of a proposed project and to assess and approve progress
billings to be made under the contract.
In a financing involving several related agreements, the Islamic bank
will need to be aware of the binding obligations arising in connection
with credit risks associated with the underlying assets for each agreement.
The Islamic bank shall ensure that all components of the financial struc-
ture are contractually independent (although these may be executed in a
parallel manner) in spite of their interrelated nature, in order to avoid
noncompliance with Shariah.
PRINCIPLE 2.3
Islamic banks will have in place appropriate methodologies for measur-
ing and reporting the credit risk exposures arising under each Islamic
financing instrument.
The Islamic bank will develop and implement appropriate risk meas-
urement and reporting methodologies relevant to each Islamic financing
instrument in respect of managing its counterparty risks, which may arise
at different stages of the contract. Depending on the instrument used, the
Islamic bank may employ an appropriate methodology that takes into
account the price volatility of the underlying assets. The methodology
selected shall be appropriate to the nature, size, and complexity of the insti-
tution’s credit-related activities.The Islamic bank shall ensure that adequate
systems and resources are available to implement this methodology.
PRINCIPLE 2.4
Islamic banks shall have in place Shariah-compliant credit risk–mitigat-
ing techniques appropriate for each type of Islamic financing instrument.
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The Islamic bank shall clearly define its credit risk–mitigating tech-
niques including, but not limited to, having in place markup rates set
according to the risk rating of the counterparties, where expected risks
should have been taken into account in the pricing decisions; permissible
and enforceable collateral and guarantees; clear documentation as to
whether or not purchase orders are cancelable;2 and clear governing laws
for contracts relating to financing transactions.
The Islamic bank shall establish limits on the degree of reliance and
the enforceability of collateral and guarantees. It shall protect itself
against legal impediments that may restrict the accessibility of collat-
eral needed to enforce its rights in respect of a debt. The Islamic bank
shall formally agree with the counterparty at the time of signing the
contract on the redemption and use of collateral if the counterparty
defaults in payment.
The Islamic bank shall define the action to be taken by it when a cus-
tomer cancels a nonbinding purchase order. The policies will describe
how the bank will (a) monitor and control its exposure to suppliers, espe-
cially during delivery when a customer is acting as an agent; and (b) iden-
tify whether the risks associated with the assets will be borne by the
supplier or the customer (which acts as agent and accepts the assets from
the supplier). For example, the Islamic bank may enter into a purchase
contract with a supplier on a “sale or return” basis, with an option to
return the purchased item within a specified period.
The Islamic bank shall have appropriate credit management systems
and administrative procedures in place to undertake early remedial
action in the case of financial distress of a counterparty or, in particular,
for managing potential and defaulting counterparties.3 This system will
be reviewed on a regular basis. Remedial actions will include both admin-
istrative and financial measures.
Administrative measures may, inter alia, include (a) negotiating and
following up proactively with the counterparty through frequent contact;
(b) setting an allowable time frame for payment or offering debt-resched-
uling or restructuring arrangements (without an increase in the amount
of the debt); (c) resorting to legal action, including attaching any credit
balance belonging to defaulters according to the agreement between
them; and (d) making a claim under Islamic insurance.
Financial measures include, among others, (a) imposing penalties to
be donated to charity in accordance with the Shariah rule, where
approved by the Islamic bank’s Shariah board or committee and (b)
establishing the enforceability of collateral or third-party guarantees.
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The Islamic bank shall set appropriate measures for early settlements,
which are permissible under their Shariah rules and principles for each
Islamic financing instrument. Some customers may expect a discount,
which the Islamic bank can give of its own volition as a commercial deci-
sion made on a case-by-case basis. Alternatively, irrespective of industry
practice, the Islamic bank can grant a rebate, at its discretion (not to be
mentioned in the contract) to customers by reducing the amount of the
debt in subsequent transactions.
The Islamic bank shall assess and establish appropriate policies and
procedures pertaining to the risks associated with its own exposures in
parallel transactions. For instance, the Islamic bank enters into an istisnah
contract as a seller to provide manufactured goods or a building to a
customer. The Islamic bank then enters into another (parallel) istisnah
contract as a buyer with a supplier (manufacturer or builder), using the
specifications drawn up for the original contract. If the supplier fails to
deliver the manufactured goods or the building according to the agreed
specifications, the Islamic bank will be in default of its obligation. If
necessary, as in the case of some Islamic banks, a separate engineering
department will be established, or an outside expert will be engaged to
evaluate, approve, and monitor the technical aspects. The Islamic bank
may also stipulate that the party to the first contract must inspect the
manufactured goods or building from time to time during the production
or construction process to verify that the specifications are being met.
The Islamic bank shall establish appropriate policies and procedures
that require it to honor its commitment to the parallel contract counter-
party. In certain countries, where a parallel contract must be transacted
with the first salaam contract in order to mitigate the exposure to market
risk, there must be no legal linkages between the two contracts.
The Islamic bank shall have in place a system to ascertain and fulfill
its obligations in respect of leased assets that are permanently impaired
through no default of the lessee. In case of such impairment, the Islamic
bank either has to provide the lessee with a replacement asset with a sim-
ilar specificity or has to refund the additional amounts (capital payments)
included in the IMB lease rentals as compared with those in an operating
ijarah. In ijarah and IMB , the Islamic banks (as lessors) retain ownership
of the leased asset throughout the contract and are liable for the conse-
quences of any damage to the asset that is not caused by the lessee’s mis-
conduct or negligence. The Islamic banks shall establish appropriate risk
management policies to mitigate losses arising from such damage during
the term of the lease.
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The Islamic bank shall ensure that there is sufficient Islamic insurance
coverage of the value of the assets, subject to availability. If necessary, the
Islamic bank shall engage an insurance adviser at an early stage to review
the insurance coverage of the leased assets.
If a loss arises from negligence by the lessee, the Islamic bank is
permitted to claim compensation from the lessee. The Islamic bank (as
lessor) bears the risks associated with the leased assets and cannot use
lessees’ guarantees to recover the amount of the losses on the leased
assets (unless these are due to misconduct, negligence, or breach of
contract on the part of the lessees).
The Islamic bank shall have in place an appropriate policy for deter-
mining and allocating provisions to be made for estimated impairment
in the value of each asset.
NOTES
1. IFIs will be mindful that the counterparty risk will not commence prior to
execution of other contracts or before certain events take place. In the case of
certain murabahah transactions, the long period preceding the delivery of
imported goods from abroad gives rise to other risks that may not all be cov-
ered by takaful or insurance.
2. In some jurisdictions, a purchase order backed by a promise to purchase
would constitute a binding contract according to contract law and would be
legally enforceable if adequately evidenced.
3. The Shariah differentiates between two kinds of defaulter: (a) the affluent or
able (willful defaulter or procrastinator) and (b) the insolvent defaulter who
is unable to pay his debts due to reasons permitted by Shariah.
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